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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Beliefs and desires 
This thesis is about intentional attitudes. These are mental states which are 
supposed to represent possible and actual states of affairs. In philosophy of 
mind, intentional attitudes (or propositional attitudes)1 are usually divided into 
two types: cognitive and conative attitudes. Beliefs have been taken to be the 
paradigmatic cognitive attitudes and desires the paradigmatic conative ones. 
Both beliefs and desires involve two components – an attitude part and a 
content part – and have satisfaction conditions. Beliefs are satisfied when they 
are true and desires are satisfied when they are fulfilled (Fodor 1985: 78). The 
difference between these two attitudes may also be expressed in terms of 
“direction of fit”: while beliefs are supposed to conform to the world, desires 
aim at fitting the world to themselves (Platts 1979: 257). Spelled out in such 
general terms, this proposal remains rather vague. Another possibility would be 
to articulate the difference by arguing that only desires can directly motivate 
behaviour while beliefs only rationalize it (Smith 1987). This claim is rather 
controversial (Price 1989). A third option is to distinguish between these 
attitudes in terms of a relation they bear to their content, p. In the case of 
beliefs, the relation to content is holding-p-to-be-true. Desires, on the other 
hand, have the relation wanting-p-to-be-true to their content. Of course, this 
characterization is rather uninformative because the description of these 
relations already makes reference to beliefs and desires. After all, believing that 
p is the same as holding p to be true and desiring that p is the same as wanting p 
to be true. On a pretheoretical level it should still be clear that these terms 
capture certain distinctive areas of our linguistic practice. Because of that, 
speaking about others in terms of their beliefs and desires can be distinguished 
from other kinds of discourse. For instance, it can be distinguished from 
speaking about others’ social roles or about their digestive systems. 
The most common questions that arise in philosophy of mind about inten-
tional attitudes can be expressed as follows: what are beliefs and desires and 
what are the conditions for having these attitudes? The widespread assumption, 
which I also share, is that our conception of mental states should comport with 
our best psychological theories about the human mind. I am not going to 
analyse different theories of mind here but some distinctions can be made. For 
instance, some authors try to start from psychology and biology and then ask 
whether the best theories in those areas require postulating something similar to 
propositional attitudes (Sterelny 2003; Bermúdez 2003a). A more traditional 
approach begins with our folk conception of those states and then asks how 
beliefs and desires should be conceptualized and how they could be related to 
                                                 
1 The idea that all intentional attitudes are exhausted by propositional attitudes is by no 
means uncontroversial (cf. Montague 2007). In the present thesis, I will nonetheless assume 
that beliefs and desires can be analysed in terms of relations to propositions. 
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scientifically respectable entities. The relevant relation can be identity or 
multiple realisability or something else (cf. Kim 2005). In any case, there is 
quite a lot of room for different theories when it comes to the relation between 
scientific and folk views. However, the folk conception of beliefs and desires 
plays an important part in all the approaches. Minimally, it can be taken to be 
the motivator for asking about the nature of mental states in the first place. Even 
if the question is simply how the mind works, philosophical approaches still ask 
whether our folk conception captures something similar to what scientific 
theories claim. Also, the folk conception usually offers an initial vocabulary in 
terms of which to even start asking what the mind is. After all, the notions of 
belief and desire originate from everyday talk. 
 
 
1.2 The question 
The fact that the folk conception is always the basis of our investigations of the 
mind, at least in some sense, motivates the central question of this thesis. The 
question is: what do we do with the concepts of belief and desire and what are 
the main benefits of their application? I am interested in what is distinctive 
about folk psychology2 when we compare it to other parts of our conceptual 
machinery. The answer to this question also lets us see what it is about belief 
and desire attributions that makes these benefits possible. 
How concepts of different mental states are acquired and which cognitive 
mechanisms enable their application is a widely researched topic in develop-
mental psychology and philosophy of mind (Wellman 1990; Stich and Nichols 
1993; Baron-Cohen 1995; Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997; Gordon 1986; Goldman 
1989; Heal 2003: Stich and Nichols 2003; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; 
Goldman 2006; Apperly 2011). As for what we do when we attribute beliefs 
and desires, the frequent, albeit often not explicit, assumption in the literature 
on folk psychology is that by attributing beliefs and desires to others we explain 
and predict their behaviour.3 An alternative view which is defended by some 
authors is that instead of, or at least besides explaining and predicting, belief 
and desire attributions enable us to shape the minds and behaviours of others 
(McGeer 2007; Zawidzki 2008). I will argue that there is a third aspect to folk 
psychology which hasn’t been considered before in the philosophical and 
psychological literature. There are certain ways in which attributers of belief 
and desire are affected by their attributions, most notably, by having the chance 
to agree or disagree with the attributed belief and to endorse or disapprove of 
the attributed desire. I will defend the claim that these ways of being affected (I 
label them with the term “affectability”) are indispensable to folk psychology. 
                                                 
2 What I mean by “folk psychology” is simply the way we think and speak about others in 
terms of beliefs and desires. I am here agnostic about whether folk psychology is a theory or 
not (cf. Stich & Ravenscroft 1996: 116). 
3 I will provide references in the next chapter. 
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Methodologically, the present approach, with its aim to clarify the use of certain 
concepts, has its origin in the philosophy of Gilbert Ryle (1949; 1962). It can 
also be related to the later Wittgenstein (1984).4 Both philosophers based their 
work on observations of the ways in which concepts are applied in everyday 
practice and the concrete implications these applications have. This should 
allow us to step back from explanations that are given to folk psychological 
activities and to ask what those activities actually consist in. As is well known, 
both Ryle and Wittgenstein hoped that their endeavours would have a 
therapeutic effect on the way in which we see ourselves. To a modest extent, I 
want to achieve something similar with the present thesis. The fact that certain 
ways of being affected by mental state attributions have been overlooked in the 
study of folk psychology has resulted in a distorted picture of social cognition. 
In the present day, the clarificatory approach has been developed and defended 
with regard to folk psychological vocabulary by such authors as Julia Tanney, 
Daniel Hutto and Vincent Descombes. Descombes argues that mental states 
should be modelled on moves in rhetoric, not on physical causes as is usually 
done in philosophy of mind, because rhetoric as an art of persuasion reflects 
better what people are actually doing when they are attributing beliefs and 
desires (Descombes 2001: 90). Hutto observes that our understanding of other 
people usually depends on their concrete circumstances and relies on shared 
knowledge of how it is proper to act and respond. These observations are meant 
to give support to the idea that the conceptualisation of folk psychology as a 
detached and theoretical activity is on the wrong track (Hutto 2009: 206). 
Tanney criticises the cognitivist view of mind, according to which thinking 
consists of the manipulation of mental representations, by bringing out how this 
doesn’t correspond to how people actually attribute mental states to one 
another. The attribution of mental states, according to Tanney, serves to 
articulate more precisely the circumstances of the attributee; there is no 
commitment to mental representations (Tanney 2005: 347). These authors each 
focus on the everyday employment of mental state concepts, on the basis of 
which they draw conclusions about the distinctive role of these concepts. This 
thesis uses similar observations to argue for the indispensability of affectability 
when people attribute beliefs and desires to one another. My account also draws 
inspiration from Huw Price who has suggested that mentalistic vocabulary may 
function in a way that distinguishes it from other areas of discourse by making a 
particular difference to the linguistic behaviour of those who use it (Price 1992; 
O’Leary-Hawthorne & Price 1996).5 He himself has given an account of the 
concept of truth along these lines (Price 1988). However, he hasn’t really 
                                                 
4 The exegesis of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a tricky issue. Here I only want to point some 
similarities at a very general level. 
5 Price relates this suggestion historically to Ryle (Price 2007: 396) but also calls his 
proposal “broadly Kantian examination and classification of different domains of discourse, 
with reference to their role in human life” (Price 1992: 409). Since my thesis isn’t 
historically oriented I won’t speculate how far into history we can look to find the inklings 
of the present approach.  
12 
developed his suggestion with regard to mental state concepts much further. 
This thesis will do that. 
I don’t intend to confine myself to merely describing the central roles of folk 
psychological attribution within human social life, though. The analysis of the 
roles of belief and desire attribution can also indicate what these attributions 
must consist in for the respective concepts to fulfil these roles. This brings us to 
the second aim of my thesis. After having considered the main beneficial effects 
of the attribution of beliefs and desires, I will ask how we should understand 
these attributions in order to explain how these effects are possible. This means 
stating necessary conditions for someone to count as an attributer of beliefs and 
desires. Such conditions are meant to articulate what should be constitutive of 
folk psychology if it is to play the roles which we treat as valuable. My claim 
will be that in order to explain the indispensability of specific responses to 
attributed attitudes (agreement or disagreement in the case of beliefs and 
endorsement or disapproval in the case of desires), belief and desire attributions 
should involve reference to speech acts.  
This way of inquiring into the conditions of mental state attribution is 
methodologically indebted to Justin Fisher’s project of pragmatic conceptual 
analysis which also starts from considering the main beneficial effects that the 
use of a concept has. It then asks how application of the concept makes these 
effects possible. It should then be possible to define such conditions of concept-
application which would deliver those beneficial effects in the most optimal 
way (Fisher 2006: 19). Even if proposed application conditions are unintuitive, 
pragmatic analysis can still be considered successful when the adoption of these 
conditions enables us to reap the benefits of the concept better than when the 
concept is employed with more intuitive application conditions (Ibid. 74).6  
There are other authors who have moved from an analysis of the benefits of a 
concept to a Fisher-style postulation of its application conditions. For instance, 
take Edward Craig who has proposed the following treatment of the concept of 
knowledge:  
 
We take some prima facie plausible hypothesis about what the concept of know-
ledge does for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept 
having that role would be like, what conditions would govern its application. 
(Craig 1990: 2). 
 
These two steps mirror the method of pragmatic conceptual analysis very 
closely. In addition, Sally Haslanger’s ameliorative approach to concepts 
deserves to be mentioned here. It starts with the question about the purposes for 
which we have a concept and then asks how we should understand its meaning 
so that it would best realise these purposes (Haslanger 1999: 468; 2000: 34; 
2005: 11; 2006: 95). Again, the similarities with Fisher (and Craig) should be 
quite clear. By adopting such a methodology, the present approach doesn’t 
                                                 
6 Of course, this doesn’t mean that we can completely ignore the already existing patterns of 
use.  
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merely describe mental state attributions. The aim is also to provide an account 
which explains how the benefits of folk psychology, which we care about, are 
possible. 
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
In the next chapter I will articulate some benefits that folk psychological 
attributions provide us with. As I do this, I will also provide an overview of the 
state of research on the roles played by folk psychological concepts. More 
particularly, the roles I will focus upon are the prediction and shaping of the 
minds and behaviours of other people. After having raised some doubt over the 
pervasiveness and stability of those attributional benefits, I will present a third 
role of belief and desire attributions: affectability. This involves the immediate 
engaged responses that attributers have to attributees. In the case of belief 
attributions, these responses are agreement or disagreement with the attributed 
belief. In the case of desire attributions, these responses are endorsement or 
disapproval of the attributed desire. I will argue that affectability is indispens-
able for folk psychology. If engaged responses weren’t open to attributers, 
mental state attributions as such would be unrecognizable to us.  
In the third chapter I will elaborate on the notion of affectability. I will 
articulate further responses which are based on the immediate reactions of 
agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval. These involve adopting 
an attributed belief or desire oneself, having emotional reactions to an attributed 
attitude and negotiation with or manipulation of another’s attitudes. This will be 
the most empirically informed chapter of the thesis. It is here that I will provide 
evidence for the pervasiveness of the aforementioned responses from different 
disciplines. 
The fourth chapter turns to the second aim of this thesis: to explicate the 
application conditions of the concepts of belief and desire. I will argue that the 
best way to do that, which takes into account the indispensability of engaged 
responses of agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval, is to 
understand belief and desire attributions in terms of speech acts. The best 
contender for this kind of account is Christopher Gauker’s (2003a) communi-
cative conception of mental states according to which an ascription of a belief is 
an assertion on someone else’s behalf and an ascription of a desire consists of a 
request on someone else’s behalf. I will defend this view against most 
immediate objections and indicate how it can also explain the other benefits of 
folk psychology besides affectability; such as prediction, explanation and 
mindshaping. 
The next chapter takes a critical stance towards the communicative con-
ception. Although the communicative conception offered an initial account of 
the application conditions of folk psychological concepts, it is crucially lacking 
in certain respects. I will argue that Gauker’s proposal is unable to fully explain 
the need for the concepts of belief and desire because the latter are too tightly 
connected with vicarious speech acts. I will then try to improve the original 
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communicative conception by offering an explanation of why the concepts of 
belief and desire need to be introduced to the practice of linguistic com-
munication. The introduction of these concepts enables one to connect requests 
on another’s behalf with the question whether the fulfilment of those speech 
acts would offer subjective satisfaction (pleasure) to the person on whose behalf 
the request is made. The adoption of the concept of belief, on the other hand, 
will be explained by the need to assert something on another’s behalf even if 
that person herself hasn’t asserted it because, considering her behavioural 
dispositions, she should assert that. With these explanations at hand, I can 
finally fully explicate the application conditions of the concepts of belief and 
desire. Since these conditions still make reference to vicarious utterances, I take 
it to be a modified version of the communicative conception. 
In the final two chapters I will respond to possible concerns about the limits 
of the modified communicative conception. In the sixth chapter I will 
investigate the ontological significance of the previous analysis. I will explore 
the various ways in which one can draw ontological inferences about beliefs 
and desires from facts about their attribution. Eventually I will argue that the 
conceptual explication that I’ve provided in the previous chapters allows us to 
construe the ontological commitments of folk psychologists in a minimalist 
way. The truth of attributions of belief and desire requires only that certain facts 
about behavioural and hedonic dispositions obtain and nothing else. In the 
second part of the chapter I will also address the question of whether these 
minimalist commitments imply interpretationism or realism about beliefs and 
desires and defend the second answer.  
In the seventh and final chapter I will consider self-attributions of belief and 
desire. These have some peculiar characteristics which are not shared by third-
person attributions. I will try to fend off a concern that the modified commu-
nicative conception is unable to account for these peculiarities. In the first part 
of the chapter I will inquire into phenomenology of self-attributions and bring 
out their relative immediacy. This immediacy derives from the fact that, unlike 
third-personal attributions which involve assertions or requests on someone’s 
behalf, self-attributions consist of (wholehearted) assertions and requests 
simpliciter. In the second half of the chapter, I will address the question of 
whether self-attributions are in some way epistemically privileged and defend 
the view that there is such privilege and that this privilege reduces to the 
contingent fact that a person has more information about her behavioural and 
hedonic dispositions than other people. 
 
 
1.4 Concluding remarks 
The present thesis focuses on an aspect of beliefs and desires which hasn’t been 
the centre of attention in philosophy of mind. Other concerns have been more 
prevalent. For instance, one of the central projects in philosophy of mind 
concerning intentional mental states such as beliefs and desires has been to 
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naturalize mental content (Dretske 1981; Fodor 1987; Millikan 1984). There 
have been vigorous attempts to explain content in terms of more basic and more 
scientifically respectable relations and properties. In this thesis I won’t take a 
stand on this issue. My acceptance of the idea that belief and desire attributions 
can be understood in terms of speech acts might leave the impression that I am 
committed to understanding mental content in terms of linguistic meaning.7 
This impression is wrong. I don’t think that any reduction of intentionality to 
linguistic meaning has to be involved here and I also hint at some conside-
rations in support of this thought in the fourth chapter.  
Since it seems that the program of naturalising content has somewhat run out 
of steam in recent years (Godfrey-Smith 2006), it is reasonable to ask different 
questions about intentional states and conceptualise them from new angles. In this 
thesis I aim at illuminating an aspect of beliefs and desires – affectability – which 
is indispensable to their intelligibility to us. Since this aspect is at least as 
important for understanding those attitudes as the nature of their content is, its 
study is philosophically well-motivated. This doesn’t mean that the more standard 
questions about beliefs and desires shouldn’t be asked. But a fresh look at what 
we do when we ascribe intentional states to one another might also force us to see 
anew what the explanandum of a theory of content should be like. 
Another limitation of this thesis is that it doesn’t deal with other elements of 
the mind besides beliefs and desires. Its central idea – affectability – charac-
terizes only these attitudes. This is why other mental states such as sensations, 
emotions, mere thoughts or intentions will be left out of the purview of my 
account. But this should be a virtue of my approach because a treatment of 
mental phenomena in general would lose sight of the various differences 
between these phenomena. 
Finally, a challenge to the present approach may take an empirical form. If 
the question is what we do with certain concepts, the result should be an 
empirical theory (Price 1992: 400). One may ask, why this task couldn’t simply 
be deferred to psychology and/or anthropology? What can philosophy 
contribute to solving that question? My first response is that the present 
approach involves an evaluative element. It is the question of why we should 
care about what we do with mental state concepts that distinguishes this 
approach from empirical theories. But in addition I must also stress that the 
picture of beliefs and desires that I develop in this thesis will not be totally cut 
off from empirical work (which becomes especially apparent in the third 
chapter). It just engages with beliefs and desires from a more general perspec-
tive and tries to gain an eagle-eye view over a certain area of mentalistic 
discourse. In the end, its claims can still be brought under empirical scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to judge the acceptability of these claims 
without such a scrutiny. As long as it is possible to evaluate philosophical 
propositions by giving arguments for or against them, this exercise isn’t 
worthless. In any case, the present approach should be judged by its fruits. 
 
                                                 
7 It is an open question whether this would amount to the naturalization of content. 
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2. THE IMPORTANCE OF AFFECTABILITY 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will set the scene by introducing the basic notion of this thesis, 
which I call “affectability”. The role of mental state attributions is something 
that has been discussed in philosophy of mind to quite a large extent. 
Nevertheless, I will try to demonstrate that the idea of affectability is something 
new and isn’t well captured well by present models. Concisely put, my claim is 
that there are specific ways of being affected by belief- and desire-attributions 
that need to be available to attributers in order for the whole attributional 
practice to make sense. By that I don’t mean to imply that affectability captures 
the whole significance of these attributions. The present chapter is more about 
situating affectability within a larger landscape than it is about opposing the 
idea to other features on that terrain. Most importantly, I claim that affectability 
can’t be reduced to the other roles that mental state attributions play. It’s one of 
the basic elements of our folk psychological practice. What’s more, the 
responses to other people that are enabled by the affectability of mental state 
attributions are more stable benefits than those that have been implied by other 
models. But before presenting my argument, we should consider what other 
models of folk psychology’s function are on offer.  
I will start in §2.2 with what I consider to be the standard picture according 
to which the basic benefits that we gain from mental state attributions are 
explanations and predictions. I make a distinction between these two types of 
benefit and concentrate on the latter. After expressing some doubts about the 
centrality of the predictive role in §2.3, I consider the mindshaping hypothesis 
as an alternative in §2.4. Having done that, in §2.5 I finally articulate the notion 
of affectability and in §2.6 defend its independence from other benefits of 
belief- and desire-attribution, and also its centrality for our folk psychological 
practice. 
 
2.2 The standard picture 
The idea that folk psychology is an explanatory and predictive tool is quite 
widespread in contemporary philosophy of mind (Segal 2000: 37; Stone & 
Davies 1996: 120; Stich & Nichols 1993). It is actually rather tedious to bring 
out the references to authors who have relied on this assumption, since this idea 
can also be quite implicit, and even if it is brought out, there aren’t usually any 
arguments given to support that assumption. Nevertheless it clearly needs 
serious consideration because propositional attitude terms do figure in speech 
acts that are either meant to explain the behaviour of persons who are 
characterized with those terms, or provide an opportunity to anticipate their 
further actions. Just to give a trivial sounding example, we can say of John that 
he went to the store because he wanted to buy some milk and believed that the 
store provided that. Or, if we know that John wants to buy milk and believes 
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that the store sells it we can presume that he will go to the store, at least if he 
doesn’t have any countervailing desires or beliefs. Belief-desire explanations 
and predictions seem to be a standard fare, or so it at least seems. 
Things are a bit more complicated than that. The previous examples may 
give an impression that folk psychological explanations and predictions are 
symmetrically related, so that whenever we explain someone’s behaviour in 
terms of beliefs and desires we could have also predicted this behaviour if we 
had known her attitudes, and that whenever we make a successful folk 
psychological prediction of behaviour this can also later be explained by those 
beliefs and desires that figured in the prediction. If that assumption holds, we 
could consider explanatory and predictive functions of folk psychology 
together, so that they can be simply subsumed under one role, labelled as 
“theoretical”. 
The assumption of symmetry has received some criticism from Kristin 
Andrews who has argued that since explanations are context-dependent (a 
feature owed to their being answers to specific why-questions8), there are cases 
when it is inappropriate to cite certain beliefs and desires when explaining 
someone’s actions while the same attitudes were relied on in predicting those 
actions. Her case concerns John who hides in the closet when there is a burglar 
in the house. The explanation of his behaviour in terms of his belief that there’s 
a burglar in the house and his desire not to be shot isn’t appropriate when the 
question is “Why did John hide rather than attack the intruder?” or “Why did 
John avoid the burglar rather than run out of the house?” We may be interested 
in why he has such a belief and such a desire in the first place and in that case 
simply citing them in explanations isn’t satisfactory. Yet it is presumably 
possible to rely on those attitudes in predicting that he will hide in the closet 
(Andrews 2003: 214). She also argues that there are ways of predicting 
behaviour that are often successful, predictions that rely on statistical induction, 
for example, but which are quite irrelevant and insufficient as explanations 
(ibid. 215). It isn’t usually satisfactory to explain someone’s behaviour by 
saying that she usually just acts that way but induction is often useful for 
predicting. Predictions seem to be in general less demanding than explanations, 
the only important thing being that the behaviour that what is predicted will 
come about, whatever the inferential steps are, while the success of an 
explanation hangs on the specific why-question that is being considered. 
What kind of why-question is appropriate for explanations in terms of 
mental states? When we are interested in folk psychological explanations that 
involve propositional attitudes, one of the most frequently discussed criteria of 
evaluation is that these explanations also justify behaviour by indicating why it 
is rational to behave that way (Davidson 1963). The explanation of why John 
went to the store rationalizes his behaviour by indicating that a reasonable way 
to satisfy a desire for milk is to go to a store and buy some; hiding in a closet 
when a burglar is in the house is also quite reasonable if one wants to be safe 
                                                 
8 This idea about the pragmatic nature of explanations goes back to van Fraassen (1981). 
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from harm.9 Physiological or biological explanations don’t seem to require the 
same kind of rationalizing as folk psychology does, which makes the latter quite 
distinctive – we are sometimes just dissatisfied with other kinds of explanations, 
for example, when we want to be able to criticize the person whose actions we 
explain. It isn’t clear that the same applies to folk psychological predictions. 
Since the sole aim of predictions is to give us accurate information about future 
events, however that prediction is arrived at, one need not be troubled with 
whether we predict someone’s behaviour folk psychologically, or not, as long as 
the predicted behaviour will come about.  
Someone may object that I operate here with an overly stripped-down notion 
of prediction while I speak about explanations in a thick sense, when 
predictions may actually involve an attempt to criticize the way that the person 
whose behaviour is being predicted deliberates. This hopefully won’t turn out to 
be simply a terminological issue but I’m sceptical about this objection because I 
don’t think that it is necessary to include such concerns about the activity of 
making predictions if our only concern is to arrive at the state of affairs that is 
being predicted. If predicting behaviour also involved criticism then this kind of 
interaction wouldn’t just be prediction. It would be prediction plus criticism. On 
the other hand, to provide an explanation which points out that the reasoning 
behind certain behaviour was unjustified is already to criticize it. This is largely 
an intuitive argument though. The most I can hope for is that this reasoning 
suggests that the asymmetry between explanations and predictions is real and 
noteworthy, and they can be kept apart when discussing the roles of mental state 
terms in our linguistic practice. I drop, therefore, the notion of theoretical 
function as a possible term that could unify the predictive and explanatory 
functions under one concept. I take them as separable. 
I would express this separability such that predictions form the forward-
looking face of folk psychology and explanations form the backward-looking 
face. This means that, in making predictions, the attributer is oriented toward 
future events in relation to the attribution, and to past events in case of 
explanations. In the context of this chapter, the focus is on the forward-looking 
face of folk psychology because the notion of affectability also characterizes the 
forward-looking face. It thus contrasts better with the predictive role – after all, 
if I am affected by the attributions, my reactions are oriented toward the future. 
It means that I take a stand on how to relate to the person who I’ve already 
interpreted, among which one option is to predict what she will do next. In what 
follows, I argue that the predictions that we gain from mental state attributions 
are less reliable than the standard model seems to assume. This paves a way to 
asking what else does folk psychology offer to us besides and before predictions 
in order for us to be able to characterize its forward-looking face more 
comprehensively. 
As for folk psychological explanations, it is quite clear that explaining 
others’ behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires provides an important 
                                                 
9 It is arguable, of course, if there aren’t any better means to keep oneself safe from burglars. 
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intersubjective benefit. It enables us to rationalize the behaviour in question. 
The attribution of a desire provides information about what the agent considers 
worthy of pursuit and the attribution of a belief helps us to see how the agent 
represented the means to satisfy that desire (Davidson 1963).10 Folk 
psychological explanations thus inform us about the subjective reasons of why 
the agent acted in the way she did (Malle 2004). A full characterization of folk 
psychology has to take belief- and desire-explanations into account. The 
following discussion isn’t meant to deny that. I come back to the explanatory 
role of mental state attributions in later chapters, where I show how it relates to 
affectability in interesting ways. But the focus of the present chapter is on the 
forward-looking face of mental state attributions. 
 
 
2.3 On the predictive role of folk psychology 
Prediction is certainly a prominent function that is stressed when philosophers 
and psychologists talk and write about folk psychology. Even the idea that folk 
psychology is first and foremost a predictive tool is quite widespread 
(Carruthers 1996: 28; Dennett 1991b: 29; Lahav 1992: 104; Stich and Nichols 
2003: 60). It is true that the predictive role of folk psychology needs serious 
consideration because propositional attitude attributions do seem to play an 
important role in enabling us to anticipate the further actions of those who have 
them.  
One way to argue against the centrality of the predictive function of folk 
psychology is to simply emphasize that people’s behaviour can be predicted by 
other means; for instance, by straight induction or by relying on the linguistic 
competence of individuals (Gauker 2003b), or by invoking norms which 
individuals are meant to conform to (Andrews 2009). I do not think this is 
sufficient to problematize the predictive role of folk psychology, though, 
because one could stress that, despite the alternative ways of predicting the 
behaviour of others, mental state attribution provides an additional way of 
making predictions and that is enough to demonstrate that folk psychological 
practice is a predictive endeavour. 
Instead, I hope to show that prediction is a rather unstable good of folk 
psychological attributions. Surely, being able to anticipate the behaviour of 
entities in the environment is, without a doubt, a crucial prerequisite for 
successful coping and even survival. It is an asset that is never too much to be 
had. It is also noticable how almost any kind of concept, unless it is very 
abstract and not related to the empirical world, helps us anticipate the behaviour 
of its referents. Since possessing a concept usually involves knowledge about 
causal relations and dispositions that its referents have to other objects, it is 
usually the case that, when applying a concept in a specific situation, we can 
                                                 
10 By admitting this, I am not claiming that this is the only possible form of action-
explanations. 
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also form certain expectations concerning what can and cannot happen11. To 
argue for that assumption it is not necessary to be a theory theorist about 
concepts or to equate concepts with abilities. All I am saying is that concepts 
usually enable us to predict what will happen and I take it as rather unproble-
matic. Even terms like “chair” and “stone” are fit to be proper examples here: if 
I identify something as a chair, I can expect that people may sit on it, if I 
identify something as a stone, I can presume that it hurts to hit your leg against 
it and so on.  
The point of these trivial-sounding examples is that the predictive function 
discriminates poorly between different vocabularies, unless it is explained what 
is specific about folk psychological predictions. If someone only states that we 
use mental state terms in predicting behaviour, this is as uninformative as it can 
get. It is still possible to argue, for example, that folk psychological predictions 
are distinctive because they appeal to intentional states. The idea would be that 
they work on the presumption that people are sensitive to the content of the 
attributed attitudes; for instance, that they try to bring about states of affairs that 
satisfy their desires with corresponding contents. This is quite vague, although 
one can probably articulate it in such a way that the distinctive aspect of folk 
psychological predictions can really be brought out. In the present context, I’d 
prefer to consider an aspect of it which rather indicates that (pace Lahav 1992, 
for instance) folk psychology is actually quite a poor device for making 
predictions. This is stronger than Andrews’s or Gauker’s claim that there are 
alternative ways of predicting behaviour. 
By folk psychology’s predictive poverty I mean that, at least in everyday 
cases, mental state attributions don’t really give us much assurance over the 
way in which the person, who is being interpreted, will behave. First, there is 
the simple phenomenological observation that it isn’t usually possible to predict 
with certainty that people act in accordance with their beliefs and desires. Just 
consider everyday cases when we are aware that others want and believe 
something. Even if this knowledge can inform our expectations, we also 
wouldn’t be surprised when the other didn’t act in accordance with those 
attitudes (cf. Morton 1996). The attribution of mental states can have satisfying 
results independently of our ability to use those states to predict what will 
happen next. Even the simple example of John wanting milk and believing that 
the nearby shop provides it doesn’t really illustrate any predictive certainty 
concerning his future behaviour. This becomes even more apparent in complex, 
multi-agent situations. 
One could form a predictive law, in the form of a practical syllogism, which 
can be expressed thus: if a person wants that p, and believes that doing X will 
bring about p, he will, all other things being equal, do X (cf. Gopnik & Meltzoff 
1997: 126). The ceteris paribus (all other things being equal) clause is crucial 
here because otherwise this law would turn out to be wrong most of the time. 
                                                 
11 A possible exception here could be phenomenal concepts the application of which 
supposedly doesn’t involve any inferences concerning their causes or effects. 
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There are always numerous factors that affect people’s actions. This isn’t as 
such an objection to the idea that this kind of predictive law enables us to 
successfully predict behaviour of persons; one can simply point out how ceteris 
paribus clauses inform laws in special sciences also (Fodor 1987). Still, the 
strong dependency of the applicability of those putative predictive laws on the 
circumstances of application, which can be extremely complex, may throw 
some doubt on the idea that prediction is somehow the most stable benefit of 
folk psychological attributions. The problem is exacerbated if we take into 
consideration the holistic character of folk psychological attributions: an 
inference from attributed belief-desire pairs to subsequent behaviour needs to 
take into account other possible beliefs and desires the attributee might have 
(Zawidzki 2008). These are well-known troubles with the simple predictive 
model which different authors have tried to resolve, by different means, by 
setting different constraints on possible interpretations, proposing that mental 
state attribution relies: entirely (Goldman 1989) or partially (Goldman 2006; 
Stich & Nichols 2003) on simulation; on prior situational and contextual 
knowledge (Wikerson 2001: 141); on narrative practice (Hutto 2008); on the 
understanding of social roles (Bermúdez 2003b). Finally, Zawidzki himself has 
suggested that successful and reliable mental state attribution requires prior 
mindshaping. But the need to complement the model indicates that predicting 
merely on the basis of beliefs and desires is a difficult feat to pull through.12  
Another consideration for thinking that folk psychology’s predictive 
potential in itself is quite poor, concerns rationality. There are authors, most 
notably Davidson and Dennett, who have claimed that folk psychological 
interpretations are based on the assumption that the objects of interpretation are 
rational – that they don’t usually believe contradictory propositions, that they 
choose the best means to their ends, follow their beliefs to their logical 
conclusion etc.13 This assumption is very much contested mostly because of its 
relative vagueness. Still, one aspect of it deserves to be brought out in the 
present context. John Searle has proposed that it belongs to our conception of 
rationality that rational agents are not directly moved by their beliefs and 
desires. Instead, they are able to stand back and evaluate them. Merely being 
caused by beliefs and desires to behave isn’t sufficient for rationality; rather, 
that kind of behaviour is nonrational (Searle 2001: 12)14. I am not sure how 
much here hangs on the notion of rationality as such. Searle’s idea is only meant 
to illustrate how we often expect persons to be able to stand back and reflect on 
                                                 
12 What’s more, in everyday situations, one also needs to reckon with the emotional and 
affective states of the attributees, which also influence how they will eventually act 
(Andrews 2012: 53). 
13 These were just some possible examples of rationality requirements, not attributed to 
specific authors. 
14 A bit similar idea according to which persons should be able to take a second-order 
perspective towards their desires and not simply act on whatever first-order desire they may 
have, can be found from Frankfurt (1971). See also Velleman (1992), about the way how 
classical belief-desire explanations leave agents out of the picture. 
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their desires and beliefs. If this kind of expectation has its place in our linguistic 
practice, the attribution of those states, then, shouldn’t be directly predictive, at 
least not in the sense that the attribution of inner states serves to predict 
behaviour in science. In order to honour the rationality of the other, one must 
reckon with the fact that she may not act in accordance with her beliefs and 
desires, and it shouldn’t be surprising when she doesn’t.  
I also tentatively claim that the attribution of propositional attitudes may 
make others actually more unpredictable than they were before the attribution. 
Let’s assume that we have regularly predicted, on the basis of induction, that 
when John goes to a restaurant he chooses a table next to a window. The 
prediction works just fine and we assume that this is simply due to John’s habit 
of picking tables. Contrast it with the case when we know that John wants to see 
what happens on the street while eating and believes that in order to see that, 
one needs to sit beside a window. Now we must reckon with the possibility that 
John can evaluate his beliefs and desires, change them, decide whether to act on 
the basis of them, and even be irrational and not notice any connection between 
his attitudes. Inductive generalization, as a rigid method, seems to be relatively 
more trustworthy as long as one can rely on it. Bringing in propositional 
attitudes complicates the matter and adds a dose of unpredictability because the 
interpreted person can presumably decide whether or not she will act in accor-
dance with her attitudes. I admit that the claim of unpredictability is only 
tentative because it depends on the theory of practical reasoning one is willing 
to adopt, and if that theory relies on a belief-desire model of decision-making, 
its supporter could argue that, if our attitude-ascriptions enable predictability, 
we should just look further for the really motivating beliefs and desires. But it 
makes sense to ask why we even need to look further if maybe there is nothing 
to be found. Actually, the idea that folk psychological attributions might impede 
our ability to make accurate predictions has explicitly been noted recently by 
Andrews (2012: 107). She appeals to psychological evidence (see Wilson & 
LaFleur 1995) according to which people tend to fixate on their initial 
assumption about others’ beliefs and desires and ignore or underestimate other, 
possibly more accurate, hypotheses. This is a somewhat different consideration 
from mine. My consideration appealed to the rationality of attributees but its 
overall point is the same: the ascription of beliefs and desires doesn’t guarantee 
an increase in predictability.  
As for the final consideration against the centrality of prediction, it is useful 
to consider certain strategic situations of decision where predictions merely on 
the basis of attitudes turn out to be intractable because agents’ decisions are 
contingent on each other. A good illustration here is the game Stag Hunt15 
wherein two persons need to decide what to hunt: a hare or a stag. If both 
persons hunt the stag, they receive the largest benefit. If, on the other hand, only 
one of them tries to hunt the stag and the other hunts the hare, then the first will 
                                                 
15 The Stag Hunt story was first described by Rousseau (1984 [1975], Sec. III), and given a 
game theoretic formulation by Skyrms (2004). 
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receive nothing, while the second still gets something. An attempt to predict 
what the other will do solely on the basis of his beliefs and desires turns out to 
be tricky: what the other decides to do seems to depend on what he believes I 
will do but what he believes I will do depends on what I believe he will do but 
what I believe he will do depends on what he believes I believe he will do and 
so on ad infinitum (cf. Zawidzki 2013: 109). The problem seems to be solvable 
when an explicit verbal promise and the assumption of trust is brought into play 
but that would mean that the successful prediction relies on a speech act and not 
an attitude. Although this issue has more limited force against predictions claim 
to centrality, given that much of our social life consists of such situations 
wherein our decisions are mutually dependent on each other, the issue still poses 
a considerable problem for those who want to see prediction as the most reliable 
good of folk psychology. 
We can say, then, that the predictive role of mental state attributions is rather 
limited and much less reliable than many seem to assume. The predictive 
possibilities of folk psychology are far from stable. This gives us a lot of room 
to consider other possibilities of characterizing the forward-looking face of folk 
psychology. 
 
2.4 Alternative: mindshaping 
To what else might be involved in the forward-looking face of folk psychology 
(besides prediction), let’s consider some alternative proposals. For instance, 
Joshua Knobe has claimed that folk psychology, unlike scientific theories, is 
influenced by our moral judgements (Knobe 2010). According to him, people’s 
attributions of intentionality depend on whether or not an action’s side effects 
are morally acceptable – if they are, people are less inclined to attribute 
intentionality to the action than in the case of negative side effects. If a scientist 
were to change her causal attributions depending on evaluative considerations 
this would hardly be acceptable and would instead be taken as a sign of a lack 
of objectivity.16 Folk psychological attributions lack that kind of ideal. Knobe’s 
idea concerning the so-called “Knobe effect” has been under heavy theoretical 
and experimental scrutiny in recent years which indicates that its status is one of 
a falsifiable hypothesis. 
However, here I am going to consider a different view which at least on a 
superficial level shares with Knobe’s hypothesis the idea that folk psychological 
attributions differ in their function from scientific explanations and predictions. 
According to it, the attributions function as a mindshaping device by which we 
mould people’s behaviour and make normative demands on them. Although 
perhaps less precise than Knobe’s claim, the mindshaping hypothesis is also 
more pretentious because it doesn’t only claim something about factors that are 
taken into consideration in mental state attributions, but also can be taken as 
saying something about the aim of those attributions and the general role they 
                                                 
16 The case of social sciences is perhaps more ambiguous. 
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play in human social life. In what follows, I will analyse the work of three 
authors who can be associated with the mindshaping hypothesis – Matteo 
Mameli, Tori McGeer and Tadeusz Zawidzki – and ask what sense could be 
made of it. In the present context, the question is whether this hypothesis gives 
us any sense of the stable benefits that folk psychology offers. 
Perhaps the most clear-cut presentation of the idea of mindshaping can be 
found in the work of Mameli who uses it to make sense of the evolution of 
social cognition. According to him, folk psychology or mindreading is a delicate 
form of human niche construction (Mameli 2001: 599). The latter denotes such 
practices by which organisms transform their environment and so alter the 
selection pressures on themselves and their descendants (Laland & Sterelny 
2006; Sterelny 2007). Examples of these practices would include dam-building 
by beavers, nest-building by ants and termites, web-spinning by spiders, 
badgers digging burrows, etc. By engaging in niche construction, organisms are 
able to canalise their evolution, at least to some extent, not merely responding to 
the already existing environment which they themselves didn’t create. If mental 
state attribution were a form of niche construction through mindshaping, this 
would mean that folk psychology alters or has altered the social environment of 
humans and these alterations should also be reflected in our genetic make-up.  
What kind of effect could both be produced by mindreading skills and be a 
reliably recurring developmental resource? One rather obvious and already 
indicated response is that one of the recurring fruits of folk psychology which 
explains its selection is its use in predictions of behaviour. Mameli thinks that 
this view should be complemented by taking into account mindshaping effects. 
These involve any kind of modification in the mental life of a subject, brought 
about by attributing traits, mental states or actions to her (Mameli 2001: 608). 
These include such effects as people actually adopting a mental state that is 
attributed to them, even if they haven’t originally possessed it, parents shaping 
the social expectations of their children by reading into their behaviour 
communicative intentions, people convincing themselves into having certain 
attitudes they didn’t have before, etc. Mameli calls them also “expectancy 
effects” since repeated attributions of a mental state produce the state in 
question as expected by the attributer, and labels such attributions “expectan-
cies” (ibid. 609). Conceived this way, expectancy effects could be taken as self-
fulfilling prophecies, postulated in social psychology. 
As Mameli himself is ready to point out, much of the work in social 
psychology can be interpreted as the study of mindshaping or expectancy 
effects. This interpretation is quite conceivable when it comes to stereotype 
attribution. For instance, gender stereotypes are at work when the results of a 
maths test differ between men and women because this difference may result 
from women having heard the stereotype of women being worse in maths than 
men (Spencer, Steele & Quinn 1999; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev 2000). This indicates 
that the attribution of a gender stereotype to someone can bring about actions 
corresponding to that stereotype. As for another example, there is some 
evidence that entertaining cultural scripts of depression can generate depression, 
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so that this mental condition may at least to some extent be the product of 
attribution and not of any natural causes (Prinz 2012a: 284). Also, there is 
evidence that the idea of being an extrovert also brings about extroverted 
behaviour (Furnham 1982). More generally, if someone thinks about oneself or 
others in terms of certain traits or attitudes, her behaviour reflects those 
thoughts and makes them true, even if the person in question originally didn’t 
have these traits or attitudes. The process either involves the internalization of 
the attributed attitudes into subject’s self-conception or it proceeds more 
automatically by generating the expectation-matching behaviour (Mameli 2001: 
614). As I understand this difference, in the first case the subject also ascribes 
the attributed attitudes to herself and in the second case she is unaware of 
forming such attitudes. 
Nothing in Mameli’s account, though, indicates that folk psychology, the 
ability to ascribe beliefs and desires, itself was selected because of mindshaping 
effects, although the latter may have played some part in altering our mind-
reading dispositions (2001: 621). The latter are still presupposed in some form 
and the predictive role of folk psychology comes before mindshaping. In the 
current context, though, where I only intend to bring out and compare different 
benefits of mental state attributions, the relationship of priority between the 
predictive and mindshaping role isn’t that important. In any case, Mameli 
doesn’t see any opposition between the mindreading and mindshaping model. 
According to him, folk psychology is selected for both functions (Mameli 2001: 
608). Although mindreading seems to be the primary rationale for the selection 
and mindshaping is more like the icing on the cake. It should also be noted, 
though, that Mameli himself doesn’t offer any examples of mindshaping 
through the attribution of beliefs and desires. His focus is not on propositional 
attitudes. 
Tad Zawidzki’s proposals are potentially more radical because he also toys 
with the idea that folk psychology as such was actually selected for the 
mindshaping function while the predictive fruits of folk psychology are quite 
meagre. As a result, he also treats mindreading and mindshaping hypotheses as 
competitors, while Mameli doesn’t see any tension between them. For 
Zawidzki, if people attribute mental states to others they act not like scientists 
who are first and foremost interested in explaining and predicting behaviour but 
rather as legislators who attempt to make people more controllable and 
predictable by setting normative constraints on them using mental state 
attributions (Zawidzki 2008: 206). The latter function should have primacy 
before the predictive one which, as far as it exists, is enabled by mindshaping. 
Much of his argumentation, as I see it, focuses on making the negative case 
against the idea that the primary function of folk psychology is to predict 
behaviour. These arguments aim to bring out the unreliability of folk 
psychological predictions which don’t presuppose prior mindshaping (2008: 
196), and the normative character of mental state attributions which isn’t 
captured by the mere mindreading model (ibid. 199). I have already discussed 
the unreliability of folk psychological predictions (see §2.2) and I largely agree 
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with Zawidzki. He suggests that successful and reliable mental state attribution 
requires prior mindshaping. How can this work? Zawidzki uses an analogy with 
traffic: although it would probably be intractable to calculate how other drivers 
might behave if the only method for doing it were to speculate about the inner 
causes – beliefs and desires – behind their behaviour. There simply isn’t enough 
time to do that when the situation requires an immediate decision. Although the 
problem of coordination seems to be resolvable if mindreading were the only 
possibility, the adoption of traffic laws provides an immediate solution to the 
problem. Instead of relying on individual mindreading resources in order to 
predict the behaviour of fellow traffickers, individuals can simply assume that 
others behave largely in accordance with the law (Zawidzki 2008: 199). If folk 
psychological attributions function analogously to normative requirements, one 
may hope to base a case for mindshaping on the ground that folk psychological 
attributions enable us to make coordination with others possible.17 
As already pointed out, folk psychological explanations can be seen as 
rationalizing explanations, so that they make sense of people’s actions in terms 
of the reasonableness of the deliberative process that underlies them (Bruner 
1990: 47). Zawidzki seems to use that idea in bringing out how in many cases, 
when we ascribe certain beliefs and desires to another person and predict her 
behaviour on that assumption, the failure of the prediction doesn’t necessarily 
motivate us to change or drop our attribution but rather it motivates us to 
challenge her behaviour as inappropriate and perhaps even sanction her for not 
conforming to the norm (Zawidzki 2008: 201). These sanctions don’t just arise 
in the case of behavioural predictions. They arise elsewhere too. For instance, if 
we know that the fact that p holds, we may demand that another person believe 
that p, even if the attribution of that belief seems to be false, and so we try to 
make our attribution true by convincing her that she should believe that p. Or, in 
case of desires, we might require others to have certain desires, even if our 
original attributions don’t correspond to the facts. These putative aspects of 
mental state attribution, then, seem to indicate that folk psychology isn’t merely 
an epistemic practice but involves a political element. As argued for in this way, 
mindshaping hypothesis may receive much more direct support. But to see how 
this aspect of folk psychology could be elaborated, I turn to Victoria McGeer’s 
account. 
McGeer doesn’t explicitly talk about mindshaping but her account of the 
regulative dimension of folk psychology basically expresses the same 
observations concerning the way that we often don’t revise our mental state 
attributions after predictive or other kinds of epistemic failure. Rather, we 
sanction or challenge the attributee for not conforming to the attribution in 
question (McGeer 2007: 148). In the end, she is much more modest than 
                                                 
17 In his recent book on mindshaping, Zawidzki (2013) doesn’t seem to take the function of 
folk psychological attributions to be mindshaping as such; rather, they function to rationalize 
counternormative behavior. This is a view that is advocated also by Hutto (2008) and 
Andrews (2012). The nonmentalistic mindshaping practices are supposed to make the 
attribution of beliefs and desires possible, though. 
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Zawidzki because she doesn’t seem to identify the mindshaping role with folk 
psychology’s selected function. McGeer’s proposals, then, are quite in line with 
the weaker version of the mindshaping thesis according to which the latter is 
meant to bring out a certain normative aspect of our folk psychological practice 
which can be taken as valuable and which has to belong to a comprehensive 
account of folk psychology.18 It is noticeable that she doesn’t concern herself 
with the question of function that folk psychology is meant to fulfil. Still, 
McGeer intends her thesis to have developmental consequences and thinks that 
it could reconceptualize the idea of folk psychology as a regulative practice. 
Drawing inspiration from Sellars (1997), she claims that the attribution of 
belief or knowledge to oneself pushes us to live up to the attribution, or if others 
attribute such states to us we can either challenge the ascription or try to fulfil 
those expectations which the attitude in question amounts to (McGeer 2007: 
146). Mental state attributions, then, set certain demands on the attributers and 
attributees which they try to answer by constraining and canalizing their 
behaviour in certain ways. One of the advantages of this view of folk 
psychology is similar to Zawidzki’s point, namely, that regulation eases the 
interpretive burden by constraining the range of attributions and their 
behavioural implications. This suggests that folk psychological understanding 
takes place in an intersubjective give-and-take where participants can work 
together to form an appropriate interpretation of one another (ibid. 149). I am 
not sure about this claim because although reciprocal interaction may reduce 
that range of possible interpretations, compared of a detached standpoint, this 
point seems to be independent from the thesis about folk psychology’s 
regulative dimension – also an opponent of the mindshaping hypothesis could 
accept that reciprocal interactions enable people to constrain their inter-
pretations by improving their access to relevant information. 
Another similar point with Zawidzki that McGeer makes is that the 
mindshaping hypothesis makes folk psychological interpretations more fluent 
by off-loading the relevant knowledge into the external environment – since the 
latter is shaped by folk psychological and other norms, the interpreters don’t 
need to rely on some rich internal knowledge-base but instead can simply 
exploit the knowledge of our shared social practice (ibid. 150). What’s more – 
and this is more of an idiosyncratic aspect of McGeer’s proposal – this 
knowledge is a form of know-how, as opposed to know-that. This should make 
interpretational understanding less mysterious (ibid. 151) but actually it is quite 
obscure what exactly that kind of know-how amounts to and McGeer doesn’t 
provide much clarification in that regard. 
As for developmental implications, since the mastery of folk psychology 
requires involvement in the regulative practice of one’s community, the social 
                                                 
18 “Even on the standard view, then, folk psychology is not just an explanatory/ predictive 
practice; it is also, in a sense, a normative practice: a practice of showing how people’s 
performances live up to certain norms and thereby become, in that special way, intelligible.” 
(McGeer 2007: 141) 
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experience of children is ordered in the way that they get introduced to 
structured interactions wherein they learn to respond appropriately to others 
both by forming the right mental states and the correct behaviour, thus 
mastering the norms of folk psychology (ibid. 153). Since McGeer stressed the 
mastery of folk psychology to be a form of know-how, the development of a 
child probably shouldn’t be seen as improving a grasp on propositionally 
articulated folk psychological principles but instead as a development of the 
relevant know-how which consists of responding properly to normative 
requirements. This idea can find some empirical support from the plausible 
claim that the mastery of norms precedes the folk psychological understanding 
in children’s development (Andrews 2009), although the latter claim doesn’t 
necessitate the former. I suspect that the theoretical advantages of the regulative 
view that McGeer proposes wouldn’t convince her opponents. As already noted, 
her account of the know-how that is required for competent folk psychologists 
is quite rudimentary. Also, although the idea that the regulative dimension of 
folk psychology can act as a constraining effect on possible mental state 
attributions has some plausibility, the description of that process is left 
somewhat implicit. Still, these possible gripes concern the fact that this account 
isn’t yet fully formed which means that it requires elaboration, not rejection.  
 
 
2.5 Evaluating the mindshaping hypothesis 
What to make of the mindshaping hypothesis, then? Can it challenge any 
fundamental assumption in the standard view of folk psychology? By “the 
standard view” I mean the relatively loose yet still tractable idea, brought out in 
the beginning of the chapter, that when we ascribe mental states to ourselves 
and to other people, the main forward-looking benefit is that those attributions 
providing us with an opportunity to predict behaviour. It is a challenge to that 
kind of model, in the sense that it points out that there is an aspect of folk 
psychology that isn’t accounted for. Although conceived on a very general level, 
without many direct empirical consequences, it can be used as a critique against 
the aforementioned philosophical assumption about folk psychology and it 
hopefully discourages philosophers from uncritically claiming seeming 
trivialities such as “the function of folk psychology is to predict behaviour”. In 
the present context, it is sufficient to confine ourselves to the interpretation of 
the mindshaping hypothesis according to which mindshaping is one of the 
forward-looking benefits that folk psychology has, along with prediction. I 
won’t address the question whether it has any implications for development, 
although it probably does. 
Having brought out two elements of the forward-looking face of folk 
psychology, prediction and mindshaping, it is finally time to introduce the 
notion of affectability. In order to arrive there, we should notice that both the 
mindshaping and the standard view share the same focus, namely, the person 
who is being interpreted. In both cases the stress is on how to understand or 
29 
change her mind and behaviour. What has been somewhat overlooked is the 
interpreter herself and how her attributions weigh on her. We need to keep in 
mind that third-person mental state attributions aren’t necessarily taken into 
account by the attributee, so that the mindshaping effects on the latter are 
contingent on the particular context of interpretation: on the motivational and 
cognitive states of the individuals involved and also on the material and social 
environment. For instance, the other person might not simply care about the 
sanctions that the interpreter wants to force on her. There might be 
misunderstandings between the two, or there might be something wrong with 
the information channels between them. There are multiple ways in which the 
mindshaping process can go awry and result in a failure to shape the mind of the 
attributee. This fragility is comparable to the unreliability of folk psychological 
predictions which I brought out in §2.2. Both in cases of predicting and 
mindshaping there is a high level uncertainty with regard to those endeavors 
actually succeeding. 
The attributer herself, on the other hand, is always affected in some way by 
her own attributions. Assuming that she was motivated to make them in the first 
place, it should be the case that they bear upon her own understanding of the 
intersubjective situation. This means that actually the most reliable effects that 
the mental state attributions have might concern the attributer, not the attributee. 
So it is also the attributer who we should perhaps look in order to see how she is 
shaped by her own attributions because in her case she is affected in some way 
or other and the process is more direct. In that sense, it should be possible to 
talk about first-person mindshaping. In what follows, I intend to elaborate on 
that idea and show that there is a kind of stable benefit of folk psychological 
attributions that comes precisely from the fact that the attributer is affected by 
her own interpretation of others. 
 
 
2.6 Affectability – engaged mindreading 
In order to see what other forward-looking benefits besides predictions and 
mindshaping are gained from mental state attributions, we should look more 
closely at what can happen before predictions are made. It is noticeable that one 
can respond to the attitudes that are attributed to another person and these 
responses can’t be reduced to a predictive activity. Let’s take some examples 
where John is always the attributer and Mary is the attributee. So for instance, if 
John thinks that Mary desires to visit Sai Baba, he might not have any specific 
expectation about whether she will do something in order to fulfil her desire. 
But nonetheless, he might (strongly) disapprove of the kind of wish Mary has. 
Due to that disapproval, he needs to decide, for example, whether to encourage 
her to fulfil her dream or persuade her to give up her desire. As an example of 
belief-attribution, imagine that John thinks that Mary believes that Earth was 
created 6000 years ago. Again, he might not have any well-formed expectations 
about how Mary will behave given that she has this belief but he still isn’t left 
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unaffected by the attribution. For instance, he might disagree with it. In that 
case, he needs to decide whether to commend Mary, who he admires for her 
conviction, or instead to express his disagreement with her.  
These examples might sound trivial but they express a crucial element in our 
folk psychological practice, which is what I mean by “affectability” or “engaged 
mindreading”. When we ascribe beliefs and desires to each other we ourselves 
are affected by our own ascriptions and this enables us to adjust our own 
behaviour, depending upon the content of the attitudes that we have attributed. 
Knowing what Mary wants and believes matters to John because it affects his 
possible actions – John needs to decide now whether to attempt to overturn 
Mary’s desire or to help her to satisfy it, and whether to persuade Mary out of 
her false belief or to leave her in ignorance and delusion. In these cases, the 
knowledge of someone’s desires and beliefs enables one to do something about 
it, and that is already enough to be interested in them. What others believe and 
desire influences us both practically and emotionally, whether or not we are able 
to form any well-formed predictions on the basis of those attitudes. Since both 
beliefs and desires have satisfaction or correctness conditions – beliefs can be 
true or mistaken, desires can be satisfied or frustrated – knowledge of those 
attitudes gives us opportunity to intervene in their possible fulfilment, whether 
or not the subjects of those attitudes will act on them. Note that this claim 
doesn’t amount to the mindshaping proposal because the focus is on the effects 
of the attribution to the attributer, leaving open whether changing other’s 
attitudes will succeed or not, or whether even moulding other’s attitudes is in 
the interests of the ascriber.19 Instead, she might simply endorse them. 
The engagedness of folk psychology is much more pervasive than this 
handful of examples might suggest and it isn’t limited to cases wherein the 
attributee has an attitude that the attributer doesn’t share. There are many 
different ways in which a person can be affected by her attributions to others. 
Nonetheless, this can be articulated quite systematically because both desire and 
belief have their particular response profiles. In case of attributing desires, if I 
attribute the desire that p to a person X, my first reaction to this attribution is 
whether to endorse or disapprove of X’s desire which I think of her has having. 
Depending on my reaction, I can then try to help X to achieve p, or prevent the 
corresponding state of affairs ever taking place. I may even lie to X about the 
possibility or impossibility of p or I may encourage X to satisfy her desire. So 
when I know that some other person wants that p, I can take it into account and 
adjust my future behaviour, depending on my own interests I have towards p. 
Although such possible actions in relation to one’s attribution are varied, I take 
endorsement and disapproval to be the most basic reactions one might have 
towards the attributed desire because the subsequent behaviour depends on 
those initial reactions. 
As for beliefs, if I attribute the belief that p to X, the initial reaction is either 
to agree or disagree with the belief. On the basis of this reaction, then, I can 
                                                 
19 However, it can be called “first-person mindshaping”. 
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express my agreement with her belief if I agree or try to persuade X of being 
mistaken in the case of disagreement. I may also form a new opinion 
concerning her epistemic credentials, usually positive in the case of agreement 
and negative if I disagree with her. In a more extreme case, I might even get 
offended and refuse to talk with her if our beliefs contradict each other. The 
attribution of beliefs might also have consequences for whether I am willing to 
engage with X in cooperative actions and affects the extent to which I excuse 
her misbehaviours. But agreement and disagreement seem to be the basic 
reactions which we undergo due to having attributed beliefs, thus mirroring the 
reactions of endorsement and disapproval in the case of desires. 
In the case of desires, there’s the ambiguity of whether endorsing the desire 
that p involves taking the content p to be desirable or simply evaluating the 
attitude as something acceptable. In the first case a danger might arise that 
endorsing another’s desire that p and wanting that p oneself get conflated. After 
all, taking something to be desirable seems to amount to wanting it and in that 
case the endorsement wouldn’t be a neutral act for the attributer. Because of that 
I interpret endorsement in the second, weaker sense. That doesn’t mean, though, 
that the interpreter need not entertain the content of the attributed desire in order 
to intelligibly evaluate the attitude as something acceptable. Unlike in the case 
of desires, an analogous issue of ambiguity doesn’t seem to arise in the case of 
beliefs – agreeing with a belief that p means also having (or acquiring) the 
belief with the same content. 
Of course, between endorsement/disapproval and agreement/disagreement 
lies indifference. In cases where I don’t really care about the attributee’s desire, 
the question of whether I should endorse or disapprove of it need not really 
matter to me; and if the other’s belief doesn’t concern me I don’t need to take a 
stand on whether it’s true or not. But it’s plausible that people mostly resort to 
attributing beliefs and desires when they do take interest in others’ take on the 
world. In the end, it’s an empirical question to what extent one can maintain 
indifference towards the attributed attitudes but I am doubtful that this can be a 
very stable stance. After all, the basic reactions to the other’s attitudes come 
very cheaply. When I comprehend what the other’s desire is directed at, I can 
already make a preliminary decision about whether the object of that desire is 
worth wanting or not; and if I understand the content of the attributee’s belief, 
thus knowing its truth-conditions, I am already able to judge whether I take it to 
be true or not, and agreement or disagreement follows.20 Even in cases of 
indifference towards the attributee’s attitudes, then, the characteristic reactions 
are open to the attributer. The case of indifference still demonstrates that every 
actual case of mental state attribution doesn’t produce an engaged response. 
                                                 
20 The idea that thinking about other’s beliefs and desire involves thinking about the subject 
matter of those attitudes is comparable to the co-cognition account of mindreading that has 
been developed by Jane Heal (1998). What’s more, in developing her simulationist theory of 
co-cognition, she has also criticized the too singular focus on the predictive function of folk 
psychology (Heal 2003: 245). Nonetheless, she hasn’t articulated the reactions of the 
attributer, as I attempt to do here. 
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Instead, the described responses are meant to turn our attention to certain 
possibilities. 
We also should distinguish between affectability in the narrow, and in the 
wide sense. In the narrow sense, the engaged responses denote only the initial 
possible reactions of agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval. In 
the wide sense, they characterize both the initial responses and the whole 
spectrum of reactions that they can bring about. In the rest of the chapter I will 
focus on the narrow meaning because the primary responses are like the axis 
around which the rest of the responses turn. Affectability, then, is something 
that can be quite systematically articulated, starting from the most obvious and 
finishing with some more speculative proposals. Although much of this idea 
might seem rather obvious, these ways of being affected should be kept in mind 
if the question is what the mental vocabulary enables us to do. In what follows, 
I will argue that not only can engaged responses function independently of the 
possibility of prediction (or mindshaping); they should also be taken as a 
distinguishing and necessary component of our folk psychological practice.  
 
 
2.7 The centrality of engaged responses 
2.7.1 Independence from predictions and mindshaping 
Hopefully it is quite clear how being affected by someone’s attitudes, at least in 
the narrow sense, doesn’t imply being able to predict or shape her behaviour on 
their basis. After all, John can endorse or disapprove of Mary’s desire, yet he 
may be quite in the dark about how Mary will behave in the future or how she 
may change her attitudes over time. Also, the knowledge about Mary’s belief 
may not really help John to predict her behaviour but he can still agree or 
disagree with it. In that sense, the possibility of being affected by the attribution 
of propositional attitudes doesn’t owe its existence to predictability or mind-
shaping and should be seen as an aspect of folk psychology that transcends 
those other two roles. We can always construct a situation wherein the engaged 
responses by means of propositional attitude ascription are still possible but no 
real predictions can be made and no ways of influencing the other are open. To 
strengthen my case, imagine a situation wherein a person’s body is paralysed 
but she can still communicate. In that case, we are able to ascribe her beliefs 
and desires on the basis of her linguistic behaviour and it is also possible to be 
influenced by the attitudes of that paralysed person in ways as I’ve described. 
Yet we may not be able to predict or influence her behaviour, which means that 
the possibility of responding and other two roles, prediction and mindshaping, 
don’t directly depend on each other. It is possible to object that we are still able 
to predict at least her linguistic behaviour but this already seems very restrictive 
because usually, when it is claimed that folk psychology enables us to predict 
behaviour, the latter isn’t confined to speech acts. What’s more, for the sake of 
the example, we may also stipulate that we can’t predict her linguistic behaviour 
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either. Even in this case, the responses of agreement/disagreement and 
endorsement/disapproval are still open to the attributer. 
It may be pointed out that the engaged responses that are independent of 
predictability and mindshaping can characterize particular cases but that is not 
really relevant when we are interested in understanding the folk psychological 
practice as a whole. From that perspective, the objection might go, the engaged 
responses are only a contingent effect of mental state attributions, derivative in 
relation to predictability, for instance. This objection can be refuted, though – 
even when considering the practice as a whole, for two reasons the engaged 
responses cannot be ignored: first, these responses distinguish the mentalistic 
discourse better from others, and second, they should be seen as a necessary 
element of the folk psychological practice. Let’s start with the first reason. 
 
 
2.7.2 Distinguishing the role of affectability 
Engaged responses better distinguish folk psychology from other vocabularies 
because predictability characterizes, to some extent, most of our conceptual 
machinery. Almost any concept can help us to form certain expectations 
concerning its referents, as long as there is some knowledge-structure that is 
connected with the concept in question. Being affected by the mental state 
attributions one makes, on the other hand, allows one to achieve something 
distinctive in social interactions. We can evaluate the success of a prediction on 
the basis of its results – whether the state of affairs being predicted occurs or 
not – and this evaluation is quite insensitive to the method of prediction. As 
long as it gives us the right result, we keep that method. If there are better 
means available we can drop it. If the future research in neuroscience enables us 
to predict the behaviour of persons by relying purely on physical vocabulary 
and if the predictions turn out to be accurate, as eliminativists hope, one should 
adopt this vocabulary in formulating one’s predictions.  
Being affected by the mental state attributions one makes is another matter. 
Compared to physical or biological vocabulary, the intentional idiom, being 
open to semantic evaluation, articulates different perspectives that persons can 
have, even if their situations are similar, that are rooted in personal histories and 
idiosyncratic commitments. Unlike physical objects, like chairs and stones, 
which can affect us only in that we must take into account possible causal 
relations they may enter into, the attitudes of others open the possibility of 
responding to them in specific ways. Since they make certain claims and 
demands on the world – whether how the world is, in the case of beliefs, or how 
it should be, in the case of desires – we can choose whether to conform or 
oppose them. We can also decide how to influence the behaviour of mindless 
objects, of course, but there is no point in negotiating with them. The latter is 
only possible when we acknowledge that these objects have attitudes which can 
be evaluated. What the engaged responses also show is how, from the first-
person perspective, others’ beliefs and desires influence us already due to the 
fact that they either correspond or conflict with our own convictions and 
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interests and it is up to us either to deepen the correspondence or to widen the 
gap. The responses of agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval, 
then, let us see the distinctive aspects of folk psychology more clearly than its 
predictive aspect.  
The case with mindshaping, as opposed to predictions, is a bit different 
because one could argue that there are specific ways of influencing others 
through the attribution of beliefs and desires that can’t be achieved by other 
means. In that regard, the mindshaping thesis might be on equal grounds with 
the claim about affectabilty. I can grant that, although it seems that affectability 
is still more fundamental because we could imagine a folk psychological 
practice without possibilities for mindshaping, while engaged responses being 
open to the participants. But this brings us to the next point. I argue for the 
indispensability of affectability for the folk psychological attributions to be 
intelligible. 
 
2.7.3 The indispensability of engaged responses 
The second reason why engaged responses can’t be ignored is that these typical 
ways of being affected by the attributions of belief and desire should be taken as 
indispensable components of our folk psychological practice. This claim is 
rooted in the idea that if we imagine a community where the ascription of 
beliefs and desires functions without people ever responding to the attributed 
attitudes with agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval, we 
couldn’t recognize the concepts of belief and desire they use as our own. We 
would take it that our community and the imagined one use the same 
vocabulary, but the latter engages in a different conceptual activity than we do. 
One can’t make sense of someone having a belief that can’t be agreed or 
disagreed with, if the content of the belief is understood; and one can’t make 
sense of someone having a desire which can’t be endorsed or disapproved of, if 
the content of the desire is understood. Attitudes that can’t be agreed or 
disagreed with and endorsed or disapproved of, respectively, would hardly be 
worth taking as beliefs and desires – these responses seem to make their use 
intelligible. Simply put, attributing beliefs and desires essentially involves the 
possibility of responding to them in pertinent ways. This may sound like a 
strong claim. But it is one that is hard to avoid once we have already admitted 
the rather commonsense assumption that beliefs and desires are attitudes to 
which such responses are appropriate. Crucial assumption here is that what we 
do by attributing beliefs and desires is experientially accessible to us, so that we 
should be able to recognize what is needed for the folk psychological practice to 
be intelligible. After all, this is our practice. The existence of such agential 
authority is by no means uncontroversial but I take it here for granted (cf. 
O’Brien 2007). 
One might argue, though, that the thought experiment I presented doesn’t 
have the force it pretends to have because without the possibility of engaged 
responses the practice could still include the same concepts of belief and desire 
as we do. The claim that they are different can only be made when concepts are 
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individuated in terms of their use. If concepts are individuated in terms of their 
causal history, for instance, then the difference in use is irrelevant. I admit that 
my claim about conceptual activity is ambiguous here between the two 
communities engaging in different practices and having different concepts. The 
scope of this work doesn’t grant me the space to engage with the question of 
which theory of concepts is correct. Although I am inclined towards both 
interpretations of the indispensability-claim, the case can be made solely by 
appealing to the differences in practice. After all, I am focused here on the 
attribution of beliefs and desires. But those who are sympathetic to the use-
based individuation of concepts should be aware of the possibility of arguing for 
the difference in concepts, too. 
A possible worry here is that merely appealing to differences in use between 
two communities doesn’t amount to any interesting claim about the necessary 
conditions for engaging in the practice of folk psychology. This is an issue 
about individuating practices and a claim can be made that these are social 
entities which don’t have any specific set of necessary conditions in order to be 
instantiated. Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1997: 191), for instance, can be 
taken as arguing for that claim, when they analyse the case of basketball where 
the so-called “Wilt Chamberlain” rules were introduced into the game, to deal 
with the fact that Chamberlain was too good a player. But despite the fact that 
the pre-Wilt and post-Wilt game had different sets of rules, they were still the 
same game. One might argue, then, that although the folk psychological practice 
with engaged responses and the practice without them are clearly quite 
different, they still amount to the same type of practice, and those responses 
need not be taken as its necessary conditions. 
The Chamberlain example need not be damaging to my claim, though. It 
demonstrates that the individuation of a practice need not be sensitive to any 
change in rules that govern it but it doesn’t prove that there are no components 
that are essential to the practice. What’s more, engaged mindreading isn’t 
articulated in terms of rules and doesn’t even have any normative element built 
into it, which seems to indicate that the Chamberlain example might even be 
irrelevant. That being said, individuating a practice is still a tricky issue but I do 
think it is reasonable to assume that there are some consequences a practice can 
have that are essential to it. By “essential” I mean here those consequences the 
total lack of which would alienate us from what we do, so that the practice in 
question would become unrecognizable to us. 
One might also object that the fact that people attribute beliefs and desires to 
nonhuman animals demonstrates that the possibility of engaged responses isn’t 
essential to the folk psychological practice because we don’t really agree or 
disagree with animal belief and endorse or disapprove animal desire. Note that 
this objection doesn’t target the idea that animals don’t have beliefs and desires, 
à la Davidson (1982). It concerns our use of the concepts of those attitudes. That 
makes responding to the objection somewhat easier because it is difficult to 
deny that higher animals have beliefs and desires. At least I don’t want to enter 
into this debate in the present context. It is possible to argue, on the other hand, 
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that for our practice of attributing attitudes, attributions to animals are parasitic 
on more paradigmatic attributions to (adult) humans who we can respond to in 
the engaged manner. Although we talk quite freely of higher animals having 
beliefs and desires, and in certain conditions attribute those attitudes even to 
inanimate objects, it is still human beings who are taken as paradigmatic 
attributees.  
What’s more, this objection might not even get off the ground because it 
isn’t completely obvious that at least the potential for engaged responses doesn’t 
characterize such attributions. It is a separate question whether agreeing/ 
disagreeing with animals’ beliefs or endorsing/disapproving their desires makes 
any rational sense but if these attitudes are attributed, such responses come quite 
naturally to us. If that is true, that we attribute attitudes to animals might even 
strengthen the case for the necessity of being affected in an engaged way. It is 
true that when we attribute beliefs and desires to animals, we are not usually 
interested in agreeing/disagreeing with their beliefs and endorsing/disapproving 
their desires, and the predictive interests can gain the upper hand. But the lack 
of interest conceals the fact that these responses are still open to us. That we 
usually are not interested in these responses in the case of animals reinforces my 
impression that attributions to animals are actually parasitic on the human cases 
because only the latter reveal the full potential of folk psychology.  
But can’t similar arguments be constructed for the predictive and mind-
shaping roles of folk psychology? After all, it would also be hard to recognize a 
folk psychological practice where the attributions don’t provide possibilities for 
predicting and mindshaping. Maybe so, but I suspect that the imagined practice 
without predictions or mindshaping is hard to make sense of because of 
instrumental considerations: it would simply seem rather pointless to have the 
attributional practice if it didn’t have any effects on the behaviour of those to 
whom the attributions are made and only the responses of agreement/ disagree-
ment and endorsement/disagreement were open to us. But if the possibility of 
the latter were absent, not only would the practice make no sense for instru-
mental considerations, it would also lose intelligibility full-stop. This wouldn’t 
be the practice of attributing beliefs and desires anymore but of some other 
states. Due to these considerations I think that affectability cuts deeper into the 
nature of folk psychology than predictability or mindshaping does. But this isn’t 
a crucial point in the present context where the aim has been, first and foremost, 
to argue for the indispensability of engaged responses for understanding folk 
psychology. 
 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
I haven’t by any means aspired to argue that the affectability of folk psychology 
is the only benefit it has. I agree with Kristin Andrews that we should adopt a 
pluralistic view of folk psychology, so that the attribution of mental states helps 
us to have engaged responses to others, but also gives some predictive 
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advantage and can be used to mould the minds of others. Yet Andrews herself 
focuses too narrowly on the role of mentalistic attributions in the explanations 
of unexpected or counternormative behaviour, when the attributed attitudes can 
make sense of that (Andrews 2012, 120).21 The present proposal isn’t reducible 
to that because the need for engaged responses aren’t confined to situations 
wherein the behaviour of another person is in some sense abnormal; she might 
behave as I’ve expected all along but the attribution of an attitude and taking an 
appropriate response are still beneficial to me. In addition, the advantage of 
having the engaged responses isn’t the same as an explanatory advantage – even 
if the behaviour of the other has been sufficiently explained, one might still 
want to be able to take an evaluative stand toward her attitudes. The present 
view, then, doesn’t merely boil down to the idea that folk psychology provides 
ways of accounting for abnormal behaviours. 
Also, although I took the prediction and mindshaping proposals to disclose 
certain benefits of folk psychological attributions, the benefit I’ve presented 
doesn’t boil down to them. Affectability is different from predictability for quite 
obvious reasons: as argued, they can be dissociated so that the engaged respon-
ses are open also in cases where predictions don’t work. As for mindshaping, 
having the engaged responses to others’ attitudes does involve a normative 
element, in that agreement/disagreement and endorsement/ disapproval are 
evaluative, and thus probably at least implicitly prescriptive acts. Nevertheless, 
whether or not those who are having those responses aim at shaping the mind of 
the other is a purely contingent matter: sometimes they do, sometimes they 
don’t. Of course, if we construe the notion of mindshaping very broadly, the 
engaged responses can be seen as forms of first-person mindshaping – by taking 
the evaluative stance on whether to agree/disagree or endorse/disapprove, one is 
forming and possibly shaping her own attitudes toward another person. But that 
isn’t something that the proponents of the mindshaping hypothesis had in mind. 
We can conclude, then, that affectability presents itself as a distinctive and 
indispensable benefit of folk psychological attributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 A similar view, focusing on the evolutionary function, has been recently proposed by 
Zawidzki (2013, Ch. 7). 
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3. MORE ABOUT AFFECTABILITY:  
FROM ADOPTION TO NEGOTIATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In what follows, I will consider three mutually complementary ways in which 
the idea of affectability can be elaborated in its wide sense. The first concerns 
the possibility of more or less automatically adopting another’s beliefs and 
desires after having attributed them without any explicit inference. This reaction 
becomes possible when disagreement or disapproval is too demanding for the 
person, given the social superiority of the other. Clarification of that suggestion 
should also do some justice to the (relatively) unreflective effects that the 
attributions might have. As for the second proposal, I will discuss the emotional 
effects that our attributions may elicit in us, drawing some parallels from Peter 
Strawson’s seminal essay about reactive attitudes. The affective consequences 
of belief- and desire-attributions that are in focus there again concern the 
difficulty of maintaining the basic reactions that were described in the previous 
chapter. While the second idea is also about the unreflective effects of folk 
psychology, the third analysis ascends the unconscious, so to speak, and 
concentrates on how the attributed beliefs and desires can be negotiated so that 
the attributee can play an active part in the interpretation. The three parts of this 
chapter should thematically follow the folk psychological interpreter becoming 
more reflective in the process of attribution. Each of these cases shows how the 
initial reactions of agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval can 
affect the following interactions between the attributer and the attributee, thus 
being essential to our folk psychological understanding. 
So there are three additional dimensions in which the affectability of mental 
state attribution can be located. Although they may seem rather disparate the 
story will have a common theme. Besides the obvious fact that they all 
exemplify the idea of affectability, in all three dimensions the attitudes 
themselves can be in focus for the attributer and not their direct behavioural 
consequences. Whether in adopting a belief of the other, feeling resentment 
towards her desire, or trying to change her attitudes – in all those cases the 
represented attitude as such is the basic object of our concern. In that sense, I 
will retain the opposition to the predictive model of folk psychology also in the 
following analysis because these ways of being affected don’t imply much 
about predictive possibilities yet still are for us something to be interested in.  
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3.2 Mimetic belief, mimetic desire 
3.2.1 The general idea 
When we are facing an attitude of another person this may sometimes require an 
immediate response. In certain situations that response may be simply to adopt 
that attitude, not necessarily being aware of one’s own reaction. Emotional 
contagion, for instance, according to which people tend to converge emotionally 
by mimicking each others’ behaviour, is a widely acknowledged phenomenon 
of social cognition (Hatfield et al. 1993, Chartrand & Bargh 1999). Emotional 
contagion can be taken as the basic form of automatic empathy, distinguished 
from the so-called controlled empathy, i.e. consciously putting oneself into 
another person’s shoes (Hodges & Wegner 1997). People are prone to take on 
the experiences and feelings of one another and this may happen without much 
effort, by merely observing someone having that feeling. The evidence for that 
phenomenon comes also from neuroscience where it has been discovered that 
the same brain areas are activated when feeling an emotion and observing a 
person having that emotion, as with disgust, for instance (Wicker et al. 2003). 
The Humean metaphor, then, that the human minds are mirrors to one another22 
is alive and kicking. 
Can something similar be said about propositional attitudes, such as beliefs 
and desires? Although I am not going to argue for an exact analogy between 
emotions and propositional attitudes, I will claim that one is justified in 
speculating that when the subject has attributed certain beliefs and desires 
which she disagrees with or disapproves of, respectively, she may give up some 
of her own attitudes in response to her attributions. There are cases when a 
person may start to actually believe or desire something, simply because 
another person is taken by her to believe or want it. The attribution of the 
attitude brings about having the same attitude. The directness of that response is 
rather analogous to the case of emotional contagion where the detection of the 
emotion can bring about the same emotion in the cognizer, without having to be 
consciously mediated. The analogy stops here, though, because the adoption of 
a propositional attitude from the other can’t be elicited simply by behavioural 
cues.  
Nor am I claiming that the process in question involves anything like pretend 
attitudes, as advocated by some simulation theorists (Currie & Ravenscroft 
2002; Goldman 2006). The attitude adopted is the same type of mental state as 
the ascribed attitude. Also, the adoption doesn’t necessarily imply anything 
about the attributer having a higher-level representation about her adopted 
attitude. In other words, the attributer need not be aware of even of the outcome 
of that process. So the process – if we only consider its starting- and endpoints – 
would look something like the following: first, X attributes an attitude to Y, and 
                                                 
22 “The minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each other’s 
emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often 
reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees.” (Hume, Treatise 2.2.5) 
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this motivates X to adopt that attitude herself. Of course, this can’t be the whole 
story and now the question is what happens between those two points. If the 
process involved turns out to be too complicated and mediated by too many 
variables then it isn’t clear why exactly the mental state attribution as such 
should be picked out as the crucial factor in attitude-adoption. For instance, if it 
is mediated by evidential considerations then the adoption of the attitude isn’t 
due to the fact of previous ascription but due to rational considerations. A tricky 
issue surfaces when the attitude of the other person belongs to the evidential 
source for adopting it oneself. I’d prefer to postpone this possibility for the later 
occasion when I discuss the negotiability of mental state attribution. Since the 
more direct and presumably even irrational ways of being affected form the 
topic here I will be concentrating on the possibility in which the evidence 
doesn’t come into play.23 
Another desideratum at this point is to show how the attitude-adoption on 
the basis of folk psychological attribution differs from the one that is based on 
the comprehension of speech acts. When we’re interested in that kind of 
adoption the most obvious example is the situation wherein we come to believe 
or desire something after hearing someone talking about it. Then one could say 
that the comprehension of a speech act involves inferring the attitude expressed 
by that utterance which is then, in certain conditions, incorporated into one’s 
own cognitive economy. I am bringing this up because, since I tend to think that 
the understanding of speech acts doesn’t necessarily require inferring the 
underlying mental states,24 I distinguish it quite sharply from the attribution of 
attitudes that isn’t necessarily tied to linguistic behaviour. The interesting 
question is what the latter helps us to do that is distinctive from the adoption of 
attitudes on the basis of speech act understanding. Then again, since in the case 
of beliefs most of the relevant evidence concerns the way in which people 
consume the (verbal) testimony of others, my treatment of belief-adoption is 
closely connected with the discoveries in that area. 
So what else is needed for the process to work? I will suggest that the 
important variables here are the personal qualities of the attributee, most 
notably her trustworthiness, attractiveness, and (social) power. The overall 
evidence for that will be sketchy, I admit, but the present purpose is simply to 
point towards a way of being affected by mental state attribution that is realistic 
enough. In what follows, I will treat beliefs and desires separately, one reason 
being that the adoption of them may proceed differently and the amount of 
evidence that can be adduced is rather different. 
 
                                                 
23 By saying that this process is direct I don’t deny that the attribution of propositional 
attitudes requires semantic competence in order to evaluate the content of those attitudes. 
This kind of indirectness can’t be avoided. 
24 This is a highly contested issue and due to the heavy presence of Paul Grice in the modern 
theories of communication the competence in communication and Theory-of-Mind abilities 
is often seen as going hand-in-hand (Stalnaker 1998). I come back to this issue in the next 
chapter. 
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3.2.2 Mimetic belief 
Let’s take beliefs first. If we are aware that another person believes some 
proposition which we ourselves haven’t formed an opinion about, that 
proposition is brought to our attention, simply as a result of thinking about it. 
This also provides an opportunity to take a stand on the truth or falsity of that 
proposition. That much isn’t contested, I hope. The question arises though: how 
do people come to assent to that content. On a purely rationalist picture the 
assent should come from considerations pertaining to whether the proposition in 
question is supported by evidence and how well it coheres with the ascriber’s 
overall system of belief. The view that I support here diverges from such a 
rationalist view by acknowledging the possibility of non-evidential “brute” 
causation in the formation of beliefs. The adoption of a belief may be mediated 
by nothing more than the authority of the other. 
A rather more radical view would claim that merely comprehending an idea 
carries with it an implicit acceptance, only after of which it can be called into 
doubt. This so-called “Spinozist” model25 has been advocated by Daniel T. 
Gilbert, for instance (Gilbert 1991). According to him, since humans are 
creatures with limited time and limited cognitive processes, needing fast 
decisions in evidentially poor or ambiguous situations, comprehension and 
acceptance go together. As for experimental evidence for this thesis, it has 
turned out, for example, that already the comprehension of a false proposition 
makes it more probable that it is taken as true (Gilbert et al. 1990). If the 
Spinozist thesis is true, the idea that beliefs are adopted by an attributer because 
she has attributed those beliefs to others may lose its edge because the belief-
adoption would be a too general phenomenon – as soon as some content is 
comprehended it is already believed. The adoption-by-attribution model isn’t 
meant to be totally homogeneous across different contexts. It should be 
applicable when certain conditions concerning the attributee are satisfied. 
It isn’t clear, though, if the Spinozist claim is right. There is also some 
evidence indicating that people tend to be less liberal in assenting to a content 
that has relevance for them. Gilbert’s experiments presented subjects with 
statements that weren’t of any immediate relevance for them and it was less 
problematic to automatically accept them, while in the case of statements of 
high relevance the response can be more thoughtful (see Sperber et al. 2010)26. 
So I tentatively maintain that entertaining content is possible without accepting 
it beforehand. Since the primary engaged responses to the attributed belief 
should include agreement, disagreement, and indifference, the Spinozist model 
is incompatible with my model of engaged mindreading where all three are 
open possibilities. 
What, then, is needed to bring about the adoption of beliefs that have been 
attributed? Since the most reasonable assumption is that one needs to be 
                                                 
25 I am not doing an exegesis of Spinoza here in order to determine his actual views. 
26 In general, it seems that the view people have cognitive mechanisms that guarantee at least 
some epistemic vigilance, has recently gained prominence. 
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specifically motivated to end up doing that, we may also ask: what can motivate 
the attributer to make the ascribed belief her own? My guess is that the answer 
lies in the image the attributer has of the attributee. For example, if the latter is 
taken as exceptionally reliable in her belief-forming procedures, the subject 
may – for the sake of convenience – rely on that person by default. Signs of 
trustworthiness are among the first things people tend to look for in another 
person (Willis & Todorov 2006). After one has a reliable informant whose 
assertions can be trusted (Koenig et al. 2004), it is possible to trust also the 
beliefs that have been attributed to her. In proposing this, I am not excluding the 
possibility of revising the belief afterwards.  
The assumption of reliability may not be the only personal quality that 
motivates the subject to do that, of course. In social psychology, the motivation 
for changing one’s attitudes is quite well-studied27, and a quite useful distinction 
can be found from Herbert Kelman who distinguished between three major 
kinds of source (the person who effects the change) variables that increase the 
probability of being influenced by another agent - credibility, attractiveness, and 
means-control28 (Kelman 1958: 54). All those factors may come into play in 
social situations when a person is aware of someone having different attitudes. 
If the other is a socially prominent individual or if she has a reputation of being 
extremely trustworthy, at least in a specific domain of expertise, or if the subject 
simply aims to please the attributee, the adoption of the attributed beliefs may 
happen quite automatically. 
We should also distinguish two types of situations: one in which the ascriber 
already has a belief on the issue that is incompatible with the belief ascribed and 
one in which the ascriber hasn’t yet taken a stand.29 The awareness of the 
attributee’s beliefs doesn’t affect the attributer in precisely the same ways in 
these two cases. It is reasonable to assume that if the ascriber already has an 
incompatible belief then more motivational resources are needed to change it. 
For instance, people aren’t usually inclined to change their perceptually 
acquired beliefs simply because another person has a diverging belief, at least 
not in normal circumstances (Clément 2010). The same probably applies to any 
kind of firmly held beliefs, although the fact that the other doesn’t accept that 
may still affect the attributer, sometimes maybe even increasing her confidence 
that she must be right, simply out of obstinance, for instance. So one shouldn’t 
expect that the adoption-by-attribution model is indiscriminately applicable to 
any kind of situation in which beliefs are attributed. Still, in situations where the 
personal qualities of the attributee satisfy the necessary requirements 
                                                 
27 The notion “attitude” seems not to distinguish strictly between beliefs and desires as 
separate types of attitudes (Petty & Wegener 1998).  
28 By means-control it is meant the possibility to influence the goal-achievement of an agent 
(Kelman, ibid.). One could also call it the social power of the source, which I will do in the 
following discussion. I also tend to think that attractiveness could in principle be reduced to 
social power because, when considering its effects, it’s a species of the latter. 
29 I disregard situations where the beliefs of the attributer and the attributee already match 
because one can’t presumably speak about adopting any new belief on attributer’s part. 
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(credibility, attractiveness, or social power) adoption-by-attribution presents a 
quick and cognitively cheap way of acquiring beliefs30.  
Before closing this sub-section, I will cast a quick glance over an additional 
possible application of the adoption-by-attribution model. One of the most 
noticeable traits of human beings is our capacity for cultural learning. This 
means that most of the knowledge is acquired from others. Every person needs 
to be introduced into his community and its beliefs in order to survive in the 
social environment, which also brings about differences between communities 
because the traits acquired are specific to the group. How social transmission 
exactly works is an intriguing question. One form it may take could be the 
belief-adoption which is triggered by the attributed belief. How can this model 
fit into current theories of cultural evolution? 
There are many theories of cultural transmission on the market. Maybe the 
most notorious one is the memetic approach according to which “units of 
culture” – ideas and behaviours – propagate in the social environment by 
reproducing across minds, analogously to genes (Dawkins 1976). The meme’s 
eye view may seem to be the best standpoint from which to defend the idea that 
beliefs can be adopted directly after having been attributed to them. Yet it is 
doubtful whether this framework can be put to work because memeticists have 
faced numerous criticisms over its naïve view about the way in which ideas are 
transmitted from one mind to another. Most importantly, cognitive anthropo-
logists have criticized it on the ground that accurate replication occurs very 
rarely via an inferential mediation on the part of the receiver (Sperber 1996, 
2000; Atran 2001). These authors claim that there are cognitive constraints 
which affect the way that the idea is processed and exclude its brute replication. 
Does this criticism also threaten the idea that a belief can be transmitted through 
adoption-by-attribution? 
Of course, it doesn’t threaten the adoption-by-attribution model as such 
because the latter doesn’t imply anything about the similarity or difference 
between the attributer and the target, so the question about replication or 
mutation doesn’t even arise. The subject may even be mistaken in her 
attribution yet still adopt the attributed belief. So as long as we don’t want to 
give the adoption-by-attribution model any explanatory role in cultural 
evolution, we are safe. But I do think one can push this idea forward when we 
look behind cognitive constraints in belief transmission. 
There are contextual biases which affect which beliefs are adopted and 
which are not. The explanatory importance of contextual biases has been 
advocated, for instance, by Joseph Henrich who has stressed especially the role 
of prestige in cultural transmission, among other factors (Henrich 2009). People 
                                                 
30 More generally, a belief-ascription allows us to take into account another person’s take on 
a situation which can motivate the ascriber to consider the possibility of being mistaken, if 
the attributed belief diverges from hers. Rejection of belief is also a response, although 
merely a negative one. And, what’s most important, in the present context, is that it is 
possible to consider the truth or falsity of a belief independently of being able to predict 
anything about the attributee. It’s the attitude itself and its content that is in focus. 
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tend to prefer highly prestigious individuals when looking for models to learn 
from and the traits that are possessed by those individuals thus enjoy an 
advantage in survival (Henrich & Gil-White 2001). Since prestige is constituted 
by admirable personal qualities and is a form of social power, the adoption-by-
attribution model could also find its place in the theory of cultural evolution – 
the hypothesis would simply be that people tend to adopt the beliefs of 
prestigious individuals, for the reason that they have those beliefs, and disregard 
the less fortunate.  
In conclusion, the idea that merely attributing beliefs can cause the subject 
also to adopt them is psychologically realistic, when actualized in situations 
where the attributee has certain personal qualities which motivate the attributer 
to rely on them in forming their own beliefs. I also argued that this rather dumb 
and irrational, yet still cognitive, process can also play a part in cultural 
evolution, at least to some extent. Can something similar also be said about 
desires? 
 
3.2.3 Mimetic desire 
Assuming that acquiring beliefs by attributing them is a cognitive strategy that 
has at least some part to play in social cognition, what precludes us from 
applying this strategy to desires? The process could turn out as follows: after 
having attributed a desire that p to Y, X may in the light of that fact and some 
kind of relevant personal quality of Y adopt that desire herself by endorsing not 
only the attitude but also its content. But it is unreasonable to assume that the 
relevant qualities in question correspond to those that effect the adoption of 
beliefs. At least the credibility of the attributee must be excluded from the list of 
source variables, simply because there is no question whether the desire is 
credible or not.  
The credibility variable could perhaps be replaced by the indication of 
practical trustworthiness. I mean by the latter the property of having such 
desires and goals that conducive towards the well-being of their possessors. The 
well-being could be understood in a wide sense, involving simple pleasures but 
possibly also more complex states of affairs. If the notion of practical 
trustworthiness is feasible the model of desire-adoption could represent such 
situations where X is aware of Y’s desire that p, deems Y practically trust-
worthy, and because of that acquires the desire that p herself, even if the 
evaluation of trustworthiness is mistaken. It is doubtful whether this model is 
applicable to intrinsic desires, though. In order for X to take Y as practically 
trustworthy, the comprehension of the latter quality requires understanding what 
constitutes well-being for X or, in other words, what is desirable for X. This 
already implies having some relevant desires concerning one’s own well-being, 
which are needed in order to evaluate Y’s practical trustworthiness, and X can 
only adopt new desires that are instrumental for satisfying those pre-existing 
ones.  
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As for attractiveness and social power one doesn’t face similar difficulties. It 
is entirely coherent to assume that people tend to prefer things which are also 
wanted by attractive individuals and those who are in the position of social 
power. What may trouble more empirically-minded philosophers is the scarcity 
of evidence for the pervasiveness of such phenomena. Although the same could 
be said about belief-adoption, the latter idea has at least some resonance with 
the discoveries in social psychology about epistemic reliance upon others. Its 
possible role in cultural evolution is also rather dubious: while adopting beliefs 
after having attributed them may serve us well in exploiting the information that 
others have, assuming that they are epistemically reliable, the analogous method 
of adopting desires may easily overload the motivational mechanisms of the 
attributer.  
The proposed idea that, in certain conditions, people tend to adopt the 
attributed desires isn’t unprecedented, though. In literary theory, René Girard 
has for decades advocated a claim that the social life of human beings is largely 
driven by what he calls “mimetic desires”. Simply put, the idea is that people 
tend to take over the desires that others have which often leads to potentially 
violent conflict, since the resources that are wanted aren’t enough to satisfy all 
(Girard 1995). In line with my proposal, Girard doesn’t think that the process of 
mimicking is direct; some kind of conative resonance. Instead, it is mediated by 
the model which includes the other person and her desire (Girard 1976) – the 
attribution comes first, or so I assume. Girard doesn’t put much stress on the 
possible source variables that determine which individuals one mimics, 
probably because he hopes to generalize his model to most social situations. Yet 
one should be cautious not to over-generalize because it is doubtful whether 
people take over any desires of any individuals.31 There are some hints of 
attractiveness having an effect on the process because, according to Girard, at 
least in early modern novels the models of desires were fictional characters out 
of reach, most clearly exemplified by Don Quixote whose every desire was 
modelled on his heroes.32 Yet Girard tends to think that in the modern world 
mimetic mechanisms function rather indiscriminately. If he is right, the 
adoption-by-attribution would actually be much more prevalent in the case of 
desires than beliefs. Yet the question remains whether the picture offered by the 
literature on mimetic desire corresponds also to the psychological facts.  
An attempt to demonstrate this can be found in Garrells (2006) but his actual 
proposals are quite sketchy and the supposed evidence he presents is actually 
irrelevant. The putative fact that infants are able to mimick the behaviour of 
other people already in the first hours of their lives (Meltzoff & Moore 1983), 
and that the deferred imitation also arises very early in development (Meltzoff 
1988) are rather unrelated to the question about the pervasiveness of mimetic 
desires. He also referes to the general hypothesis that there is a common coding 
                                                 
31 I may do some injustice to Girard’s theory, which is actually very elaborate. 
32 “We literally don’t know what to desire and, in order to find out, we watch the people we 
admire: we imitate their desire.” (Girard 2004: 8) 
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between performed and perceived actions which enables children to understand 
that other people are like them. This is supported by the discovery of mirror 
neurons and the possible innateness of motor imitation (see Meltzoff & Decety 
2003). Yet since the common coding hypothesis isn’t about desires, it seems to 
be irrelevant in the present context. 
Possibly a more interesting discovery in that respect is that infants’ imitative 
abilities are sensitive to intentions and the goals of the person who is being 
imitated (Meltzoff 1995) because this involves adopting the intentions of other 
persons in order to fulfil their failed attempts at performing a task. Yet 
intentions are not desires. Imitating the first has a quite clear role to play in 
acquiring new skills (Wohlschläger & Bekkering 2002) while the imitation of 
desires probably lacks that kind of function. Also, since it isn’t entirely clear 
whether this kind of imitation of intentions involves attributing them to the 
other person, it may not resonate well with the adoption-by-attribution model 
that is under discussion here. Finally, in the aforementioned cases, mimetic 
abilities can been as a precondition rather than the outcome of mentalistic 
attributions. This is implicitly brought out by Garrells himself when he points 
towards the hypothesis that imitation is developmentally more basic when 
compared with the Theory-of-Mind ability (Garrells 2006: 67). 
But maybe developmental psychology isn’t the best place to look for the 
evidence about mimetic desires, anyway, especially if we are interested in the 
pervasiveness of that phenomenon and what variables influence it. If we look 
towards neuroscience, we can find some data, according to which the activation 
of the ventral striatum – which is considered to be the reward area of the brain – 
is in positive correlation with the shared preference of a person who is 
considered to be an expert (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. 2010). This seems to 
indicate that people are motivated (find it rewarding) to seek agreement in 
desires with the other if the other’s opinion is valued. This suggestion remains 
largely a suggestion, though. I will only assume that the mimetic desires, 
acquired in the way described by the adoption-by-attribution model, can and do 
emerge in certain social situations, and that personal qualities such as social 
power and attractiveness (and possibly practical trustworthiness) are the main 
source variables that effect the process. 
Minimally, from the subjective point of view, the awareness of a desire that 
diverges from one’s own or one which hasn’t been considered before, provides 
a possibility for considering the desirability of its content oneself. This is by no 
means a negligible effect of desire-attributions since adopting that desire 
through those considerations is a risky enterprise. But sometimes, when the 
attributee is respectable enough, this may actually pay off. Even if the subject is 
unable or unwilling to adopt the attributed desire the mere possibility of doing 
that can give rise to hesitation and a lack of resoluteness. It’s fitting, then, to 
consider the emotional effects of mental state attribution next. 
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3.3 Reactive attitudes and folk psychology 
One need not adopt an attributed mental state in order to be affected by it, of 
course. Sometimes the result is only limited to eliciting certain affective 
responses. It seems quite obvious that being aware of other’s beliefs and desires 
can induce different reactions in us. Then again, this doesn’t say much. One 
needs to specify what reactions mental state attributions produce which are 
specific to this capacity. That is the starting-point: even if the attributer isn’t 
willing to adopt the ascribed attitude she usually has some sort of idea of 
whether the belief is something to be agreed or disagreed with, and the desire is 
something to be endorsed or disapproved. The affective reaction to the attitude 
should exhibit that kind of positive or negative valence.  
The opinion that other people have certain beliefs and desires can delight or 
sadden us in noticeable ways. As we found earlier, a more active response 
would be to attempt to satisfy or frustrate a desire and to consolidate or overturn 
a belief. Yet the passive emotional reaction is something that probably underlies 
most of our attempts to do that, acting as a motivational source. One feels no 
motivation to effect a change in someone’s beliefs if she is indifferent towards 
them. The same applies to desires, of course. But, for instance, if the other 
person wants something that I consider to be simply repulsive I probably am 
inclined to frustrate that desire; I certainly condemn it, at least implicitly, and 
this condemnation underlies the inclination to frustrate the desire in question. 
On the other hand, if the desire is deemed praiseworthy the appropriate reaction 
may be to admire the person for having that kind of attitude. Our relation to the 
cognitive attitudes of others is also affect-laden: another person having a false 
belief (or our thought of her having a false belief) can cause an attitude of 
condemnation in us; especially if that belief is formed on the basis of evidence 
that clearly points the other way. Epistemic laziness is blameworthy for many 
by itself, and the opposite applies to epistemic rigour. The affective reactions to 
beliefs aren’t confined to the presumption of epistemic evaluation, though. One 
may have more warm feelings to another person simply because of sharing a 
belief with her. 
The issue of our affective responses to our own mental state attributions 
doesn’t seem to be a well-researched area in the study of social cognition. In 
philosophy, an analysis of an idea which is somewhat along these lines can be 
found in the work of Peter Strawson, whose essay “Freedom and Resentment” 
brought into focus the notion of “reactive attitudes” (Strawson 1974). The 
motivation for that essay was to re-conceptualize the question of free will and 
determinism, and to argue that our moral practices of ascribing responsibility 
don’t strictly depend upon whether determinism is true or not. What matters 
here for my concerns is not the question whether Strawson was successful in 
achieving that goal. Rather, I point towards the concept of reactive attitudes in 
order to see whether it can be employed to account for our reactions to beliefs 
and desires. 
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Strawson draws attention to reactive attitudes to others’ attitudes and inten-
tions that are manifested in their actions; such as gratitude, resentment, 
forgiveness and love (1974: 4). The list is open-ended. It is meant to cover all 
those responses that we might have to “goodwill, its absence, or its opposite” 
(ibid. 6). He doesn’t distinguish clearly between our responses to others’ 
attitudes and to actions, although he stresses the first. Still, the attitudes of the 
other people he focuses on are those which are also expressed in action. This 
kind of focus on his part isn’t surprising because reactive attitudes are more 
explicit when they are caused by others’ overt behaviour. The latter may have a 
more noticeable effect on us than the attitude that is left unexpressed. 
Nonetheless, I intend to supply some considerations in favour of the idea that 
the awareness of others’ attitudes themselves has emotional effects on the 
subject.33 
Another thing to note about Strawson’s approach is that he doesn’t strictly 
define the mental states of others awareness of which can cause reactive 
attitudes in us. He speaks vaguely about attitudes and intentions (ibid. 5). Since 
my focus here is on beliefs and desires, it can be doubted whether the reactive 
attitudes considered by Strawson can even be caused by those mental states. 
The opposite danger would be that his account is too general and includes any 
kind of attitude people may have. That is why the following discussion is 
Strawsonian only in its inspiration but not necessarily in its content.  
What kind of reactive attitudes would be appropriate to assume in case of 
thinking that other people believe or want something? For instance, could 
gratitude or resentment be such attitudes? Although some quirky scenarios may 
be possible, gratitude doesn’t seem to be fit for that job. One feels gratitude 
towards another when the latter has done something that has influenced the first 
in some positive manner. Merely wanting or believing something doesn’t merit 
any gratitude. The case of resentment is somewhat more intriguing. One 
possible meaning of resentment would be the feeling of displeasure that arises 
due to another agent’s action that is considered to be a wrongdoing (La Caze 
2001: 33).34 Taken this way, the reactive attitude of resentment is first and 
foremost a reaction to overt behaviour and doesn’t provide what we are looking 
for; namely, a reactive attitude to beliefs and/or desires. But resentment could 
be given a more specific sense. There is also resentment as ressentiment which 
is a stronger term in that it includes also the feeling of powerlessness when 
compared to some other person (Nietzsche [1887] 1988). Ressentiment arises 
when the subject can’t do anything to influence the wrongdoer; to punish her, 
for instance35. 
It may seem that since ressentiment still arises when some other person has 
done something, not simply wanted or believed something, it doesn’t really 
                                                 
33 I don’t mean to claim that Strawson himself ignores that possibility. 
34 For Adam Smith, this attitude is also accompanied by the desire for revenge (Smith 1984). 
35 For an analysis of the difference between resentment and ressentiment, see Meltzer & 
Musolf (2002). 
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illuminate the possible reactive attitudes towards others’ attitudes in themselves. 
But since ressentiment also involves the feeling of powerlessness, it can also be 
extended to others’ beliefs and desires. What another person(s) believes or 
desires is often beyond our control, maybe even more than their behaviour, 
since actions can be manipulated by more means, even by adjusting the material 
environment (enabling conditions for action) of an agent, so that the behaviour 
in question simply can’t get off the ground. Yet to influence others’ beliefs or 
desires themselves is more difficult both because these attitudes aren’t 
perceptually accessible and there doesn’t seem to be any reliable method, 
available to a layperson, to manipulate them.36 Of course, there are probably 
noticeable individual differences between people’s abilities to influence others’ 
beliefs and desires. Ressentiment can arise when a person is unable to do to that 
but feels, whether justly or unjustly, that the other shouldn’t have that belief or 
desire in question that she thinks the other person has. In the case of beliefs, at 
least, one may in principle resort to rational argumentation to convince the 
other. But a person who has weaker argumentative abilities than the other may 
even feel ressentiment because of that.  
As for resenting another person’s belief, it is here where reactive attitudes 
and adoption-by-attribution, described in the previous sub-chapter, can be 
brought together. A person, being aware of discrepant beliefs of another person 
who is in the position of power is inclined to adopt those attitudes oneself but as 
long as she is aware of her powerlessness she also feels ressentiment towards 
the other. Inequalities between persons may actually bring about uniformity in 
beliefs – people in the “lower” positions adopt the attitude of the respected 
ones. But that uniformity can be quite unstable and artificial because of the 
resentfulness of the “weak”. Of course, ressentiment can emerge before and 
without adopting the beliefs of the other and the latter reaction probably can 
alleviate the negative attitude. After all, people tend to appreciate more those 
people to whom they are similar (Sally 2000).  
Let’s also consider the standpoint of the person in the position of power. 
Power over others acquires a peculiar dimension when it extends over the 
attitudes of the latter. Since beliefs aren’t usually behaviourally manifest, don’t 
have strongly predictable effects (as argued in the previous chapter), and can 
change quite unexpectedly, an attempt to control them involves a high chance of 
failure. In order to achieve “full” control one should also somehow guarantee 
that the other wouldn’t feel any resentment (in the sense of ressentiment) while 
adopting the attitude because if she did, the belief that the other adopts wouldn’t 
be fully and sincerely endorsed by her. If a person believes something and has a 
negative emotion because of having those mental states, it is an example of bad 
faith on her part because she is not able to make the attitude fully her own. She 
                                                 
36 I am definitely not asserting that there are no methods. The art of demagogy, or even 
advertising in some cases, would be an appropriate example here. In the next section I will 
elaborate on that these ideas. 
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is alienated from her attitude.37 This is why the attempt to control someone’s 
beliefs is quite tricky – simple authority isn’t enough because it creates a 
resentful attitude which precludes oneself from having full control over the 
other.38 The person in power needs to control also the resentfulness of the other 
which otherwise may lead to forsaking that belief at the first opportunity. 
But the person in control also has her own typical reactive attitudes towards 
those with lesser power and influence. For instance, towards those who adopt 
her beliefs while actually being resentful, one possible reaction would be to feel 
contempt or pity. If the others retain their divergent beliefs, the reaction would 
be harder to predict. In any case, people in opposite positions of power have 
both their characteristic reactive attitudes towards each other. The same 
probably applies to resenting someone’s desires but I used the example of 
beliefs because the control over the desires of another person presumably 
doesn’t imply any attempt to make her adopt one’s own. However, this doesn’t 
spell any trouble for the idea that ressentiment is still a reactive attitude to take 
towards the attributed desires of others as long as the subject feels herself to be 
powerless to control them. 
These remarks have been hypothetical, though, and may need confirmation 
by research in social psychology. The aim was to provide some indication of 
how a reactive attitude to a mental state attribution might look. Nonetheless, I 
tend to think that the resentment and contempt towards other people having 
certain propositional attitudes is a real phenomenon. The question is rather 
about its extent and the underlying mechanisms39. People tend to be frustrated 
and feel indignation when others, whose opinions are valued, don’t share their 
beliefs and desires, especially if they can’t do anything to change them.  
Ressentiment and contempt are only two possible reactive attitudes among 
many.40 The feeling of anger, for instance, may arise in any situation where the 
belief or desire of the other is deemed to be in some sense devious. The results 
of that reaction may get quite nasty. They encompass many possibilities: from 
two children fighting over what to do to religious wars where the mutual anger 
is inflamed by the awareness of two sides having incompatible beliefs and 
preferences. Or take the disappointment and bitterness of a person who knows 
that some significant other doesn’t share her beliefs and desires. Or, the despair 
of those whose beliefs don’t find any resonance in the community they live in. 
The list here, as with Strawson’s, is open-ended and I don’t attempt to reveal all 
the possibilities. 
                                                 
37 I will analyse further what it means to be alienated in the seventh chapter of this thesis. 
38 Naturally, there can be other factors. 
39 These claims about reactive attitudes can even be taken as a priori in a very weak sense, in 
that they characterize certain practical possibilities that belong to the everyday folk 
pscyhological practice the existence of which can’t be directly falsified by empirical 
research. For a similar idea, see Heal 1998. 
40 For some suggestions concerning reactive attitudes towards beliefs, see Zimmerman 
(2007), and Schwitzgebel (2010). Both stress the rational responses of criticism and 
approval. 
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Reactive attitudes aren’t limited to negative ones, of course, although the 
latter are somewhat more salient. Some desires and beliefs are more 
commendable than others and having them can also induce approval on the 
attributer’s part. It is probably quite common that when someone discovers that 
another person shares a belief with her, she also finds that person to be more 
congenial and feels positive emotions towards her (Lydon et al. 1988). The 
same applies to shared desires the awareness of which increases the probability 
of achieving common goals, so that people should appreciate the similarity in 
attitudes. It is also possible in principle that people sometimes feel positive 
affect towards those whose attitudes are different from theirs but the reverse 
tendency is presumably still more prevalent. Similarities and harmony between 
persons are usually more attractive to both parties. 
Although largely speculative, the philosophical point that can be picked out 
from these examples is that the reactions that the mental state ascription induces 
can be focused on the attributed attitudes themselves and not their behavioural 
or psychological consequences. What additional variables come into play is an 
open (and empirical) question but doesn’t inhibit us from making a general 
claim. The affective importance of others’ mental states as such provides an 
additional consideration to doubt the claim that prediction is the basic fruit of 
folk psychology.  
But why do people have reactive attitudes to mental states in themselves?41 I 
am here not seeking a sub-personal explanation, at least not at this point, 
because from the pragmatic perspective, a more interesting question is why the 
beliefs and desires of other people should matter to us in producing such 
reactive attitudes and how they relate to our practical interests more generally. 
One possible response would still be to maintain that we should care about them 
because of their potential behavioural consequences. Although sometimes they 
may not produce them it is reasonable for us to be concerned about them simply 
because they are possible. It’s better to be safe than sorry and caring about the 
beliefs and desires seemingly non-instrumentally is just the most simple and 
efficient strategy to avoid being unpleasantly surprised by other’s actions. In 
this way it is perhaps possible to conjoin the fact that the reactive attitudes are 
caused by the mental state attribution itself and the claim that one is still in a 
more fundamental sense interested in the possible behavioural outcomes of 
those states. 
I don’t think that such explanation is satisfactory. After all, I have already 
argued in the second chapter that the predictive potential that folk psychology 
offers is rather meagre and doesn’t really distinguish mentalistic vocabulary 
from other kinds of conceptual tools. To claim that the main rationale for the 
mental state ascriptions is the making of predictions is to make an empty 
gesture in order to somehow stick to one’s guns. Also, since I am here 
                                                 
41 “In themselves” doesn’t mean that mental states aren’t attributed in a wider context of 
social circumstances and personal characteristics. It simply refers to the fact that our 
emotional reactions don’t strictly depend on behavioural consequences of the mental states. 
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interested in an explanation that only attempts to put the mental state attribution 
in a context of our consciously acknowledged values and concerns; much in line 
with what I assume to be Strawson’s approach (Strawson 1974: 24). Explaining 
the importance of our reactive attitudes in such an indirect way overlooks their 
most immediate consequences for us. What are they? 
Keep in mind that my focus has been on incompatible, not compatible, 
desires and beliefs, and mostly on the negative reactive attitudes towards them. 
My answer to the previous question is mostly confined to such negative 
attitudes such as resentment and anger. Positive reactive attitudes to compatible 
mental states might require a different explanation. This shouldn’t be seen as a 
flaw in my account since it isn’t clear why different kinds of reactive attitudes 
should be explained in similar ways. So what explains the negative attitudes? I 
propose that the beliefs and desires of others – at least when they are different 
from the ones that the attributer has – function as a challenge to the attributer. 
For instance, the challenge posed by the divergent desire of another person isn’t 
confined to the fact that this desire may cause actions the attributer may not 
like. In fact, I’ve argued against the view that the possible behavioural 
consequences are the main thing to care about. Merely the awareness that the 
other person wants something different demands at least an implicit response. 
The divergent desire also expresses the uncomfortable truth that the state of 
affairs that the subject cares about may be deemed unworthy by others because 
of their divergent desires and that is what gives the attributer a reason to be 
concerned; be it a bad reason or not. As for incompatible beliefs, the 
explanation is similar: being aware that another person has a different belief 
about some subject matter constitutes a challenge to the attributer because the 
latter needs to ask which of them is right in her belief. One needs to take into 
account that someone believes something different and that can be quite 
disturbing.42  
In sum, both divergent beliefs and divergent desires function as challenges to 
the attributer of attitudes because they make her aware of the particularity of her 
cognitive and conative perspectives. This may seem to some to be a rather 
shallow explanation because it doesn’t say anything about the causal 
mechanisms that bring about reactive attitudes in the face of others’ mental 
states. Nevertheless, there is still some value in bringing out how the reactive 
attitudes to the mental state attributions are related to the wider concerns of the 
attributer – to know what is true and what is satisfying. The awareness of other 
perspectives calls that into doubt and can bring about negative affective 
reactions, especially if the attributee’s perspective somehow dominates the 
attributer’s own. 
                                                 
42 This kind of depiction feeds quite smoothly into the debate in epistemology over 
conciliationism. According to that view, one should decrease radically her confidence in her 
belief if her epistemic peer disagrees with her (Christensen 2009). The clear difference here 
is that I don’t intend to prescribe anything when saying that the awareness of a divergent 
belief can shake one’s confidence and elicit negative reaction. Nor I distinguish between 
epistemic peers and other folk.  
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As I said, the reactive attitudes to compatible beliefs and desires might 
demand a different explanation. In this case, the mental states of the attributee 
function as an additional support for the attributer’s own perspective, which 
tends to bring about positive affective reactions. Such an explanation wouldn’t 
even be completely different from the one given to the reactive attitudes 
towards incompatible attitudes. While the latter challenge the attributer’s own 
perspective the compatible attitudes confirm it, and challenge and confirmation 
can be seen as two opposites on a continuum. But I won’t delve into that here. 
The important general idea here is that the common sense conception of mental 
states can be quite affect-laden and this this is because the beliefs and desires of 
other people directly bear upon one’s own theoretical and practical perspectives.  
 
 
3.4 Manipulating and negotiating attitudes 
3.4.1 Becoming active 
Thus far in the chapter we have only considered reactions to the mental states of 
others which are passive and don’t require any deliberation or active thinking 
and planning on the attributer’s part. In the case of reactive attitudes I mostly 
concentrated on the passive sentiment of ressentiment, which arose when the 
attributer wasn’t able to do anything about another’s belief or desire. Of course, 
situations where the other person can be at least to some extent affected by the 
attributer are probably more common. So what can the attributer do in a 
situation of conflict43 between her mental states and those of others, besides 
simply having a reactive attitude or conforming to the other’s perspective? 
What are the relevant possibilities here?44  
To analyse those cases in which we are aware of the other person having a 
belief or a desire with which we are unhappy, it is useful to consider these 
possibilities in the form of a decision tree, starting from the most generally 
defined opposite reactions one might have and moving downwards to more 
specific possibilities. On every level, one of the reactions puts an end to the 
interaction game, while the other carries forward the dual structure. So, starting 
from above, the most general choice is simply whether to ignore the unattractive 
attitude or do something about it. Consciously ignoring such an attitude is a 
perfectly feasible option but it also puts a quick end to the flow of possibilities. 
This doesn’t mean that the aforementioned passive reactions like automatic 
adoption or a reactive attitude couldn’t still be available but these don’t require 
any active deliberation on the part of the subject anyway. So the possibility of 
ignoring others’ beliefs or desires is one way to react, and I am not going to 
speculate when it is cognitively demanding and when it is not. 
                                                 
43 By conflict I mean that the subject considers the belief or desire of another person to be 
reprehensible in some way. 
44 Although conflicting beliefs and desires are in focus, I don’t deny that situations when 
there is harmony between attitudes do not have their own practical possibilities. 
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The opposite of ignoring is doing something about the other’s attitude, and 
this can be realized in two ways. The first of them, conforming to the attitude in 
question, reflects the automatic adoption already analysed above. The only 
difference here is that the subject chooses to take over the other’s attitude, while 
considering, for instance, the fact that the other is in a position of power or that 
she has good reasons for holding that attitude. The weighing of reasons wasn’t 
possible on the passive level. But the other option besides conforming which 
additionally evolves into two separate paths is what I call “alteration”: an active 
attempt to change the attitude of another person. The question is now how to 
mould the desires and beliefs of others, and I distinguish two possible answers – 
manipulation or negotiation45. These are not mutually exclusive options – 
negotiation can include a noticeable amount of manipulation – but they are still 
analytically separable.  
Manipulation, as I define it for the present context, is a way of leading 
another person into thinking or wanting something while concealing one’s own 
role in producing that change or, if not concealing, at least not allowing the 
other to challenge this role and cast doubt upon it. This may not be an orthodox 
definition of manipulation, if there even is any46, but it should help us make the 
intended distinction between manipulation and negotiation. Negotiation should 
be possible only when the other is able to respond to the attempts of the 
attributer to change her beliefs and desires. Manipulation and negotiation should 
express two general ways of moulding the desires and beliefs of other people. In 
case of the first, only one person is the active participant, in the second, both 
are. Both of those two strategies can elicit reactive attitudes in others and may 
result in a rather automatic adoption of attitudes, as described above. Unlike the 
previously analysed responses, both manipulation and negotiation seem to 
require active deliberation on the part of the subject. And finally, the difference 
between these two strategies stems from the fact that negotiation also requires 
the other person to be an active participant in the process. The manipulation is 
also a two-way game in the sense that the subject has to calculate the possible 
responses of the other person and his possible moves, depending on those 
responses. But the fact that the manipulative moves of the subject are dependent 
on the other person doesn’t mean that the latter can challenge those moves, 
which is necessary for negotiation to emerge.47 In what follows, I will briefly 
analyse each of these strategies. 
                                                 
45 Or “persuasion”, as Rudinow (1978: 338) puts it. He also adds coercion as the third 
possibility. Since I am interested here in ways in which people try to influence beliefs and 
desires of each other, I leave coercion out of my account because it aims rather 
straightforwardly at influencing actions and overlooks the motivation of a person. 
46 There seem to be two uses of “manipulation” in everyday talk, one is morally neutral and 
the other is not. I prefer the first one but I admit that using this expression may bring about 
unwanted connotations. 
47 The distinction between negotiation and manipulation is basically the age-old opposition 
between authority and mere power, reason and persuasion, argument and force (Williams 
2002: 9) which are often hard to distinguish. 
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3.4.2 Manipulation of attitudes 
Probably the most obvious example of manipulation is deception. The growing 
ability to deceive conspecifics is seen by many to be one of the underlying 
causes of the evolution of social intelligence and intelligence in general in 
primates (Byrne & Whiten 1988). The ability to deceive isn’t even confined to 
those organisms which have the ability to ascribe mental states. This is 
demonstrated by the simple phenomenon of mimicry, for instance. In the 
present context, the evolutionary role of deception isn’t the most pressing issue. 
The existence of intentional deception, the aim of which is to induce a false 
belief in the other person, is surely a real phenomenon in the social world, and 
has a part to play in social situations. Deception can proceed through different 
paths – by giving the other false information, by holding back relevant 
information, but also by offering true information which is formulated so that it 
is possible to make some false inferences from that. 
Is it also possible to deceive someone into wanting something? There are no 
false desires, only inappropriate and failed ones. So deception doesn’t seem to 
apply to them. Yet one can still talk about it when a person induces in another a 
desire that she originally didn’t have and does that without giving her an 
opportunity to consider the advantages and disadvantages of having that desire. 
Desires can still be responsive to reasons, at least to some extent. But it also 
seems that deceiving someone into wanting something requires the prior 
manipulation of her belief about what is worthwhile to desire and what is not. In 
that sense, the deception is primarily about beliefs. 
Deception is also a rather specific way to influence the beliefs of others 
because it only aims at creating false beliefs. Manipulation, as I defined it, isn’t 
confined to that because it involves any attempt to influence other’s attitudes 
without letting her actively contribute to the process. So it is perfectly possible 
to manipulate someone into believing something true, as long as the other 
person is unaware of the process or unable to control it. The same applies to 
desires – people can be made to want something that is actually useful to them, 
the process still being a form of manipulation. Take the adoption-by-attribution 
model, for instance, that was considered before, according to which people can 
adopt the beliefs and desires that they have attributed to their social superiors. 
Even this can be taken as manipulation by the latter if they intentionally exploit 
their status in inducing attitudes in others, whether these attitudes are true and 
useful or not.48 More generally, if a true belief or useful desire is formed 
because of the action of another person without the subject being able of even 
minimally reflecting on that, this can be taken as manipulation. 
Joel Rudinow has also argued that manipulation isn’t limited to deceptive 
moves. For him, manipulation aims at changing the motivational profile of a 
person by deceiving her or using her weaknesses (Rudinow 1978: 346). The 
second disjunct is about creating in another person an incentive that she can’t 
                                                 
48 This isn’t meant to deny that adoption-by-attribution is mainly an automatic and 
nonintentional process. 
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resist. In a way this kind of disjunctive account captures the distinction between 
manipulating another person’s beliefs and desires, respectively. Manipulation of 
beliefs would be a form of deception and the manipulation of desires would be a 
way of exploiting the other’s weaknesses. This is still a bit too restrictive 
because Rudinow seems to confine at least the manipulation of beliefs to the 
formation of false beliefs while my account tries to avoid this implication. But 
the general spirit of his approach is pretty similar to the one considered here.  
But is my definition of manipulation – a definition that is not limited to 
deception and includes any kind of one-sided social influence – satisfactory? Is 
it an unhappy consequence of the definition that only reflectively acquired 
beliefs and desires can be seen as not being outcomes of manipulation? After 
all, there are probably many beliefs and desires that originate from others but 
are not formed with any explicit awareness or ability to control them. Most of 
the attitudes of children are probably acquired from others unreflectively. Does 
that mean that these attitudes are also the objects of manipulation? Or what 
about the case of rhetorical persuasion which relies not only on arguments but 
also on particular qualities of speakers and listeners?49 Since I am not aiming at 
drawing a moral distinction here, I don’t think it’s really a problem. The 
pedagogy of children does have a strong manipulative element, in the sense of 
manipulation considered here, because it often avoids any active contribution 
from the pupil, at least in the earliest years of a child’s life. I suspend judgement 
on the question whether this kind of manipulation can be avoided or not, or 
even whether it is good or not. As for rhetorical persuasion, one can also say 
that it is a form of manipulating others into believing and wanting something. In 
public discussions manipulative elements are intermingled with negotiation, and 
the distinction presented here is, in a way, an ideal one.  
Both negotiation and manipulation can be ways of being affected by mental 
state attributions. The main difference between the two, as I’ve already noted, is 
that in negotiation the interpreted person plays an active part in responding to 
the interpretation. Still, what significance does the distinction have for the folk 
psychological interpretation and affectability? The idea of affectability was 
meant to bring out how others’ beliefs and desires can bear upon us and not in 
the way that physical facts do. The awareness of them can affect us in specific 
ways – through reactive attitudes, adoption of others’ beliefs and desires, or our 
own actions – without necessarily any predictive inferences concerning the 
direct behavioural consequences of those attitudes.50 In manipulation, our 
actions in relation to others’ attitudes may be somewhat more similar to our 
dealings with merely physical facts or objects than in negotiation. After all, 
manipulation is usually associated with using mere force and rather than reason 
                                                 
49 For Aristotle, for instance, there are three sources of persuasiveness in rhetoric, the first 
comes from the character of the speaker, the second from the emotional state of the hearer, 
and the third from the argument (Rapp 2010). According to my account, only the last one 
would be a form of pure non-manipulative strategy. 
50 I am not denying that we make predictive inferences concerning the possible effects of our 
actions on the mental states and behaviour of others. 
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or argument. The manipulator seems to treat the other as an object of purely 
causal treatment. 
Although this depiction isn’t completely off the mark, there is still an 
element in the manipulative behaviour that is important to point out. If the 
objects of manipulation are beliefs and desires, the sheer-force metaphor isn’t 
appropriate because it doesn’t seem to be possible to simply force people to 
believe or want something, even if one is in a position of power.51 This is 
largely an intuitive claim and may be disproved in the future when the 
neurosciences evolve to the point at which its means will be available for many. 
But at least for now, the manipulation of others’ beliefs and desires is still a 
difficult skill that requires the ability to exploit the complex web of social 
relations. 
 
3.4.3 Negotiating attitudes 
As I’ve postulated, what distinguishes negotiation from manipulation is that the 
other person plays an active part in the interpretation process by being able to 
challenge the attributer’s role in inducing in her the belief or desire in question. 
Negotiation is reciprocal in that both sides play their part in construing the folk 
psychological interpretation. So it is not necessary that the attributer has a 
pregiven understanding of what attitudes the other has and a pregiven plan that 
specifies how to change them. Such an anticipatory understanding is in any case 
unstable because what mental states the other has may become clear only at the 
end of the negotiation. Furthermore there may be no specific initial plan that 
concerns how to change the other’s attitudes because the attributer’s under-
standing of her communicative intentions may be ambiguous and only become 
clear during the process of negotiation (Gibbs 2001: 109). The attributer’s own 
mental profile in general may change during the process and the participants 
may come to have attitudes that they didn’t know that they have had before 
(Ratcliffe 2006: 39). That is the most important reason why negotiation is a 
specific way of being affected by folk psychological interpretations because the 
interpretation of the other can also influence the self-interpretation of the 
attributer and she might come to change her own self-understanding. In the case 
of adoption-by-attribution something similar is going on because the attribution 
can also result in an attitudinal change but that process is nonreflective and 
nonreciprocal. If the inclination of the attributer to adopt the attributed attitudes 
is exploited by the other person who is in the position of power, manipulation 
emerges. But in negotiation, both participants have some control over the 
process, which is also more dynamic. 
In the case of beliefs, consider, for example, someone who attempts to 
change a belief which she has attributed to another person by presenting some 
considerations against it. Since the other is in a position to respond to that 
attempt, the process of negotiation may go in different directions: if the other 
                                                 
51 Remember also the remarks in the previous subchapter about the instability in the power 
over attitudes because of the ressentiment. 
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doesn’t agree with that attribution she can argue that the interpretation itself is 
mistaken, or, if she agrees, she can take into account the arguments of the 
subject against that belief. The outcome may be that the original attributer 
herself adopts the belief in question if the other manages to convince him in the 
second way. Alternatively, the attributer may simply drop the attribution if the 
other is able to make the case that she actually doesn’t have that belief. This 
may seem obvious and even trivial but it elucidates nicely the way in which the 
process of folk psychological interpretation – when reciprocal – is something 
quite different from explaining and predicting the behavior of physical objects.  
As for desires, negotiation may seem to proceed differently, if at all, because it 
isn’t clear whether desires can be responsive to arguments. If negotiation is 
about challenging someone’s attitude, having a desire may seem to be immune 
to that kind of challenge. Also, can one speak about justification in the case of 
desires? If one is a Humean about reasons and takes them to be derivable from 
desires in some way, then desires are a bedrock of justification in practical 
reasoning and asking for reasons for having a desire is an inappropriate 
manoeuvre. 
The first thing to note is that even if desires are not responsive to reasons, it 
is still possible to maintain that in negotiation the attribution of a desire can be 
challenged and interpretation is still reciprocal in that sense. Even if there are no 
reasons for having a desire, arguments for or against ascribing a desire to 
someone still have their place in social interaction. But, although I wouldn’t 
delve too deep into theories of practical reasoning, I still claim that the idea of 
desires being responsive to reasons has some plausibility when we consider 
everyday conversations between reflective individuals. It seems to be entirely 
appropriate to ask such a person if she should have the desire she has or whether 
the desire in question is actually useful for her. If she admits that the desire she 
has isn’t actually beneficial by any means, she may be able to give up that 
desire, at least in the long run and in the absence of addiction or some other 
abnormality (see Moran 2001: 115). If that is true then the difference between 
the reason-responsiveness of beliefs and desires may be a mere temporal matter 
and desires can be negotiated in the same way. 
The account of negotiation presented here hardly amounts to a completely 
original claim because traditional approaches to folk psychology (theory theory 
and simulation theory) have already been criticized by those authors who I will 
call interactionists52 and who see the social interaction as a crucial or even 
constitutive aspect of folk psychological understanding (Gallagher 2006, Hutto 
2004, Ratcliffe 2007). I also see negotiation as a counterexample to the 
detached prediction-explanation model of folk psychology because in 
negotiation the interpretation proceeds through reciprocal interaction and the 
attitudes can often become aims in themselves and their possible behavioural 
consequences may have only secondary importance. Nonetheless, I am not 
making any claim here that negotiation (or interaction) is a necessary 
                                                 
52 This may not be the best label for them but I can’t think of any better. 
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component of mental state attribution because there are other ways of being 
affected by mental state attribution, which I have introduced before. The 
aforementioned authors tend to generally overlook manipulative forms of social 
cognition. 
Still, the affectability through negotiation does seem to assume the mutual 
responsiveness of the interpreter and the person being interpreted. When 
speaking about others in terms of beliefs and desires we can position ourselves 
to those attitudes before knowing their future behaviour so that we can act in 
response to those attitudes. It is natural to assume further that we can treat the 
other who we interpret also as the one who is interpreting us. Two interpeters 
have, at least to some extent, different points of view so that taking into account 
the other’s perspective cannot proceed solely from a projection of one’s own 
perspective on the situation. If the interpretations are mutual then the other can 
also help or thwart our interpretation of them and also our interpretion of 
ourselves. If I attribute a belief or desire to someone she can challenge my 
interpretation, and vice versa. If we are on to something with the idea of 
affectability, and the folk psychological attribution’s relevance comes before its 
predictive function, then the possibility of mutual interpretation doesn’t depend 
on it either.  
To give an additional example of an account of interpretation through 
negotiation, James Bohman (2000) connects the mutual interpretability with the 
second person perspective which consists of taking an appropriate performative 
attitude and which differs from both first- and third-person perspective in that it 
depicts the person being interpreted as an active partner in a dialogue who is 
also able to respond to my interpretations. He sees it as a distinctive stance 
toward other persons when we want to understand them and he even postulates 
it as a methodological standpoint that the social sciences should take. 
 
It is not I or we that must be satisfied; the interpretive situation is one in which 
an interpreter is interpreting someone else, who in turn can offer an interpretation 
of his own actions and the interpretation of the other’s interpretations. The I who 
is an interpreter is a you as a participant in communication, and thus no account 
of the hermeneutic circle can do without the second person. (Bohman 2000: 223) 
 
I am not in a position here to judge the role of negotiation in the social sciences 
but Bohman’s account of mutual interpretation is relevant in the present context 
because it exemplifies the reciprocal element in negotiations and how they 
affect the subject by (re)considering also her own self-interpretations. In 
conclusion, knowledge of others’ beliefs and desires gives us a possibility of 
negotiating their views of the common world or to from that sort of negotiation. 
Both constitute a response, even if the latter does so only in a negative way. 
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3.5 Taking stock 
The possibilities presented here were meant to provide an elaboration of the 
affectability that comes from the folk psychological attributions, which is hard 
to account for in terms of a simplistic explanation-prediction model. The reason 
why the latter faces trouble is that the mental states that we ascribe matter to us 
not solely for satisfying explanatory or predictive concerns. Instead, the possi-
bilities considered here – adoption-by-attribution, reactive attitudes, manipu-
lation and negotiation – revolve around people having those attitudes, without 
necessarily aiming at the behavioural consequences of those mental states.  
These considerations don’t tell us much about the function of folk psyc-
hology but still reveal its substantial consequences for human social life. They 
don’t tell us about the function because both what folk psychology was selected 
for, and why it emerged in the first place, are still open questions. I can in any 
case claim that the meaningfulness of that question doesn’t affect the points 
presented here. Even if folk psychology initially emerged because of the 
behavioural consequences that were inferred from attributions of mental states, 
now the attitudes themselves can be non-instrumental objects of concern (see 
Woodward 2009). How this can be was exactly the question that I have been 
trying to answer here. Now it is time to draw these different threads together. 
When the subject attributes a belief or desire to another person, it is quite 
safe to assume that the different possible reactions depend on the particular 
relationship between those agents.53 In the end, it is the job for social psycho-
logy to clarify the most crucial variables that play a part in the function of 
affectability. Still, I’ve mostly stressed the role of social power between the 
attributer and the attributee, although trustworthiness in the case of belief-
attribution and attractiveness in case of both mental states may also be 
important. Then again, attractiveness can also be taken as a form of social 
power since the latter is a rather wide category. When there is an inequality 
between the interpreter and the one being interpreted, so that the first dominates 
the second, the result may be the automatic adoption of the attributed mental 
state by the subject and/or ressentiment towards the other person because of the 
attributer’s inability to influence the other’s attitude. If the inequality in power 
goes the other way, the subject is in the position to somehow manipulate the 
other into believing or wanting in a manner to her liking. And finally, when the 
power to influence the other is relatively equal between two persons, the most 
natural response is the attempt to negotiate the attribution if one party is 
dissatisfied with it. On the other hand, if the negotiation happens in the situation 
of inequality, the person in power can push it towards manipulation again.54 
                                                 
53 What is lacking in my account, is attention to group-level attributions, but I do think that 
the most paradigmatic mental state attributions take place in two-person interactions. 
54 To anticipate a possible question, I should note that the reason why I have mostly focused on 
the possible reactions to divergent attitudes comes from the fact that if the attitudes of persons 
agree with each other the participants find it less necessary to adopt a metarepresentational 
stance and they can remain at the first-order mental states, directed at the world.  
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One could raise the concern that I haven’t really defined what social power 
means here and I need to respond because this concern is perfectly reasonable. 
In the most general sense, social power is the capacity of a person to influence 
the behaviour and mental states of other persons, whether or not they agree to 
this influence. Stated that way, the definition is certainly very vague but perhaps 
satisfactory for present purposes. It is still possible to make some specifications. 
For example, social power shouldn’t be conceived merely as a power to do 
something (Hobbes 1996 [1641]: 58), but as a power over someone (Dahl 1957: 
202)55, being always interpersonal. Also, power is a dispositional concept 
(Lukes 2005: 69), a capacity that can be actualized only in specific conditions  
An interesting question is: to what extent the social power of a person is also 
constituted by the folk psychological attributions of others? For instance, if 
someone feels ressentiment towards another person and is inclined to adopt her 
mental state because of that, contrary to her own preferences, the social power 
of the other not only influences the way in which the subject is affected but it is 
also partially constituted by the affectability by which the subject is moved by 
the other. The fact that the others are inclined to adopt the attitudes of a more 
powerful person makes the latter even more socially dominant. Power can thus 
be gained by controlling the interpretation of one’s mental states by others if it 
brings about appropriate reactive attitudes and submission to the mental profile 
of the subject. Because of that, the affectability that comes from folk psycho-
logical attributions in unequal situations can enforce already existing power 
relations and even create a new kind of social power; the one that is rooted in 
persons being aware that the other (the dominant one) has certain mental states 
which they cannot influence.56  
Following this line of thought, power can also be gained through the ability 
to create second-order desires in others that have one’s own beliefs and desires 
as objects. If others want the subject to have certain attitudes but are unable to 
influence them, they are stuck in a situation where they don’t really have many 
options besides either conforming to those attitudes themselves (adoption-by-
attribution) – and thus basically giving up the second-order desire – or remain in 
impotent resentment (ressentiment). In both cases, the subject retains her 
dominant position because the others depend on her attitudes (or, more 
precisely, on their interpretation of her attitudes). The subject who is able to 
generate such second-order desires in others knows that they are affected by 
their own attributions and can take advantage of this knowledge. 
Power relations influence the way in which persons are affected by their folk 
psychological attributions, and vice versa, but do they also affect the attribution 
                                                 
55 In Dahl’s definition, A having power over B implies a counterfactual so that B wouldn’t 
do certain things if A hadn’t any power over him (see Lukes 2005: 44). I tend to think that 
this is too restrictive. Although it may be epistemically more difficult to understand the 
situation where this condition isn’t met, it is still possible to talk about A having power over 
B, as long as she is able to influence her B in some relevant way. 
56 How the ability to control others’ attitudes is the highest form of social power is also 
stressed by Lukes (2005: 27). 
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process itself? Do they play a part in determining how people attribute mental 
states to others? This is a further question, one that I won’t answer here. But the 
take-home message at this point is that the affectability that folk psychology 
provides is closely entangled with the questions of social power and influence 
and its effects can be quite different depending on the specific relationship that 
the subjects are involved in. Through folk psychological attributions people 
consolidate and disentangle their friendships and animosities, which feed back 
into the effects that those attributions have. All this can centre on mental states 
themselves, not only their behavioural consequences. 
In this chapter I elaborated on the idea of affectability and hopefully 
succeeded in bringing out the diversity of reactions to folk psychological 
attributions. I presented them in an order that began with the more automatic 
ones and I worked towards those which include reflected negotiations. How-
ever, in all cases, the social relationship between the attributer and the attributee 
plays its part in influencing the intersubjective consequences of the attribution 
process. In what follows, I hope to show that this aspect of folk psychology is 
also relevant to the way that we construe the application conditions of folk 
psychological concepts. 
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4. FROM AFFECTABILITY TO THE 
COMMUNICATIVE CONCEPTION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters, I analysed what I called the affectability of mental state 
attributions which revealed itself in the responses of agreement/disagreement 
and endorsement/disapproval to the attributed attitudes and the further reactions 
that derive from them. Although the analysis stayed at a descriptive level, I also 
argued that such engaged responses are indispensable for our folk psychological 
practice. That is to say, such responses are always open to the attributers of 
attitudes. Affectability is something that can’t be reduced to other benefits that 
mental states attributions provide such as prediction, explanation or mind-
shaping. Nevertheless, one may ask whether this fact implies anything 
interesting about the concepts of belief and desire or even about the beliefs and 
desires themselves. 
In this chapter I am going to seek a construal of mental state attribution that 
makes intelligible why the engaged responses to the ascribed attitudes are 
appropriate. This sharpens the understanding of the concepts of belief and 
desire and it will raise the question what their application conditions must 
involve in order to explain the indispensability of the engaged responses. I will 
focus on affectability in the narrow sense, which includes the responses of 
agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval. By “application condi-
tions” I mean the conditions under which the attributer counts as having applied 
the concept in question.57 In the case of beliefs and desires, then, the question is 
about the conditions under which the concepts of belief and desire are 
applicable to persons in a way that can deliver the benefits of affectability. I 
label this way of analysing the application conditions “explication”. By using 
that term I don’t intend to commit myself to Carnap’s (1950) project of 
conceptual explication with which the present account might be associated. I 
don’t want to engage in historical exegesis or to ascertain whether there are 
substantial similarities or differences between our accounts. Because hopefully 
this doesn’t matter for the present project. A more directly comparable account 
is Justin Fisher’s (2006) project of pragmatic conceptual analysis which 
operates along broadly similar lines and to which my own account owes a lot. In 
his case the explication also starts from a consideration of the main benefits of a 
concept and then “reverse engineers” it to see what its application has to involve 
in order to provide those benefits. As far as I’m aware, though, he himself 
hasn’t applied his approach to the concepts of belief and desire. What matters 
here is the possibility of inferring something substantial from the benefits of a 
certain way of concept-use to the application conditions of those concepts.  
                                                 
57 In the present case one could also talk about the attribution conditions of beliefs and 
desires. 
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The pragmatic conceptual analysis (or conceptual explication) differs from the 
standard conceptual analysis by not requiring that the specific conditions of 
concept-application correspond to the intuitions of the concept-users. As long as 
those application conditions can explain how the concepts in question deliver 
the benefits that we are interested in, the explication can be satisfactory. I 
consider this to be an advantage of explication over the standard conceptual 
analysis because it isn’t clear that intuitions are the best guide to the meaning of 
our concepts. I won’t argue for such skepticism towards intuitions in this 
chapter, though. Even if conceptual analysis were a trustworthy method for 
understanding the application conditions of our concepts, the present exercise 
would still be worthwhile in its own right. As long as we are interested in under-
standing how our concepts can bear the fruits they do, explication deserves 
some attention. It helps us to see how our concepts can benefit us even under 
possibly unintuitive application conditions. The explication doesn’t aim at 
capturing all the main patterns of use but at clarifying the conditions under which 
the use gives us the benefits we care about. It can thus have revisionary 
repercussions: certain commonly acknowledged features of the concept’s use may 
be rejected if they are not relevant to the delivery of the benefits in question. 
Still, the content of the application conditions should be epistemically 
accessible to ordinary ascribers. Only then would they be in a position to know 
when these conditions hold because the ascribers should be able to consciously 
put to use the results of the explication. Otherwise the whole endeavor wouldn’t 
make much sense. The explication is meant to help the users of those concepts 
understand what they are doing and why it is worthwhile. There might also be a 
substantial psychological story about how the application of concepts works. 
However, since the workings of cognitive mechanisms themselves are not 
accessible to subjects, the application conditions shouldn’t be expressed at that 
level. The hope is that after we have explained how the main benefits are 
delivered, there will be nothing more at the personal level to be said about the 
application conditions of the concepts in question. 
I will proceed as follows. First, in section 3.2 I will consider and reject 
certain accounts of the application conditions of the concepts of belief and 
desire. This diagnosis should help us identify a better account that would 
explain the benefits related to affectability. In section 3.3 I will consider the 
possibility of understanding folk psychological attributions in terms of speech 
acts. Such an approach allows us to see how the application conditions of those 
concepts can be modeled on the conditions for uttering and comprehending 
assertions and requests. Then, in section 3.4, I will analyse Christopher 
Gauker’s theory of propositional attitude ascriptions (the communicative 
conception) which is the best (and only) version of this kind of approach. 
Finally, in section 3.5 I will present an additional consideration in support of 
Gauker’s account. I will defend the view that his communicative conception 
provides the necessary application conditions for the concepts of belief and 
desire for explaining affectability. Discussion of the shortcomings of the 
communicative conception will be left for the next chapter. 
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4.2 Initial proposals 
When we now think about the proposed main benefits of the concepts of belief 
and desire, namely, the responses of agreement/disagreement and endorse-
ment/disapproval, it might seem difficult to get the explication started. What 
could the proper application conditions for those concepts be if the use of those 
concepts is to deliver the effects in question? In order to fully articulate these 
responses as benefits of the concepts in question we should also bear in mind 
affectability in the wider sense. This includes the emotional responses as well as 
the negotiation and manipulation of others’ attitudes. Does the possibility of 
such engaged responses put some constraints on how we should understand the 
application conditions of mental predicates? 
In what follows, I go through some well-known theories of mentalistic 
concepts to see how well they are able to explain the indispensability of 
engaged responses. I don’t intend to seek a deductive argument in support of 
one account against others. The aim is to make an inference to the best 
explanation which should satisfy three desiderata. First, it should make explicit 
why engaged responses are not merely contingent effects of mental state 
attributions, but need to be open to an ascriber whenever beliefs and desires are 
attributed (as argued in the second chapter of the thesis). Second, a satisfactory 
account of application conditions should also show why beliefs and desires 
merit different responses of agreement/disagreement and endorsement/dis-
approval, respectively. Beliefs and desires have distinctive response profiles and 
acceptable application conditions of mental predicates must respect that. Third, 
the proposed application conditions should be epistemically accessible to 
ordinary ascribers: there shouldn’t be any need to defer to experts in order to 
know whether these conditions hold. This also means that the ascribers 
themselves should be able to understand why affectability is a proper response 
to beliefs and desires. 
So let’s consider certain theories of mental concepts and see whether the 
application conditions that can be read off from them can explain the 
indispensability of affectability. Let’s take, for instance, behaviourist accounts 
that attempt to analyse the application conditions of mental predicates in terms 
of certain behavioural dispositions. On that view the concepts of belief and 
desire are applicable to the subject when she has the appropriate behavioural 
dispositions (Ryle 1949).58 When we ask whether the behaviourist account can 
explain the indispensability of the engaged responses to the attributed attitudes, 
it isn’t clear how she can do that. For the behaviourist, the ascription of attitudes 
only commits the ascriber to considering the pertinent dispositions and there is 
no reason to think that she should be able to agree or disagree with the 
attributed belief or to endorse or disapprove of the attributed desire. Her only 
forward-looking response is prediction of behaviour on the basis of the 
                                                 
58 Although behaviourism has fallen out of favor, dispositionalist views which also analyse 
mental states in terms of dispositions, not necessarily only in terms behavioural ones, can 
still be found on the market (see Schwitzgebel 2002).  
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conditionals which specify the pertinent disposition. So if I am right and the 
engaged responses are indispensable for propositional attitude attribution, 
behaviourism has difficulties in accounting for that. If we take it as a theory 
about the application conditions of the concepts of mental states, it doesn’t 
manage to function as an explication that properly registers affectability as the 
central benefit of the propositional attitude attributions.59  
The problem with behaviourism seems to generalize to functionalist views 
about the concepts of mental states. Let’s ignore the plethora of different views 
that go under the label of “functionalism.” These accounts in general, as long as 
they even profess to say something about the application conditions of the 
concepts of belief and desire, construe them in terms of the causal relations 
between environmental inputs, inner states and behavioural outputs (see Lewis 
1972). Yet beefing up the information base of the application conditions with 
reference to inner states doesn’t seem to make functionalism more successful 
than behaviourism vis-à-vis their capacity to explicate the concepts of belief and 
desire. It still doesn’t explain why the engaged responses should be indispens-
able to the attributers. Predictions and explanations seem to be the only 
necessary benefits that knowledge of the functional roles of mental states 
provides. 
We are now in a position to diagnose the failure of behaviourism and 
functionalism and draw a more general conclusion from that. It seems that no 
account of the application conditions of the concepts of belief and desire that 
takes the use of those concepts to consist of merely identifying certain 
regularities or causal relations between inner and outer states of a person can 
account for the indispensability of engaged responses of agreement/disagree-
ment and endorsement/disapproal and thus fail to satisfy the first desideratum of 
acceptable application-conditions. Any explication of the concepts of belief and 
desire which aims to explain such indispensability needs to introduce something 
extra in order to make explicit the connection between application conditions 
and engaged responses for an ordinary ascriber. 
With that in mind, a rather obvious move would be to turn to represen-
tationalist views which take propositional attitudes to be relations to repre-
sentations with propositional content (Fodor 1975; Cummins 1996). After all, 
such representations are semantically evaluable and engaged responses of 
agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval consist of taking a stand 
on the content of another’s attitudes. If the application conditions of the 
concepts of belief and desire make reference to the contents of those attitudes, 
the engaged responses seem to be an appropriate possible outcome of the 
mental state ascriptions. Since functionalism and behaviourism don’t make such 
                                                 
59 Note that I am not here considering the nature of attitudes, but only the respective 
concepts. Inferring something about the latter from the affectability of belief- and desire-
attributions would be a too hasty step. It might be even true that behaviourism is correct 
about the nature of beliefs and desires but mistaken about the application conditions of the 
concepts. 
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reference in their application conditions60 one could claim that they failed to 
explicate the concepts in question. On the other hand, if the attribution of beliefs 
and desires involves picking out the representations which are semantically 
evaluable then the engaged responses may seem to be understandable reactions 
to the ascribed attitudes. I am not saying that a representationalist is necessarily 
committed to claiming that the attributer of beliefs and desires has to identify 
the mental representation which the attributed attitude is supposed to stand in a 
relation with. She may treat the nature and the attribution of attitudes separately. 
I am only pointing out that if she does make such a claim she might have a 
chance of explaining the indispensability of engaged responses. Represen-
tationalism, then, seems to satisfy the first desideratum, namely, that engaged 
responses to propositional attitudes are indispensable. Semantic evaluability, 
after all, seems to be an essential characteristic of mental representations. 
This appearance might be illusory, however. It isn’t clear whether a mere 
fact of tokening a mental representation can call forth an engaged reponse or 
why does it even matter to a person who is aware of this representation. As I’ve 
argued in the previous chapter, reactive attitudes that we have towards others’ 
beliefs and desires should be explained (on the personal level) by the fact that 
beliefs and desires function as confirmation or challenge to the ascribers’ 
cognitive and conative perspective, respectively. Unless a mental representation 
is backed up by communicative force (being used to claim that something is or 
should be the case), it doesn’t provide any reason to have an affect-laden 
reactive attitude towards it. This is only a phenomenological point, though, and 
won’t probably convince a representationalist. 
However, representationalism also faces difficulties with the second deside-
ratum of acceptable application conditions, namely, to explain the difference 
between beliefs and desires in such a way that would explain why the engaged 
responses to those two types of attitudes are different. Attributing propositional 
content doesn’t yet constitute attributing beliefs or desires. One way for a 
representationalist to distinguish between the two is to claim that although 
belief that p and desire that p have the same contents they are distinct because 
their contents enter into different functional roles. But in that case the dis-
tinction is based on functionalist considerations and we saw that the indispen-
sability of engaged responses couldn’t be explicated on their basis.  
A different proposal would be to argue that beliefs and desires are actually 
relations to different types of content. For instance, one could distinguish 
between indicative contents which have truth-conditions and imperative 
contents which have satisfaction-conditions. Indicative contents specify what 
the world is like and the imperative contents specify what it should be like. 
Let’s suppose that beliefs are relations to indicative contents and desires are 
relations to imperative contents. The move from the difference between the two 
kinds of contents to the difference in engaged responses could be made as 
                                                 
60 Since functionalism is a rather general view about the mind, the idea that beliefs and 
desires involve relations to representations isn’t strictly speaking inconsistent with it. 
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follows. The responses to the attributed beliefs, agreement and disagreement, 
can be taken as acts of affirming and denying what is the case. The responses to 
desires, endorsement and disapproval, on the other hand, evaluate what should 
be the case. If this is correct the difference in engaged responses seems to map 
nicely onto the difference between the two types of contents. If this suggestion 
works, the different engaged responses (agreement/disagreement and endorse-
ment/disapproval) seem to latch onto two different types of content, thus 
satisfying the desideratum of the explication. In a nutshell: the response of 
agreement/disagreement is appropriate in the case of an attributed belief 
because the ascriber has assigned indicative content to it; the response of 
endorsement/disapproval is appropriate in the case of attributed desires because 
the ascriber has assigned imperative content to it. 
Imperative contents are contentious. They can be found in Millikan (1984: 
97) and in the work of some authors have tried to understand the content of 
pains in these terms (see Klein 2007; Martinez 2011, for a critique, see Cutter & 
Tye 2011). In the present context, it is worth pointing out this controversy 
because, assuming that the imperative theory of pain is successful, one can ask 
what distinguishes desires from pains. They seem to be distinct. It doesn’t make 
sense to endorse or disapprove of pains on the basis of their contents. One 
natural proposal would be to articulate the distinction in terms of different 
functional roles. But then we would fall back into the earlier problem of 
explicating the engaged responses on the basis of functional roles – a problem 
which seems to lack a satisfactory answer. Furthermore, the threat of 
indistinguishability may remain if we reject the imperative theory of pain 
because there are other mental states that can be characterised as having 
imperative contents such as intentions, decisions or tryings. If we did need to 
turn to functionalist considerations in order to distinguish these mental states 
from desires then once again it wouldn’t be clear how we could explicate the 
concept of desire merely in terms of imperative contents. The appeal to such 
contents doesn’t seem to fully explain why the attribution of desire delivers the 
benefits it does, even if it involves assigning an imperative content. 
Representationalism faces an additional problem. It doesn’t seem to be able 
to satisfy the third desideratum, according to which the proposed application 
conditions have to be accessible to ordinary ascribers. ‘Mental representation’ is 
a technical notion and not something that belongs to the conceptual repertoire of 
the folk. In any case, ordinary ascribers are probably unable to recognize when 
a particular mental representation is tokened. This means that representationalist 
application conditions would be uninformative to them and wouldn’t help to 
understand when it is appropriate to ascribe beliefs and desires. This difficulty 
that representationalism has in explicating the concepts in question shouldn’t be 
surprising, though. Construing the application conditions for ordinary ascribers 
hasn’t really been the central concern of its proponents.  
A disgruntled voice might now object that I am simply too demanding. None 
of the proposed accounts we have considered (behaviourism, functionalism or 
representationalism) have explained the indispensability of engaged responses. 
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Still, none of them has been inconsistent with the fact of these responses either. 
Maybe the possibility of differential engaged responses need not be built into 
the attribution conditions. The fact that these responses are always open to us 
may simply be a psychological or social fact about us as human beings. Since 
evaluating what others think or prefer matters to people, this might suffice for 
explaining why we tend to have the responses in question. But this, the 
objection might go, doesn’t require construing the application conditions of the 
concepts of belief and desire in the manner that explains the indispensability of 
agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval. It is possible to cash out 
the application conditions in functionalist terms, for instance, and still maintain 
that the engaged responses are crucial, both psychologically and socially. 
This objection has its force because the envisaged scenario seems to be 
possible. One cannot deny that merely functionalist application conditions, for 
instance, can deliver the explanatory and predictive fruits and don’t exclude the 
possibility of engaged responses. It can deliver them as long as these application 
conditions can specify the contents of the attitudes and the difference between 
them, either on the content- or the attitude-level. One just needs to postulate in 
addition the (psychological) disposition to have two kinds of engaged response 
to those two kinds of attitude. But merely pointing out this possibility doesn’t 
show that we shouldn’t seek an explication that has the indispensability of 
engaged responses built into the application conditions. If it’s true that 
affectability is indispensable for folk psychology, as argued in the second 
chapter, it is an explication we should strive after. The aim of the present 
chapter is to argue that there is an explication that explains why the engaged 
responses are always open to us (i.e. their indispensability), something that the 
other accounts can’t fully achieve. 
 
 
4.3 From engaged responses to speech acts 
In order to reach the desired explication I need to take a detour. Remember that 
in the previous section I discussed imperative contents, as opposed to indicative 
contents, in order to help us draw the distinction between beliefs and desires 
and explain the difference in the appropriate engaged responses. It is noticeable 
that imperative contents are modeled on imperative utterances, and indicative 
contents on expressions in the indicative mood. Let’s take a representation with 
an imperative content p which thus has a certain state of affairs or event-type as 
its satisfaction-condition. It is natural to express this representation in terms of 
the imperative utterance “p!”, or “let it be the case that p!”.61 Analogously, the 
expressions in the indicative mood should be applicable to indicative contents. 
A theorist may stress that the possibility of expressing the content in linguistic 
                                                 
61 Perhaps instead of imperative, we should speak about optative utterances because 
imperatives are tied second-personal interactions, while the optative can take a third-
personal form, too. Nevertheless, I stick with the term “imperative” and simply stipulate that 
it can be also be in the third person. 
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form doesn’t imply that the representation itself has linguistic structure. None-
theless, we at least model the representations in terms of linguistic utterances. It 
is actually very common to model mental states in such a way because the 
content of mental states is usually understood in terms of truth-conditions and 
reference. Linguistic utterances are exactly the paradigmatic entities that have 
such properties. 
Notice that when we distinguish between indicative and imperative moods in 
language we can have the engaged responses, which were supposed to 
characterize beliefs and desires, also to assertions and requests. After all, these 
speech acts have satisfaction conditions, closely parallel to beliefs and desires, 
and we can frustrate them, satisfy them, negotiate with those who have perfor-
med them, etc. To put it more precisely, in the case of another person making an 
assertion that p my initial response to it is agreement or disagreement. The 
pertinent responses that might follow are basically the same as those that follow 
from the attribution of belief: an expression of solidarity or an attempt to 
persuade the other of being mistaken. The attribution of desires, on the other 
hand, mirrors the understanding of requests: if another person has requested that 
p I can endorse or disapprove it. If I endorse it I can try to fulfil the request. If I 
disapprove of the request I may try to act against it or simply ignore it. The 
pertinent responses to others’ mental states mirror the responses to the respec-
tive speech acts: endorsement or disapproval, agreement or disagreement.62  
Remember the difficulty that the representationalist had in distinguishing 
between the proper response to beliefs and the proper response to desires in 
providing their application conditions. This difficulty was tied to the fact that 
the possible differences in causal-functional roles didn’t seem to provide any 
reason to think that this difference necessitates the difference in engaged 
responses. If we now consider the possibility of modeling the application 
conditions of beliefs and desires on assertions and requests then the different 
engaged responses map nicely onto those two kinds of speech act. To elaborate, 
the (sincere) assertion that p can be taken as the asserter’s expression of her 
commitment to the truth of p and the (sincere) request that p expresses the 
commitment to the claim that p should be the case. This makes it under-
standable why the response of agreeing or disagreeing whether p is the proper 
response in the first case and endorsing or disapproving of the prospect of p is 
proper in the second. We have the same pattern of responses in the case of the 
respective attitudes. 
                                                 
62 The response profiles to attitudes and speech acts are also similar with regard to them both 
functioning as a challenge or confirmation to the attributer’s conative perspective in the case 
of desires and requests, and a challenge or confirmation to her cognitive perspective in the 
case of beliefs and assertions. They function as a challenge in the case of incompatible and 
as a confirmation in the case of compatible attitudes and speech acts. In the previous chapter 
I already brought out how attributed attitudes function as a challenge to or a confirmation of 
an attributer’s perspective and this explains why they matter to her. Now the further idea is 
simply that the significance of speech acts for a person who comprehends them is similar to 
that of attributed attitudes. 
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Remember also that the appeal to the distinction between imperative and 
indicative contents was perhaps the most promising move for the representatio-
nalist to make. Yet it had difficulties distinguishing desires from other possible 
states with imperative contents such as pains. Those states didn’t seem to 
involve endorsement/disapproval as the proper response. Using requests as the 
model for understanding the import of desires at least specifies the proper 
response that would then distinguish desires (and requests) from other kinds of 
attitude, like pain, intention, or decision. The engaged responses to desires 
mirror the responses to requests. In addition, desires seem to be conceptually 
connected with requests because the latter can be taken as natural expressions of 
desires in a communicative situation. Finally, the ability to utter and 
comprehend assertions and requests belong the linguistic competence of the 
folk which means that application conditions which make reference to speech 
acts should be epistemically accessible to them. 
It seems, then, that one can hope to have a satisfactory explication of the 
concepts of belief and desire if their application conditions can be cashed out in 
terms of assertions and requests. The indispensability of the engaged responses 
to attitudes would then be inherited from the engaged responses to the 
corresponding speech acts that belong to the application conditions of the 
attitude-concepts. That idea is expressed in Christopher Gauker’s communica-
tive conception of beliefs and desires which I am going to analyse and defend in 
the next section. But there are some questions that need to be answered before 
doing that. 
One worry might be that responses to speech acts, taken by themselves, 
don’t completely match up with responses to the respective attitudes. Bernard 
Williams, for instance, has argued that there is a crucial difference between 
responses to assertions and beliefs. In the case of the latter their falsity 
motivates a “fatal objection”, namely, that the person should give up her belief. 
Yet there are numerous circumstances where it is quite acceptable to utter false 
assertions. It is rather the insincerity of an assertion that matters for evaluating it 
as incorrect and this requires having certain beliefs and intentions backing up 
the assertion (Williams 2002: 70). If a person sincerely asserts that p, she also 
believes that p. In such a case she should retract her assertion when it is false 
because the aim of the assertion in this case is to share a belief with the hearer. I 
don’t think that this is particularly damaging to the attempt to explicate the 
concept of belief in terms of assertions. The difference in responses doesn’t 
cancel out important similarities. Agreement and disagreement are proper 
reactions both to assertions and to beliefs. 
Nevertheless, following the previous problem one might raise a further and a 
seemingly more serious objection to any attempt to understand the application 
conditions of attitude-concepts in terms of speech acts. Namely, one might raise 
the concern that this similarity between attitudes and speech acts doesn’t reveal 
anything interesting about the folk psychological practice. According to such an 
objection, the significance of speech acts such as assertions and requests should 
be explained in terms of the beliefs and desires that underlie them, not the other 
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way around. After all, assertions are supposed to express beliefs and requests to 
express desires. By trying to say something substantial about mental state 
attributions in terms of speech acts, the objection could go, I seem to put the 
cart before the horse.  
The first thing to say in response is that one should acknowledge that there 
need not be a one-way understanding of assertions in terms of beliefs but beliefs 
can also be understood in terms of assertions (Williams 2002: 81). The same 
considerations should also apply to desires and requests. In the present context I 
take the analysis of the (attribution of) attitudes in terms of speech acts to be 
useful because it brings out the way in which we can explicate the concepts in 
an affectability-sensitive manner. Nevertheless, it could be objected that I have 
to make the controversial assumption that speech act production and compre-
hension is possible without the attitude attribution. If this assumption doesn’t 
hold then the application conditions for mental state concepts can’t be cashed 
out in terms of speech acts. The explanation of the latter would refer to the 
attitudes and this makes the analysis circular. 
But is that circle vicious? If the aim is only to illuminate a certain aspect of 
the belief and desire attributions by appealing to speech acts, this doesn’t entail 
that there can’t also be a reverse way to understand speech acts in terms of 
attitudes. Williams’ point, after all, is exactly that the two approaches can be 
complementary, not that there is a one-way understanding of the relation 
between attitudes and speech acts. Since the engaged responses to the latter are 
somewhat more apparent in our linguistic communication the present choice is 
to understand the less apparent responses to attitudes as similar to the ones we 
have to the speech acts. Nevertheless, it is possible to maintain this idea and to 
argue that we can’t really understand or even produce speech acts without 
attributing mental states as well. The understanding of them is intertwined, so to 
speak, and the present decoupling is only for analytic purposes. 
I do think that denying the viciousness of the circle is a feasible path to take 
here. If we concentrate on our actual situation, the understanding of attitudes 
and the understanding of speech acts are strongly linked. But for those who are 
still not convinced, one can also argue that speech act comprehension without 
mental state attribution is at least empirically possible. Imagine, for instance, a 
"ritualistic" community where discursive acts only follow pre-given rules that 
define the success of communication, independently of subjective interests and 
perspectives of the participants. In that kind of community, language can still 
serve the function of providing information and coordinating action. One could 
object that agents there would be irrational but this is beside the point. A more 
relevant objection could be that the content of linguistic utterances is ambiguous 
and identifying the beliefs and desires behind such utterances is required to 
disambiguate the message. One needs to make a stronger claim, though, in order 
to make this into a real objection. One should claim that ascribing beliefs is 
necessary for disambiguating messages. But as long as there are other means of 
disambiguation available or as long as there are messages that are not ambi-
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guous, this objection has no bite. The burden of proof against these possibilities 
is on my imaginary opponent.  
What’s more, there are models of linguistic communication that don’t 
necessarily require agents to have mentalizing abilities. For instance, Richard 
Breheny (2006) has defended a minimalist account according to which basic 
communication only presupposes the capacity to jointly attend shared 
situations. From another angle Ruth Millikan (2005) has argued for the feasibi-
lity of communication that is enabled by linguistic items which have conven-
tional semantic mappings. Comprehension of these mappings doesn’t neces-
sarily require guessing at the propositional attitudes behind their production. 
The third example is Tad Zawidzki (2013) who takes linguistic communication 
to consist of understanding what is rational and proper to utter in a context 
considering the observable behaviour of others, without having to attribute 
propositional attitudes. According to Zawidzki, different mindshaping practices 
have caused us to have uniform expectations towards specific types of speech 
act as patterns of behaviour. Our responses to those speech acts can be 
explained without invoking our knowledge of the mental states that are 
supposed to underlie them.63 I won’t delve any deeper into the question as to 
which of these three accounts is the most promising because this would be a 
topic for an entire additional research project. In the present context I only 
mention these theories in order to strengthen the case for the intended 
explication. 
There is also empirical support for the possibility of speech acts without 
attitude ascription. This comes from the fact that there are high-functioning 
autistic individuals who have a theory of mind deficit but are able to participate 
in linguistic communication (Andrews 2002). Even those who are able to pass 
the (explicit) false belief task show impairments in understanding mental states 
in real life social situations (Andrews and Radenovic 2006). The case of autism, 
then, indicates that there are people who comprehend speech acts but who are 
not competent attributers of beliefs and desires. This isn’t a completely un-
controversial point because autistic individuals have also problems with 
mastering certain aspects of language, especially its pragmatic features. For 
instance, they have difficulties understanding reversibility of pronouns (Tager-
Flusberg 1994), context-sensitivity (Happé 1997), metaphor (Rundblad and 
Annaz 2010) and irony (MacKay and Shaw 2004). The fact that autistic 
speakers are not fully able to master the intricacies of linguistic communication, 
however, doesn’t mean that they don’t grasp the difference between indicative 
and imperative utterance. For this, it suffices to be able to differentially respond 
to those two kinds of utterance, with agreement/disagreement and endorsement/ 
disapproval, respectively. 
                                                 
63 Zawidzki concentrates mostly on the question about the phylogeny of language, and 
speculates how the complex syntax might have its origins in the practices that involve costly 
signals, such as ritualistic displays (Zawidzki 2013: 167) 
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What about implicit false belief tasks? If people with autism were able to 
pass them, this would indicate that they still have theory of mind abilities and 
that their difficulties with the explicit tasks require a separate explanation. As it 
turns out, however, they don’t manage to pass the implicit task either (Senju et 
al. 2010). I take it, then, that there are people who able to participate in 
linguistic communication but are unable to attribute beliefs and desires. This 
indicates that not only is linguistic communication without propositional 
attitude attribution possible, there are also actual cases of this. 
One could still object that it doesn’t really amount to a proper understanding 
of a speech act if one doesn’t take it to express the respective attitude. This 
objection seems unjustified because it simply excludes the possibility which I 
was arguing for. However, I can even allow that assertions and requests need to 
be explained in terms of attitudes and speak about quasi-assertions and quasi-
requests instead. As long as there can be speech acts which have agreement/ 
disagreement and endorsement/disapproval as their response profiles and which 
can be understood without attributing attitudes, they can be employed to explain 
a function of belief and desire ascriptions that I am advocating. Whether one 
calls them assertions and requests is merely a terminological issue.  
The worry that the comprehension of speech acts requires mental state 
attribution, then, can be assuaged in three ways: first, by casting doubt on 
whether there’s a vicious circle when we appeal to speech acts in our expli-
cation; second, by considering a hypothetical linguistic community wherein 
speech acts are performed without mental state attribution; third, by pointing 
out feasible empirical models of linguistic communication that don’t involve 
mental state attribution as a necessary element. Construing mental state 
attribution in terms of responses to speech acts is thus possible regardless of 
whether in our linguistic practice they are strongly intertwined. We can find 
such a construal in the form of Christopher Gauker’s communicative conception 
of beliefs and desires to which I will turn next. 
 
 
4.4 The communicative conception 
As already mentioned, the communicative conception of propositional attitudes 
can be found in the work of Christopher Gauker. He defines it as follows: the 
paradigmatic case of ascribing a desire to someone is equated with commanding 
(or requesting) on her behalf and ascribing a belief with asserting on her behalf 
(Gauker 2003a: 221). For instance, when I claim about Mary that she believes 
that it is raining, I assert on her behalf: “It is raining”. If I claim about Mary that 
she desires that her friend passes his exams I request on her behalf: “Pass the 
exams”. Gauker himself illustrates the attribution of desires with the following 
hypothetical story. A house is being built. One of the builders, Balam, wants 
some rope and orders his assistant, Namu, to get some. Namu can then tell the 
keeper of the supplies that Balam wants some rope. In doing that, he actually 
passes over Balam’s request (Gauker 2003a: 222). The example of a belief-
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ascription also involves members of the same fictive tribe: Namu needs to know 
where logs are located and the leader of the loggers, Hanul, tells him that they 
are at the south fork of the river. Namu can then go back to other builders and 
attribute to Hanul a belief with the same content. This can also be described as 
an assertion on Hanul’s behalf: “The logs are at the south fork of the river”. The 
attribution of mental states in both examples can be analysed as the attribution 
of corresponding speech acts on behalf of others. 
It can be argued that the previous examples don’t show what is special about 
beliefs and desires. Namu could also have made his reports concerning Balam’s 
behaviour in terms of assertions and requests not beliefs and desires. The choice 
between these possibilities seems to be arbitrary. Gauker makes a crucial 
qualification here: attributions of beliefs and desires are special because they do 
not have to be directly related to the actual assertions and requests of another 
person (Gauker 1994: 273; 2003a: 224)64. Gauker can maintain that although 
their attribution has its beginnings in the communicative situations depicted in 
the given examples, this practice has gained a relative independence from the 
speech act attribution. In order to attribute to someone a belief, it is not 
necessary that she has actually made a corresponding assertion. The same 
applies to the attributed desire. Beliefs and desires are in that sense more 
independent of the linguistic behaviour of the attributees than assertions and 
requests. For example, when I don’t want to commit myself to another’s claim 
or when I don’t regard her as trustworthy, it is appropriate for pragmatic reasons 
to say that the other believes that claim but not to assert it. All in all, for 
Gauker, the differences between the attribution of speech acts and cor-
responding mental states reduce to what is appropriate to ascribe in a context 
and what’s not. Sometimes the attribution of a speech act is appropriate while 
the ascription of a corresponding mental state isn’t, and vice versa. 
The communicative conception exemplifies nicely the proposal suggested in 
the previous section. There I proposed to explicate the application conditions of 
the concepts of belief and desire with reference to speech acts so as to make the 
appropriateness of engaged responses to the attributed attitudes intelligible. In 
Gauker’s account, the ascription of a belief involves a vicarious assertion. 
Because of that the question of whether to agree or disagree with the belief 
comes naturally to the ascriber. Agreement/disagreement is a natural response 
to an assertion and also to a belief because of that. The ascription of a desire, on 
the other hand, involves treating the other person as if she had made a request. 
Requests are speech acts that are endorsed or disapproved of. Since the 
application conditions of the concept of desire make reference to requests, the 
question of whether to endorse or disapprove of the attributed desire is an 
intelligible move in response. The communicative conception treats beliefs and 
desires as having an inherent communicative import to which the possibility of 
                                                 
64 This is a bit in tension with Gauker’s claims about privileged access to one’s own mental 
states, namely that person’s willingness to assert that P is a good guide to his believing that P 
(Gauker 2003a: 234). 
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engaged responses is indispensable. The interpreted persons are treated by the 
interpreter as (silent) participants in the conversation (Gauker 2003a: 226) and 
the attributed attitudes have the same communicative significance as speech 
acts. The communicative conception is thus well-suited to explain the perti-
nence of engaged responses to attributed attitudes by referring to (vicarious) 
speech acts in the application conditions of the respective concepts. 
It is probably quite counter-intuitive to equate the attributions of desire to X 
with requests on X’s behalf. Requests are made to an audience but one can have 
desires that are not addressed to others. If a person wants there to be peace in 
the world does it make sense to say that it is appropriate to request on her behalf 
that there be peace? Who is this request directed at? Yet one can amend 
Gauker’s conception by replacing requests with a more general category of 
evaluative utterances. Such utterances have the form “It should be the case that 
p” (cf. Van Cleave & Gauker 2010, 320). If we adopt this idea, the attribution of 
a desire that p should be taken as a claim on other’s behalf that it should be the 
case that p. Here, I am still using the term “request” to mark such an utterance 
but it is important to bear in mind that the term can take both the second- and 
third-person form. However, if someone finds this use of the word “request” 
hard to stomach, she may simply think about evaluative utterances. Construing 
desire-attribution on the model of evaluative utterances still explains why the 
responses of endorsement/disapproval are appropriate. 
Where in the philosophical landscape is the communicative conception 
located? First, the communicative conception is definitely not a version of 
behaviourism because mental states are not equated with dispositions to assert 
(Gauker 1994: 275). The latter aren’t included in the application conditions 
either. For instance, it is sometimes appropriate to ascribe a belief to someone 
despite the fact that she lacks the disposition to assert the content of that belief. 
Gauker himself opposes what he calls “postulationism” according to which 
beliefs and desires are theoretical entities which are postulated in order to 
explain and predict behaviour (Gauker 2003a: 216). It isn’t entirely clear 
exactly what kind of philosophical position can be identified with the 
postulationist conception. Functionalism is probably Gauker’s primary target 
because he characterizes postulationism as the view that beliefs and desires are 
inner mechanisms that mediate between sensory inputs and behavioural outputs 
(ibid. 215). It is functionalism that analyses mental states in terms of their 
causal roles65. But the communicative conception also seems to clash with the 
identity theory which equates having mental states, either types or tokens, with 
having certain physical structures in one’s head. The identity theory requires 
from the successful attribution of mental states more than simply that they be 
appropriately ascribable to a person. Because of its metaphysical commitments, 
identity theory is more demanding when compared with the communicative 
conception. All in all, the communicative conception is opposed to views that 
                                                 
65 I am not going to delve into the differences between various functionalist positions 
because it’s inessential for the present purposes. 
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try to find a deeper fact of the matter which beliefs and desires are supposed to 
be dependent upon or identified with. In that sense, the communicative 
conception has strong affinities to those strands in the philosophy of mind that 
are labelled “interpretationism”66 In his earlier book Gauker also adopts this 
designation and calls it: “an account of what beliefs are need not be anything 
over and above an account of their attribution” (1994: 293).67 
What distinguishes the communicative conception from other interpreta-
tionist positions is the way it depicts the function of folk psychological 
interpretation. As I’ve already mentioned, Gauker denies that the attribution of 
beliefs and desires with the aim of explaining and predicting others’ behaviour 
is the most fundamental form their ascription takes and instead stresses their 
role in linguistic communication. This brings him into conflict with Dennett, for 
instance, for whom the most notable value of having our folk psychological 
vocabulary is tied to the prediction of behaviour (Dennett 1987: 17). As far as 
I’m aware, the communicative conception is the only account of attitude 
attributions that let’s us see how the central function of these attributions is to 
enable the engaged responses that characterize affectability.68 
In a later chapter I will come back to the issue of interpretationism and what 
the ontological commitments of the communicative conception are.69 Here the 
focus is on the question of whether it can explicate the application conditions of 
the attitude-concepts in a satisfactory manner. As already noted, it seems to be 
in a good position to provide us with application conditions that explain why 
affectability is so central in the case of folk psychological attributions. In the 
next section I am going to inquire into whether it can also explain the other 
benefits of those attributions. 
 
 
4.5 The communicative conception and  
the other benefits of folk psychology 
The denial that beliefs and desires are causally efficacious inner states and the 
seeming disregard of the predictive and explanatory roles of mental state 
attribution might leave a wrong impression. It might seem that the commu-
nicative conception doesn’t explain why we sometimes do manage to explain or 
predict the behaviour of persons in terms of propositional attitudes. For 
instance, let’s take a case when someone chooses to apply for a certain job in 
one company instead of another. It is natural to explain her choice in terms of 
her desire to have a large salary and his belief that the first company offers it. In 
                                                 
66 For a clear articulation of interpretationism, see Child 1996: 23.  
67 In a later chapter I am going to argue against the interpretationist understanding of the 
communicative conception, but at that point I have made some crucial modifications to 
Gauker’s original account. 
68 Gauker doesn’t express himself in such terms. 
69 It should be kept in mind that this will be the communicative conception in a substantially 
modified form. 
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addition, if we don’t know yet which job she is going to apply for, knowing her 
desire for a large salary, and her belief that the first company offers it, allows us 
to predict that she is going to apply for the first offer.70 These examples seem 
appropriate. An opponent of the communicative conception could even use 
them as fodder for his argument that the attribution of desires and beliefs should 
track causally efficacious inner states. How else could we explain the success of 
those explanations and predictions if mental states weren’t causally efficacious 
inner states? Already in the first chapter I stressed that the predictive and 
explanatory roles of mental state attributions can’t be denied. Any account of 
the application conditions of the concepts of belief and desire needs to reckon 
with that fact. 
Still, Gauker notes correctly that the claim that the concepts of mental states 
are applied in explanations and predictions doesn’t automatically carry with it 
any postulationist commitments (Gauker 2003a: 238). Not every successful 
explanation or prediction of behaviour demands that the terms that figure in 
them refer to any definite inner entities. For instance, the explanation and 
prediction of behaviour in terms of character traits doesn’t need to be 
interpreted in those terms unless one is prone to hypostatizing traits. The 
concept of character trait identifies certain behaviour patterns but does not 
identify a definite inner entity which is supposed to be behind those patterns.71 
This still leaves open the more important question: when we do sometimes 
ascribe mental states in order to predict and explain behaviour, how is it 
possible if the attributions of these states are equated with mere vicarious 
speech acts?  
Gauker’s own solution to the problem of how we are to account for the 
explanatory and predictive role of belief and desire ascriptions72 is to 
demonstrate how mental state attributions, defined as assertions and requests on 
behalf of others, can still be used for the purposes of explanation and 
prediction73. He basically construes explanation and prediction as attributions of 
inner conversations (assertions and requests)74. Let’s say that we give a 
rationalizing explanation of why someone acted in a certain way by relating it to 
her beliefs and desires. In this case we interpret her action by requesting on her 
behalf that she would achieve a certain goal and an assertion or a set of 
assertions which say how to achieve it. Take the example of a person applying 
                                                 
70 We can predict. This doesn’t mean that we have to do that. 
71 The analogy here may be a bit confusing because the communicative conception doesn’t 
claim that beliefs and desires are constituted by behaviour patterns. The analogy between 
mental states and character traits is certainly imperfect. 
72 Note that I don’t separate here the explanatory and predictive functions. I did that in the 
first chapter. For the present purposes a sharp distinction between them is irrelevant. 
73 Actually his first step is to argue against psychophysical laws that are supposed to underlie 
the causal connections between mental states and which the interpreters are supposed to rely 
on (Gauker 2003a: 239). 
74 “…an explanation of behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires is a recounting or 
reconstruction of a conversation.” (Gauker 1994: 277) 
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for a job, for instance. When we explain her choice by her belief that the 
company she chose offers the best salary then this explanation can be 
reconstructed so that we assert on her behalf: “This company offers the best 
salary”. When we attribute to her the desire for a large salary we can also 
describe it as a command on her behalf: “Have a large salary!” Although these 
re-descriptions may feel a bit awkward, they are not absurd. The fact that we 
can make assertions and requests on others’ behalf often provides us with an 
opportunity to anticipate and understand their behaviour, at least on the 
assumption that people usually act in accordance with the assertions and 
requests we take them to have performed (Gauker 1994: 278). 
An objection could be raised that the re-description of folk psychological 
explanations and predictions in terms of requests and assertions distorts this 
context of mental state attribution. If successful assertions and requests seem to 
require a potential response from an audience and the explanations and 
predictions of individual behaviour don’t seem to include this requirement, why 
should we construe them in the way the communicative conception demands it? 
We can do this but one could nevertheless argue that explanations and 
behaviours which lack a communicative context couldn’t passably be described 
in terms of assertions and requests. Let’s take the example of a person applying 
for a job. I’ve already admitted that the re-description of the explanation of his 
behaviour in terms of a vicarious request sounds awkward. But is it even 
appropriate given that an audience for the request is lacking?75 The same could 
be asked about the belief that one company offers a larger salary and the 
corresponding assertion with that content.  
I have two responses to this objection. First, there are self-directed assertions 
and requests. I can surely assert to myself “Uku, you’re behaving inappro-
priately” or “I have a meeting tomorrow” and give myself a request to behave 
better or to attend the meeting. These self-directed assertions and requests are 
also acknowledged by Gauker (1994: 274) and their feasibility is crucial for the 
communicative conception to work. In the cases when the audience seems to be 
lacking, a person can treat herself as the audience of her assertions and requests. 
When explaining the applicant’s choice between the two job positions by 
asserting and requesting on her behalf we can say that he also made the 
necessary assertions and requests to herself. In that sense, the re-description of 
mental state attribution in terms of assertions and requests isn’t necessarily a 
distortion of our explanatory and predictive practice. 
Second, the re-descriptions of the explanatory and predictive mental state 
attributions in terms of assertions and requests on another’s behalf still gets the 
point of those attributions right. Asserting that a certain job is more profitable 
than the other and requesting that one get the job with the best salary can both 
explain and predict one’s behaviour, at least unless the agent is irrational and 
without suffering the weakness of will. These kinds of cancelling condition, 
                                                 
75 Although, see Gauker 1994: 276 for a claim that there can be commands that that “do not 
seriously call on anyone to do anything.“ 
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known as ceteris paribus clauses, apply to any theory of common-sense 
explanation and prediction, which means that they don’t pose a threat to the 
communicative conception. In order for assertions and requests on behalf of 
others to play the explanatory and predictive role, we need only assume that 
people quite regularly act on the basis of assertions and requests. We simply 
need to assume that we can use this generalization to anticipate and make sense 
of others’ behaviour. Explanations and predictions in terms of assertions and 
requests map quite neatly onto explanations and predictions in terms of beliefs 
and desires without changing the goal of the attribution. It is still explanation 
and prediction we are aiming at in these situations. 
The problem that seems to deserve further elaboration is how to explain the 
putative fact that people tend to act according to assertions and requests. It 
could be objected that if this explanation makes reference to beliefs and desires, 
the communicative conception will be in trouble. But note that I have already 
rejected the claim that the explication of the application conditions of the 
concept of belief and desire has to be reductive. It can allow non-vicious circles. 
What is needed to act in accordance with assertions and requests is an open 
empirical question. Although I pointed out some models in 3.2 that don’t 
presuppose the ability to attribute attitudes in order to understand speech acts, I 
don’t think that it takes away from the point of the explication even if this 
ability is required.  
But can the communicative conception also account for the mindshaping 
effects of mental state attributions? Remember that the mindshaping thesis was 
about how the attribution of mental states serves to mould the behaviour and 
minds of people by forming expectancies which the actions and thoughts of the 
interpreted persons should line up to. I took mindshaping to be one benefit 
among others that folk psychology offers. The communicative conception 
doesn’t explain this benefit straightforwardly because nothing in it implies that 
the attribution changes or possibly changes the person being interpreted. But it 
is consistent with the possibility that as long as the attributee is aware of those 
attributions she will adjust her behaviour and thinking in response to the 
attribution. I took mindshaping to be a contingent benefit of folk psychology 
and I think that it suffices to point out that the communicative conception 
doesn’t exclude the possibility of mindshaping. In any case, the communicative 
conception is actually in a stronger position than postulationism to explain 
mindshaping. The reason is that postulationism (which treats mental states as 
causal postulates) has difficulties explaining how brute causal forces could 
make normative bear upon the subject. Assertions and requests, on the other 
hand, can be taken as presenting such demands. My awareness that others treat 
me as if I had requested or asserted something may motivate me to act in 
accordance with those virtual speech acts. This may happen even if I haven’t 
made the corresponding speech act myself. As analysed in the previous chapter, 
the mediating factor here might be the social superiority of the attributer, for 
instance, but the list of relevant factors is left open. We can say, then, that the 
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communicative conception is in a position to explain how the mindshaping 
effects are possible. 
Actually all is not well and good with the communicative conception. In the 
next chapter I am going to argue that Gauker’s appreciation of the explanatory 
role of mental state attributions doesn’t go deep enough. Here I simply point out 
that the communicative conception has resources to account for other benefits 
than the engaged responses. In the remainder of this chapter I instead 
investigate an additional positive consideration in support of the communicative 
conception. 
 
 
4.6 On behalf of the communicative conception 
The aim of this subchapter is to give some further support to the thesis that the 
attribution of beliefs and desires must make reference to corresponding 
assertions and requests. To do that I am going to reverse the argument that was 
brought up against the communicative conception, namely, that the latter isn’t 
able to make sense of folk psychological explanations and predictions. I think 
that Gauker has been quite successful in responding to that objection, as shown 
in the previous section. Nonetheless, he hasn’t used it to his advantage to give 
additional support to the communicative conception. 
To achieve that, I intend to turn the tables by challenging the postulationist 
to account for the communicative role of mental state ascription.76 The 
communicative conception is relatively successful in deriving the explanatory 
and predictive uses from the communicative ones by demonstrating that the first 
can be (hopefully) always re-described in terms of the latter. But the possibility 
of a reverse move hasn’t been demonstrated by the opponent of the 
communicative conception. If we assert or request on someone’s behalf, can our 
actions be re-described in terms of explaining and/or predicting her behaviour 
without any reference to the vicarious assertions and requests? What follows is 
not a conclusive argument to prove that it is impossible but I argue that there is 
at least a reason to doubt that one could do it. This is also meant to strengthen 
the point already brought out in section 3.2, namely, that the accounts that 
explicate the conditions of mental state attribution without reference to speech 
acts don’t explain the communicative import (i.e. the possibility of engaged 
responses) of the attributed beliefs and desires. There are occasions of belief 
and desire attribution with such a communicative significance but in which the 
attributions can’t be re-described in terms of explanations or predictions.  
Let us consider some examples of the communicative attribution Gauker 
himself used. There was the example of Namu who attributed the desire to get 
some rope to Balam and by doing that requested rope on Balam’s behalf. He 
also attributed to Hanul the belief that the logs were at the south fork of the 
river and by doing that uttered the corresponding assertion on Hanul’s behalf 
                                                 
76 Not only postulationist because it concerns anyone who doesn’t mention speech acts in the 
application conditions of the concepts of belief and desire. 
82 
(Gauker 2003a: 222). How could an opponent of the communicative conception 
analyse these attributions in terms of explanation and/or prediction? It is out of 
the question that by speaking about Balam’s desire or Hanul’s belief Namu in 
any way predicts their behaviour because the two have already acted. Their 
possible future behaviour isn’t relevant in those contexts, at least not directly. 
This means that the only way of arguing for the re-describability must come 
from possible explanations implied by those attributions.  
At first glance Namu’s vicarious speech acts don’t seem to explain Balam’s 
or Hanul’s actions because Namu’s aim is to transmit requests and assertions. 
Which kind of actions are we even talking about? Although the answer seems to 
be clear (i.e. that we are interested in Balam’s request and Hanul’s assertion) I 
brought it up because it is not entirely evident why we should ask this question 
in the first place. After all, the explicit communicative context of those 
examples doesn’t concern explaining the actions. It concerns requests and 
assertions getting conveyed and the identification of those speech acts makes a 
reference also to the possible responses of the audience (Hornsby 1994).77 
Merely asking what actions are being explained in those examples distorts the 
context of the attributions. The context is communicative, not explanatory. It is 
distorting to see the ascriptions of belief and desire as implicit explanations of 
the corresponding speech acts instead of as vicarious assertions because this 
would miss the point of the attribution. The point is to convey those assertions 
and requests and to react to them properly. Not treating the attribution as a 
speech act that is being conveyed would change the goal of the attribution. 
I am actually going to argue in the next chapter that belief and desire 
attributions involve implicit explanatory commitments. But even if we grant 
that, the present challenge on the opponent is to show that the communicative 
significance could be fully described in terms of explanations. Only then would 
it be possible to claim that the component of asserting or requesting on others’ 
behalf in mental state attributions can be reduced to some sort of explanatory 
activity. It isn’t clear how this challenge could be met. Vicarious speech acts 
express certain commitments to the truth (assertions) or worth (requests) of the 
state of affairs that are being represented. Whether they involve explaining 
anything is left open by these commitments.  
This irreducibility of communicative significance could also be expressed in 
terms of proper responses to it. Folk psychological explanations can call for the 
ascriber to make a judgement concerning the rationality of behaviour and 
thought that is being explained. The proper response to the communicative 
significance of belief and desire attributions is not that kind of judgement but 
agreement/disagreement or endorsement/disapproval which are directed at the 
attributed attitude. The response isn’t to the attributed attitude’s connection with 
behaviour and other attitudes. That we make assertions and requests on behalf 
                                                 
77 One could speak here about explanations in a minimal sense so that any (true) report of 
someone doing something counts as an explanation because it makes. But we are 
considering here postulationist explanations which are not treated in such a minimal way. 
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of others while attributing beliefs and desires makes such responses under-
standable. The attempt at re-description in terms of explanation simply misses 
the significance of the belief and desire attributions in such contexts. 
Before concluding this chapter I need to consider one more objection. This 
might discredit the idea that the communicative belief and desire attributions, 
exemplified by Gauker’s story of the builders, are mental state attributions in 
any substantial sense. The phrase “I believe that...” can be used as a mere hedge 
to qualify one’s statements without actually self-ascribing a belief. It might be 
objected in a similar manner that vicarious utterances which don’t have 
explanatory or predictive import do not amount to belief- and desire-ascriptions 
strictu sensu. They could be seen as mere vicarious utterances, functioning as 
mere hedges to the conveyed speech acts. Gauker’s own examples might be a 
bit unfortunate here because in the case of Namu, Balam and Hanul the 
supposed attitude-ascriptions boil down to attempts to convey others’ speech 
acts. In such cases the hedge-interpretation might seem pertinent. If we 
concentrate only on Gauker’s examples, then, the present objection might have 
a punch. But it is important to note that the appropriateness of attributing a 
speech act and of attributing the corresponding attitude don’t coincide in 
Gauker’s conception. There are occasions when one can ascribe the attitude but 
it would be false to say that the attributee has made the corresponding utterance 
and vice versa. Nevertheless, what matters in such cases is still the communi-
cative significance of those attitude ascriptions which can’t be reduced to their 
explanatory role. For a postulationist this qualification might not suffice 
because it doesn’t correspond to her intuitions about the causal commitments of 
the mental state attributions. But note that we are here explicating the concepts 
of belief and desire and the explication might deliver application conditions of 
those concepts that need not match the intuitions of the ascribers. The 
communicative conception is justified as long as it helps us understand how 
folk psychological attributions imply the indispensability of engaged responses 
and as long as it explains how it is possible to explain, predict and mindshape 
on the basis of belief and desire attributions. 
Nevertheless, this objection has its point. In the next chapter I will argue that 
the original communicative conception overlooked the importance of the 
explanatory benefit of belief- and desire-attributions. This means that it should 
be complemented in a crucial respect. Here I only wanted to show that Gauker’s 
account can be taken as providing the initial explication of the application 
conditions of the concepts of belief and desire. The reference to speech acts 
seems to be a necessary component if those conditions are to explain the 
indispensability of affectability. The mental state attributions can’t be under-
stood merely in explanatory and predictive terms. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I argued that if we take affectability to be the central benefit of 
folk psychology then the communicative conception of beliefs and desires is the 
most natural way of construing the conditions for attributing those attitudes. 
Since the attitudes share their communicative significance with speech acts, 
modelling mental state attribution in terms of the latter helps us to see why the 
engaged responses to the attributed attitudes are appropriate. The next chapter 
investigates the communicative conception further and raises some doubts 
concerning its inability to fully account for the benefits of mental state attri-
butions. Although I am going to argue that the original communicative con-
ception can’t fully account for the application conditions of belief and desire, I 
maintain that the assertions and requests on behalf of others constitute a 
necessary condition for the attribution of beliefs and desires. 
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5. MODIFICATION  
OF THE COMMUNICATIVE CONCEPTION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I defended the communicative conception of beliefs and 
desires as the most promising explication of the concepts of those attitudes. It 
enabled us to see the appropriateness and indispensability of engaged responses 
to attributed attitudes. Gauker’s initial account of the communicative con-
ception provided the necessary conditions for the attribution of beliefs and 
desires. This chapter will take a critical stance. I will argue that the original 
communicative conception has to be elaborated in order to do full justice to the 
benefits that mental state attribution delivers. The aim is to show that there is a 
genuine explanatory need that the attribution of mental states satisfies and 
which needs to be accounted for by the communicative conception. The further 
aim is to modify the communicative conception in a way that does justice to 
that need. 
I will take it for granted that the attribution of beliefs and desires involves 
assertions and requests on the behalf of others as was established in the previous 
chapter. The problem with the communicative conception, I claim in section 
5.2, is that, while it accounts for the affectability of mental state attributions, it 
fails to explain why the concepts of belief and desire are needed in addition to 
an understanding of assertions and requests on others’ behalf. The accounts of 
both concepts need quite substantial alteration in order to be satisfactory. After 
having argued for that, in section 5.3 I will present the modified communicative 
conception. According to it the necessity of postulating desires arises in situa-
tions wherein the requests and hedonic states of persons don’t match. As for 
beliefs, I claim that they need to be postulated in cases when the dispositions of 
persons are in tension with their actual assertions. In section 5.4 I draw some 
comparisons between the modified communicative conception and some other 
approaches to the concepts in question. Finally, in section 5.5 I will consider 
some possible objections to my account. 
 
 
5.2 Problems with the communicative conception 
5.2.1 The initial worry 
The communicative conception takes attitude attributions to be speech acts that 
can be performed in specific situations. But one may feel (very) uncomfortable 
about the claim that the difference between beliefs and assertions (also desires 
and requests) boils down to a pragmatic distinction. Isn’t there some essential 
disparity between them? This intuitive shortcoming of the communicative 
conception isn’t yet an argument against it. Gauker could claim that he aims at 
providing the most coherent theory of beliefs and desires which takes into 
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account only a subset of intuitions people have on the subject. In the previous 
chapter we saw that it does seem to explain the main benefits of folk 
psychological attributions. One would need to elaborate on the feeling that the 
attribution of beliefs and desires doesn’t merely consist of the making of 
assertions and requests on the behalf of others. 
I do think that there are various points where it is possible to raise some 
serious concerns that go a bit further than merely stating the intuitive point. It is 
safe to say that Gauker doesn’t merely want to fit the attribution of beliefs and 
desires somehow or other into his overall theory. The communicative con-
ception should still be about the concepts of belief and desire that people 
actually use. What could be the evidence that Gauker has or has not managed to 
achieve that? From the perspective of traditional conceptual analysis, the 
answer seems to be simple – if the proposed conception of beliefs and desires 
doesn’t capture the most important intuitions one has about those concepts then 
it isn’t satisfactory. Since in the present framework the aim is not to provide an 
analysis of those concepts that is supposed to respect all intuitions I am blocked 
from taking that track. I still think, though, that we can sometimes say when a 
theory doesn’t actually explain what it aims to, for the reason that it explains 
something else. This is a very difficult issue, of course. The most noteworthy 
example of such difficulties is perhaps the discussion about how to explain 
consciousness.78 Nonetheless, there do seem to be unproblematic contexts 
wherein the evaluation of a certain explanation as unsatisfactory (in the sense 
that it misses its explanandum) is reliable. This doesn’t require a full analysis of 
the explanandum. 
So what is it about the communicative conception that gives us reason to 
doubt that it actually captures our everyday notions of belief and desire? The 
first suggestion is that the idea of attitudes as devices for performing vicarious 
speech acts doesn’t actually reckon with the fact that when we say that someone 
believes or wants something we say something about that person. For instance, 
we seem to say something about her subjective perspective on things. This 
suggestion doesn’t yet amount to a criticism of the communicative conception. 
Nevertheless, for the moment it suffices to say that the conception of attitudes 
which don’t express their possessor’s subjective perspectives makes such 
attitudes unrecognizable to us. It does so in the same way that the attribution of 
attitudes without engaged responses made them unrecognizable.  
My critique of the communicative conception in this chapter concentrates on 
a more concrete difficulty. Remember that according to Gauker’s communica-
tive conception the concepts of belief and desire were adopted as a means of 
transmitting the speech acts made by other people. He also illustrated this with a 
hypothetical story about builders conveying assertions and requests to one 
another which were then labelled “beliefs” and “desires” (Gauker 2003a: 222). 
                                                 
78 Take Dennett for instance, in case of whom the critics of his theory of consciousness 
(Dennett 1991a) have often argued that it actually isn’t about consciousness (see Chalmers 
(1995), for the objection along these lines).  
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The problem we found with that suggestion was that it didn’t seem to reveal any 
discursive need that was over and above the need to speak about assertions and 
requests. It really doesn’t add anything besides new terms to a linguistic 
practice. These terms simply coin the assertions and requests that are already in 
use under the labels “assertion” and “request” with new terms “belief” and 
“desire”. 
Gauker’s theory does have resources that enable us to adjust the aforemen-
tioned story in a way that would present a more distinctive role for the concepts 
of belief and desire. This is because assertions and requests on others’ behalf 
form two specific kinds of discursive move that are responsive to a need which 
can’t be satisfied by mere assertions and requests. There are occasions in which 
mental state ascriptions have an application that can’t be fulfilled simply by 
ascribing a speech act. This can happen, for instance, when the attributee 
doesn’t perform the corresponding speech act herself or when the attributer isn’t 
ready to take the attributee as authoritative (Gauker 1994: 273). Let’s call these 
two cases the occasion of absent utterance and declined authority. Keeping that 
in mind, the adjustments to the original account would be relatively simple. We 
simply have to consider situations wherein the agents find it appropriate to 
assert and request on the behalf of others without acknowledging their authority 
or wherein they haven’t produced the corresponding utterance themselves. 
Having the attitude-concepts, then, fulfils the need to perform vicarious speech 
in such situations. Isn’t such contextual usefulness all we need? The question is 
whether we can remain satisfied with that suggestion: do the situations of absent 
utterance and declined authority constitute a sufficient condition for certain 
things to qualify as beliefs and desires? 
 
 
5.2.2 Conceptual need for mentalistic concepts 
We have defined absent utterance and declined authority as those situations in 
which talking straightforwardly of assertions and requests on others’ behalf are 
somewhat inappropriate. Introduction of the concepts of belief and desire 
seemed to be useful because it allowed us to draw the distinction between full-
blown and qualified vicarious utterances. We can now ask whether this move by 
Gauker suffices to make the motivation for introducing these concepts explicit. 
I will argue that the communicative conception in its present form still doesn’t 
manage to articulate a substantial conceptual need behind the attitude-concepts. 
To see that we should first consider what the notion of “conceptual need” 
actually amounts to. 
A conceptual need isn’t, strictly speaking, a psychological state. It is rather a 
state of affairs which is defined in terms of the absence of the concept in 
question. It arises when people find their conceptual repertoire insufficient for 
conveying something distinctive about the world or themselves. It can be 
appealed to when we are interested in understanding the main benefits that the 
application of the concept offers. If a proposed need can actually be fulfilled by 
existing means then we have reason to doubt that such a proposal is acceptable. 
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One can find a similar appeal to conceptual needs in the genealogical approach 
to concepts pursued by such authors as Bernard Williams (2002) and Edward 
Craig (1990). These accounts present us with a hypothetical situation in which 
the concept in question isn’t yet in use. One can then ask what needs could be 
fulfilled by introducing that corresponding expression into the vocabulary of the 
community. This kind of speculation is intended to bring out the distinctive role 
of the concept that is under scrutiny and its connection to other concepts. The 
present question is whether Gauker has been able to do this with the concepts of 
belief and desire. In a way, then, the following articulation of the problem can 
also be taken to be a contribution to the genealogical accounts of concepts. 
Before going on we should note that the concepts that are used in genealo-
gical explanation are also linguistically articulated. The genealogy of a concept 
is supposed to articulate the need for introducing a new word into the vocabu-
lary. Because of this, there won’t be any strict distinction between the concept 
and the word that is supposed to express it. In what follows, I will talk about 
them interchangeably. That probably seems like a seriously troublesome move 
for many because words are specific to a language. The genealogical account of 
the concept of belief as the term “belief” faces the threat of explaining only the 
English word. But in this case it wouldn’t say anything about the synonomous 
words in other languages that also denote beliefs (e.g. Überzeugung in German, 
uskumus in Estonian, etc.). It seems that if we want our account of the attitude 
concepts to be generalizable, we should make the distinction between words 
and concepts, and ask only about the latter. 
I do agree that different words like belief, Überzeugung and uskumus have 
something in common and the idea that they express the same concept makes 
that commonality explicit. For the purposes of understanding the conceptual 
need for the concepts of belief and desire, I will assume that these concepts can 
be individuated in terms of the inferential significance of words. In that way the 
words in different languages can be taken to express the same concept.79 When 
accepting this conception, the genealogical approach makes much more sense 
because we can ask about the function and significance of a concept by con-
sidering the role of the corresponding word in our language-use and conscious 
thought. What is discovered about the word belief will hopefully also hold for 
the words Überzeugung, uskumus, etc., which may differ in their phonemic 
properties but can share the same inferential-functional role (Sellars 1974: 425).  
But does admitting this commit me to a specific theory about the structure of 
concepts? When I individuate concepts by the inferential roles of words, don’t I 
simply exclude the possibility of an atomistic theory? We should keep in mind, 
though, what it is that we are presently doing. “Concept” is a term that is used 
in many different ways, for many different purposes (Machery 2009). Unlike 
                                                 
79 This conception is quite obviously influenced by Bob Brandom’s inferentialist approach to 
conceptual content, going back to Wilfrid Sellars (Brandom 1994). The difficulties with 
Brandom’s theory – most notably, the problem of holism – are numerous but for the present 
purposes I will assume that the general approach is on the right track. 
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theories about conceptual structure, I am here not really interested in the nature 
of concepts as such. As long as the genealogy enables us to reach some 
understanding of the possible role and value of a concept for our self-
understanding, it can be counted as successful. Furthermore, if this requires 
thinking of concepts as embodied in our language-use and embedded in 
inferential structures, then I see no reason not to take the endeavour to be 
legitimate. By exploiting the possibility of bringing words and concepts 
together through the words’ inferential role, I remain agnostic on the question of 
whether there are other ways of understanding concepts that handle them in a 
way that is independent of language. 
So what are those conditions which necessitate the introduction of a new 
concept? The communicative conception is a view that by attributing attitudes 
we perform certain communicative acts which count as such due to convention. 
I understand convention to be a set of assumptions governing some social 
practice. Under what conditions do we need to introduce a new term to label an 
element in such a practice? This brings us to a rather difficult issue because it 
isn’t even clear if practices can be individuated without mentioning the mental 
states of the community members. Setting that worry aside, it is reasonable to 
claim at least that a minor change in a convention doesn’t mean that the practice 
it pertains to or its particular elements need be renamed. A social category can 
remain constant through minor changes as long as it fulfils its function. For 
instance, after the presence of a priest’s presence has been deemed unnecessary, 
marriage can still be called “marriage”, the bridegroom can still be called 
“bridegroom” and the bride be called “bride”. The conceptual needs for intro-
ducing terms for social practices and statuses are quite various but the 
introduction of a new term should have distinctive discursive and practical 
consequences. In talking about distinctive consequences I am relying on 
intuitive considerations but the following discussion should demonstrate how 
they can be put to use in order to evaluate Gauker’s account. 
Let’s think now about the agents who have come up with the practice of 
making assertions and requests on each other’s behalf. Consider those occasions 
in which the ascription of beliefs and desires (as opposed to the uttering of 
vicarious speech acts) seems to become necessary. According to the commu-
nicative conception, we have here two situations wherein the straightforward 
speech act on another’s behalf can be deemed inappropriate – when the other 
person doesn’t perform the corresponding assertion or request herself (absent 
utterance) and when she is not taken as authoritative (declined authority). The 
question, in a nutshell, is – should the agents in such situations adopt new 
concepts in order to distinguish these two kinds of vicarious utterance from 
those that are made when the respective utterance is not absent and authority is 
transmitted?  
First, we should note that there’s a problem with the suggestion that declined 
authority and absent utterance necessitate introducing a new concept. Assuming 
that both situations are cases of genuine conceptual need, the question arises: 
given that these two cases are very different, why should they motivate the 
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introduction of the concept of belief in the case of assertions and the concept of 
desire in the case of requests? It seems that if they both express genuine 
conceptual needs then they should give rise to two concepts, both in the case of 
assertions and in the case of requests. One would identify non-authoritative 
speech acts and the other would identify speech acts on another’s behalf without 
that other having made the relevant utterance. These two concepts seem to 
diverge in their significance. The cases of declined utterance and absent 
authority, then, seem like entirely different cases for introducing the concepts in 
question.  
So let’s consider these two cases separately, starting with declined authority. 
Does this situation articulate the need to adopt the concepts of belief and desire? 
I am not sure if the answer has to be affirmative. The case of declined authority 
doesn’t seem to express a genuine conceptual need at all because the fact that 
the attributer isn’t sure about the attributee’s authority doesn’t alter the fact that 
the latter has performed the speech act. The subject simply conveys it. It would 
be unnecessary to invent a new label for this act. It would be sufficient to say: 
“She asserted that p but don’t take her seriously“; and”She commanded that p 
but don’t take it seriously.” 
Note that when I deny that the case of declined authority reveals a real 
conceptual need I don’t base my claim merely on the fact that the sentence in 
which the new term is applied can be paraphrased into another sentence without 
that term. It is rather about asking what point there is to introducing the new 
term. The answer seems to be negative in the present case. Of course, it is 
useful to distinguish between authoritative and non-authoritative speech acts. 
Nonetheless, it actually seems to be less confusing when we draw this 
distinction while maintaining the terms “assertion” and “request” in both cases. 
If we maintain these terms then we won’t lose sight of the fact that the utterance 
was also uttered in the case of declined authority. For instance, if a child tells 
her parent to bring her ice cream, reporting it as a command with a comment 
that it was merely a child who requested it, should be unproblematic. 
It is possible to think up a situation wherein introducing a new term in the 
case of absent authority would have a more far-reaching significance. I don’t 
deny that. For instance, one can imagine a community wherein those who 
perform unauthorised speech acts are sanctioned or even punished. In such a 
community, the introduction of a new concept would have distinctive practical 
consequences. However, imagining such a possibility requires us to make very 
particular (and rather far-fetched) assumptions about the community in 
question. Such a conceptual need does not explain the concepts that are used in 
the actual world. I take it, then, that the case of declined authority doesn’t 
motivate the introduction of the concepts of belief and desire. It should offer a 
more substantial and stable benefit. 
As for the case of absent utterance, the question is why do we need to speak 
about beliefs and desires in a situation wherein we are inclined to assert or 
request something on the behalf of others but wherein they haven’t made the 
respective utterance themselves? Why not simply say that they would assert or 
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request it if the circumstances were more accommodating? Why does one need 
to coin new terms for such discursive situations? Doing it doesn’t seem to 
answer real conceptual needs but simply invents labels for something that can 
already be expressed in terms of (potential) assertions and requests. When a 
new concept is introduced to represent a form of social practice the latter has to 
be genuinely new, with distinctive practical consequences. By labelling the 
dispositions to command “the concept of desire” wouldn’t satisfy any genuine 
conceptual need. The same seems to apply to assertions and beliefs. So the 
initial response to this proposal is the same as in the case of declined authority. 
To counter this problem Gauker might stress that the ascription of a mental 
state to someone doesn’t even require that she be disposed to produce the 
corresponding utterance (Gauker 2003a: 225). But if the attributee need not 
even be disposed to perform the speech act that is uttered on her behalf then an 
obvious question arises: on what grounds we can perform that vicarious speech 
act? This shouldn’t be an entirely arbitrary matter but Gauker himself doesn’t 
provide any suggestions about the conditions under which the attribution would 
remain appropriate without the disposition on the attributee’s part. Yet without 
these grounds, the vicarious speech acts seem to be ill-motivated. What’s more, 
this proposal leaves us in the dark about what need there is to perform such 
seemingly baseless speech acts on another’s behalf without the other even being 
disposed to utter those speech acts herself. In order to make this need explicit 
one has to say something more about the conditions under which such vicarious 
speech acts can be performed. Otherwise these practices (and the introduction of 
concepts to mark them) wouldn’t make much sense. There should be a reason to 
make such an assertion or command. 
Gauker might respond by making some further distinctions between different 
kinds of vicarious speech acts in order to account for the intuition that the 
attribution of beliefs and desires should say something about the grounds for 
performing speech acts on the behalf of others in the case of absent utterance. 
For example, he could distinguish between person-relative and non-person-
relative speech acts. The first imply that the person on whose behalf it is made 
agrees with or endorses it but the latter leave this open. The first case would 
perhaps provide us with the condition under which the speech act on another’s 
behalf is appropriate, even if she hasn’t performed it herself. What’s more, 
wouldn’t the need to utter vicarious person-relative speech acts also suffice to 
account for the need to introduce new concepts? After all, it would allow the 
agents to relate vicarious assertions and requests to the subjective perspective of 
the attributees (as long as the readiness of the attributees to agree with and 
endorse such speech acts expresses their subjective perspective). This seems 
like a practically significant and distinctive move in the discourse.  
This suggestion is actually relatable to my own positive proposal but it 
involves an ambiguity as it stands. The person-relative speech act on the behalf 
of another either requires that another person explicitly agrees with or endorses 
it or that she would agree with or would endorse it in certain circumstances. In 
the first case the need for introducing a new concept falls away – one could 
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simply attribute to her the assertion that p or the request that it should be the 
case that p – after all, she explicitly agrees with or endorses them. But if she 
merely would endorse them then one can always ask for the grounds on which 
she would do that. The answer to that question should say something about the 
person but the communicative conception leaves us in the dark about what it is. 
In any case, what the endorsement of the vicarious speech act amounts to needs 
further elaboration and Gauker hasn’t done that. My own positive proposals will 
exploit this lacuna in his account. 
My claim, then, is that the communicative conception doesn’t manage to 
explain why one would need to coin new terms for use within the practice of 
performing vicarious speech acts, thereby arriving at the ideas of belief and 
desire. It either gives these concepts a communicative role which is too shallow 
to motivate the introduction of new terms or it faces the problem of explaining 
the grounds for performing speech acts, unable as it is to make intelligible the 
need for the concepts of belief and desire. This still isn’t a conclusive proof 
against the communicative conception. One could maintain, for instance, that 
concepts of attitudes really do play such a shallow role. But an alternative 
explanation would have an advantage over Gauker’s position if it demonstrated 
the existence of a more substantial conceptual need. 
 
 
5.2.3 The solution? 
The inability of the communicative conception to explain the need for the 
concepts of belief and desire poses a challenge. How should we proceed in 
order to remedy the situation? I suggest that we can mostly retain Gauker’s 
main idea that the attribution of attitudes involves making assertions or requests 
on behalf of others but we need to complement it by reconsidering how it 
relates to the conceptual needs that the agents might have in the case of absent 
utterance. 
The explanation for beliefs and desires that I have in mind starts with the 
following hypothetical situation. The agents have linguistic competence and the 
ability to perform assertions and requests. In that respect, it follows Gauker’s 
lead. It also acknowledges the fact that those agents need to assert and request 
on the behalf of others and that sometimes this may happen in cases of absent 
utterance80. But I claim that the explanation of why a concept of desire is 
needed in such a community should also make explicit why it is proper to 
perform a speech act on the behalf of another even if the other didn’t make the 
corresponding utterance herself. You need to have a reason to assert or request 
something on another’s behalf. This means that there should be an explanation 
of why this kind of action is appropriate. It is natural to say that someone’s 
having a belief or desire explains why it is appropriate to make a corresponding 
assertion or request on her behalf. The grounds for performing vicarious speech 
                                                 
80 Since I’ve dismissed the case of declined authority as involving a genuine conceptual 
need, the focus will be on the case of absent utterance. 
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acts, then, should be the key to revealing the conceptual need for the attitude-
concepts. It is not a mere detail that needs to be faced after the communicative 
conception has already been established.  
Is this concession a return to postulationism which Gauker opposed? It 
certainly differs from his account in admitting that the concepts of belief and 
desire have a distinctive explanatory role. But since I haven’t yet answered what 
kind of explanatory posits they are, it is left open whether beliefs and desires are 
causal postulates or nor. I can also continue to agree with Gauker that the 
attribution of beliefs and desires doesn’t have much predictive potential. Most 
importantly, I stick to the idea that the attribution of beliefs and desires involves 
assertions and requests on the attributee’s behalf. But the two problems I’ve 
presented mean that one cannot remain as deflationist as Gauker does. The 
account of belief and desire attribution needs to say something about the 
conditions under which a person is properly describable in terms of such 
concepts. I don’t exclude the possibility that assertions and requests on 
another’s behalf could form the core of the concepts of belief and desire – just 
as Craig conceded that the justified true belief may be a correct but minimal 
definition for the concept of knowledge (Craig 1990: 33) – but this is only a 
starting point for a more substantial account. 
 
 
5.3 The modified communicative conception 
5.3.1 Desires 
To see how the communicative conception needs to be complemented, let’s 
start from the concept of desire. I hope that it is a relatively intuitive point that 
one can distinguish between mere acknowledgements of requests and actual 
attributions of desires. The latter should also take the perspective of the 
attributee into account. From the previous analysis we saw also that the most 
promising account of the conceptual need – that of person-relative speech acts – 
took attitude attributions to say something about the attributee. My proposal 
with regard to desire attributions is that the ascription of a desire opens up the 
question of whether the interpreted person will also be satisfied when the 
represented state of affairs is realized. The ascription of a request doesn’t have 
such a consequence. By saying that another person orders or would order 
something one doesn’t necessarily say anything about her actual sympathies. 
Gauker, of course, is more subtle in that the practice of making requests on the 
behalf of others is meant to be separable from the actual utterances of 
individuals. But as we saw in connection with the problem of grounds, Gauker 
doesn’t provide many positive suggestions concerning the ascribability condi-
tions of such vicarious requests. The alternative account, then, should make 
explicit how desire attributions explain when it is appropriate to request on 
another’s behalf and relate this somehow to the attributer’s understanding of the 
attributee’s subjective satisfaction. 
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To see how to do this, let us now reconsider the hypothetical situation 
wherein the concept of desire isn’t yet introduced but wherein the agents engage 
in the practice of making requests to each other. This is something that Gauker 
needs to allow in order to explain the need for the concept. It is reasonable to 
assume that such agents also have some primitive abilities for social cognition 
such as emotion-recognition and for understanding how people are affected by 
events: whether they are pleased or displeased; satisfied or frustrated. This 
claim is also plausible for empirical reasons (see Nichols (2001, 436) for the 
view that the understanding of affect doesn’t require possession of the ability to 
attribute propositional attitudes). One quite obvious move to make, if our aim is 
to clarify what subjective satisfaction amounts to, is to take into consideration 
our capacity to recognize when someone is pleased. 
Doesn’t the admission of affective understanding already bring with it the 
understanding of desires? After all, it is quite natural to say that if someone 
finds something pleasurable she wants it. One can doubt, though, that the mere 
fact of something being disposed to cause pleasure to a subject amounts to her 
having a desire for it. What is pleasurable for a subject need not be desirable for 
her. What’s more, from the present perspective, introducing a new term “desire” 
for something that can already be satisfactorily understood in terms of potential 
pleasure is pragmatically rather pointless.  
Another important thing to note is that the understanding of pleasure doesn’t 
imply that the agents in question have to be postulationists about it. They don’t 
need to identify pleasure with some causally efficacious inner states. In order to 
understand that another person is pleased with a state of affairs, nothing more is 
needed than certain observable criteria that help one recognize that the other is 
in that condition. These criteria can include linguistic utterances, bodily expres-
sions and temporally extended patterns of behaviour; anything that is relevant 
for recognizing that the person is satisfied. The present appeal to the under-
standing of affect, then, isn’t opposed to the spirit of the communicative 
conception.  
Now the question is what the concept of desire could enable those people to 
do that wasn’t possible before. They understand evaluative utterances and are 
able to realize when a person feels pain or pleasure, is content or frustrated. In 
that kind of state circumstances will emerge in which a person who utters a 
request doesn’t seem to be personally satisfied when it is carried into effect. 
There are also situations wherein she would presumably take pleasure in some 
state of affairs but hasn’t requested it. The need to speak about desires arises 
when there is a tension between the objective satisfaction condition of a 
command and the subjective affect that it arouses. These are situations wherein 
the person’s requests don’t seem to reflect her actual needs. The ascription of a 
desire is essentially perspective-sensitive because it not only states a request on 
another’s behalf but also relates it to the question of what really pleases that 
individual. In that way desires are still akin to requests but are also tied to the 
perspective of the agent, the explanation of which is lacking in Gauker’s 
communicative conception. For instance, imagine a situation wherein I know 
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that another person really enjoys eating broccoli, we’re in a situation where she 
is hungry and there is some broccoli in the fridge. Although she hasn’t 
explicitly uttered a request for broccoli, I find it natural to ascribe a desire for 
broccoli to her, thus treating her as if she had requested it. In that way I can 
endorse such a (virtual) request and find means to satisfy it. I have extended the 
engaged response of endorsement which is characteristic to requests to the case 
of absent utterance. 
The conceptual need that the notion of desire satisfies is, then, the need to 
know which requests would lead a person to her subjective satisfaction and 
which would not. In addition, this proposal nicely explains the grounds for 
making vicarious requests in cases of absent utterance. It does so by relating 
them to the ascribers’ ability to anticipate and recognize others’ pleasure. 
Gauker lacked the means to make explicit what the grounds for vicarious 
requests in such cases could be. The present account, on the other hand, 
provides a reason to treat the other person as if she had uttered a request 
because satisfying the latter would be pleasing to her. 
It is also noticeable that this line of thought forces us to recognize an 
irreducible explanatory role played by the concept of desire. The modified 
communicative conception brings together Gauker’s idea of the attribution of 
desire as a request on another’s behalf and the idea that the mental state 
concepts play an explanatory role. But it is important to note that, as with 
admitting the understanding of affect into our account, this concession doesn’t 
impy postulationism about desire attributions. The latter would be the case if the 
explanatory role of desires were to track causally efficacious inner states. In the 
present case, the explanation merely makes intelligible why the vicarious 
utterance is appropriate. As already noted, the recognition of someone’s being 
pleased doesn’t require postulating inner causes behind a person’s expressive 
behaviour. The desire attribution only requires for its success that the attributee 
would be satisfied if the claim on her behalf were fulfilled. That can be 
understood on the basis of overt criteria. 
One might wonder whether my proposal encounters a difficulty that is 
similar to the one faced by Gauker’s initial account; namely, whether the need 
to understand which requests would please the attributee is really such a 
substantial conceptual need for the concept of desire. It could be argued that 
introducing a new term into such a situation is unnecessary. Why not simply 
speak about dispositions to feel pleasure in certain situations? The key here is 
that vicarious claims still play a role in the present account. Since my own 
proposal retains Gauker’s idea that the desire attributions involve requests on 
another’s behalf the concept of desire can’t be reduced to the concept of a 
disposition to feel pleasure. It articulates a connection between speech acts and 
affect that helps its users achieve something distinctive in their linguistic 
practice. Note that this claim about distinctiveness doesn’t appeal to the 
impossibility of paraphrasing desire-ascriptions into vicarious commands 
conjoined with pleasure-attributions. The paraphrase might be possible just as it 
was possible to talk about qualified command-reports instead of desires in the 
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case of declined authority. The distinctiveness in question concerns what desire 
attributions enable us to do. They have a synthetic function. They articulate the 
connection between two kinds of phenomena: imperative speech acts and 
affective conditions. What’s more, they explain why it is proper to extend the 
practice of commanding to the cases of absent utterance. The original 
communicative conception didn’t extend the use of the concept beyond the 
domain of speech acts and didn’t assign any explanatory role to the concept. 
The present proposal, on the other hand, does both. 
Let’s elaborate on the merits of the present account. Explaining the concept 
of desire in terms of pleasure also connects it naturally with its wider functional 
significance in human social life, thus demonstrating the explanatory potential 
of the modified communicative conception. Having the concept of desire as a 
tool for connecting the communicative behaviour of agents with their affective 
expressions enables people to think about whether making claims on another’s 
behalf will actually be advantageous to her when the command gets fulfilled. 
This opens up specific ways of coordinating with others. The best way to show 
this is to consider how the cooperative actions would look if people didn’t 
attribute desires to one another. Such actions would still have goals in relation 
to which the behaviour of individuals could be evaluated. The imagined 
community could still be engaged in building houses and shelters, gathering and 
growing foodstuff, educating children, performing rituals, etc. During these 
activities people would command each other to do things and also to command 
on behalf of one another All of this fits into Gauker’s account alongside the fact 
that the mere practice of vicarious requests doesn’t require the introduction of 
the concept of desire into the communicative practice. What that imagined 
community lacks is the means of connecting the question of whether the 
practice of commanding is successful with the question of whether participants 
of that practice will be subjectively satisfied with the particular claims made.  
This is basically a repetition of my earlier points. But these points are 
important to bear in mind if we are to recognize the full significance of having 
the concept of desire. Introducing that concept into the aforementioned situation 
enables people to see the success of their communicative practice in a new light. 
Now the success can be evaluated not only on the basis of the fulfilment of 
objective goals but also on the extent to which individual agents are satisfied 
with it. Taking the idea that people have desires seriously might even cancel the 
objective criteria for evaluating the success of the practice. At least the desire-
based criteria might compete with the objective ones. Assuming that people are 
somewhat altruistically motivated, at least to their ingroup members, the need to 
know whether the communicative practices of a group bring satisfaction to its 
members is important. Employing the concept of desire enables us to satisfy 
that need. In that sense this concept is important for leading a worthy communal 
life and for coordinating action. 
But does the concept of desire also open up new ways of manipulating 
others? I don’t deny that at all. For example, one can deceive others into 
thinking that a person wants some state of affairs to be realised even though the 
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attribution isn’t actually sensitive to the affective profile of that person but 
instead only to that of the subject/attributer. Let’s consider a situation wherein 
another person is more authoritative in her wishes than the attributer. In that 
case the latter might achieve what she wants by putting others to work on the 
false assumption that the person whose vicarious commands they are satisfying 
actually wants them to be satisfied. However, in actual fact, they are serving the 
subject who has attributed such a desire to the more authoritative person. By 
exploiting the fact that desire attributions are supposed to bring together the 
requests on another’s behalf and the other person’s satisfaction, one can deceive 
people into mistakenly seeing such a connection. The present example is only 
one among many strategies to do that. It is almost needless to say that these 
manipulative moves undercut the original purpose of the desire attributions. If 
people always decoupled vicarious commands and subjective satisfaction from 
one another then the practice of attributing desires would presumably lose  
its point. 
The modified communicative conception, then, handles the intuition that 
desires involve subjective satisfaction very well. It makes explicit the functional 
significance of the concept of desire and offers an explanation of the cases of 
absent utterance. In all these respects it is superior to Gauker’s original account. 
Nevertheless, it maintains that the attribution of desire involves requesting on 
someone’s behalf. It also avoids the postulationist claim that the attribution is 
involves reference to the inner causes of people’s behaviour. The addition of 
pleasure-recognition makes the account perhaps less deflationist but that is the 
price we have to pay if we want to hold onto the main insights of the 
communicative conception. 
I now move on to account for the concept of belief and for the conceptual 
need to adopt it. 
 
5.3.2 Beliefs 
As in the case of desires and commands we also distinguish between beliefs and 
assertions as distinct categories. A person asserting that p isn’t the same as her 
believing that p. Nor does a person believing that p necessarily mean that she 
asserts or is disposed to assert that p. Of course, the communicative conception 
as presented by Gauker doesn’t identify beliefs with assertions or dispositions to 
assert. Instead, according to Gauker, the need to assert on the behalf of others is 
the source of the concept of belief. Yet the criticism made above applies also in 
the case of beliefs. There seems to be a deeper conceptual need involved in talk 
about beliefs than merely the need to make assertions on each others’ behalf. 
The latter wouldn’t necessitate the introduction of a new term. As with desires 
we should consider the explanatory role that the concept of belief could play in 
the practice of asserting on the behalf of others. 
My proposal for the concept of belief is somewhat different from the account 
of the concept of desire. In the case of the explanation of desires the subjective 
satisfaction conditions were explicated in terms of actual and potential hedonic 
states. The explanation of the concept of belief doesn’t appeal to anything like 
98 
that. Beliefs don’t have subjective satisfaction conditions like desires.81 What 
counts is whether they are true or not.82 Yet the case of absent utterance is still 
imporant if we are to understand the significance of belief ascriptions and the 
latter should still say something about the attributee.  
If we consider the possible needs for making such seemingly groundless 
vicarious assertions it might be of help to think back to the engaged responses 
of agreement and disagreement that constituted the affectability of belief 
attributions. Situations arise wherein a person hasn’t made an assertion that p, 
yet she behaves in way which is in accordance with such an assertion.83 Since 
she should assert it given how she behaves one wants to treat her as if she had 
asserted it. In such a way one can agree or disagree with her even in the case of 
absent utterance. By relating to her in such a way we treat her as our inter-
locutor who hasn’t yet said what she should say. Her actions speak louder than 
words, so to speak, and merit a response that would be relevant to an assertion. 
This is a case of absent utterance where the need to express one’s engaged 
response makes explicit why the vicarious assertion is reasonable and why it 
motivates the introduction of the new term, “belief”, to mark its difference from 
ordinary assertions. 
My suggestion, then, is that the ascription of a belief is meant to bring out 
the fact that the assertion on someone else’s behalf is appropriate when the 
other person ought to be ready, given her behavioural (and perhaps other) 
dispositions, to endorse such a vicarious assertion. This is appropriate even if 
she hasn’t made or isn’t disposed to perform that speech act. For instance, 
imagine someone who doesn’t say that she thinks that people of different races 
deserve different treatment but treats them in discriminatory ways (Schwitz-
gebel 2010: 532). The attribution of a racist belief to her serves as a means for 
disagreeing with her, even though she hasn’t made any corresponding assertion, 
and to bring her into the discursive space where it is hopefully possible to argue 
with her as if she had asserted it 
Why have I stressed that the other ought to be ready to endorse the vicarious 
assertion? The motivation here is to respect the fact that our ordinary practice of 
belief attribution doesn’t treat agents as fully authoritative over the convictions 
they actually have. There are cases when an assertion may be endorsed by a 
person but she can nevertheless be taken as believing something else or even 
contradictory to the original assertion. I have in mind here those occasions when 
people sincerely claim one thing but their actions speak against it. Such was the 
                                                 
81 Believing something can be accompanied by a feeling of conviction but I don’t think that 
this feeling is the essential characteristic of belief. 
82 One can also express this in the terms used by Ronald de Sousa: while desires have both 
semantic and emotional satisfaction conditions, beliefs can only be semantically satisfied i.e. 
are true or not (de Sousa 1998: 123). 
83 Such a way of behaving should be describable without any reference to beliefs in order to 
avoid circularity. The concept can’t be already in use for it to be introduced. For a proposal 
how to specify ascription-relevant dispositions without reference to mental states, see Stout 
(2006). 
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case of the implicit racist, for instance. The belief attribution, then, isn’t limited 
to situations wherein the other person endorses the vicarious assertion. It also 
extends to the situations wherein, given her overall behaviour, we think that she 
should agree. 
As another example consider a situation, imagined by Dennett, wherein an 
art critic gives praise to his son’s average paintings. Does he believe, Dennett 
asks, that his son’s paintings are average and does he simply want to promote 
his son’s career or is he so blinded by his love for his son that he really believes 
that these are high-quality paintings (Dennett 1981: 39)? Dennett presents this 
example in order to argue that there are cases when the facts about brain-wiring 
might be relevant for deciding what the person believes. In the present context, 
though, the ascription of the first belief (namely, that his son’s paintings are 
average) exemplifies a situation wherein the belief attribution makes explicit 
what the person should assert, considering his overall dispositional profile as an 
art critic. In fact, it is the determining role of behavioural dispositions and the 
fact that the person might not be disposed to assert that p that motivate the 
introduction of the concept of belief. Otherwise we could simply talk about 
actual and potential assertions. The considerations about conceptual needs, then, 
support the view of belief attributions which stresses the wider dispositional 
profile in determining whether it’s appropriate to ascribe a belief or not. This 
doesn’t mean that in Dennett’s example the attribution of the first belief is not 
contestable but it illustrates how beliefs are something over and above 
assertions. 
As with our account of desire attributions the present proposal about the 
concept of belief has an advantage over Gauker’s original communicative 
conception because it gives the concept an explanatory role. It articulates the 
conditions under which vicarious assertions in the case of absent utterance are 
appropriate but it avoids postulationism. The dispositional profiles that ground 
belief attributions don’t need to imply anything about causally efficacious inner 
states. Neverthess, the belief attribution itself has a genuine explanatory role to 
play. It doesn’t merely state the vicarious assertion; it explains why it is 
appropriate to assert. Such an explanation makes intelligible our engaged 
responses to the agent by situating her behaviour in a wider context which 
includes more than her dispositions to assert. This is somewhat similar to Julia 
Tanney’s account of reason-explanations according to which the latter don’t 
pick out causes behind people’s actions but rather give insight into wider 
circumstances which the action in question belongs to. Such an explanation 
gives additional information about the situation of the agent in order to make 
her intelligible to us (Tanney 1995; 2009).84 In the present case, this kind of 
intelligibility amounts to the possibility of agreement or disagreement with the 
agent. As in Tanney’s account, the belief attributions are meant to convey 
                                                 
84 Since Tanney’s analysis concerned action-explanation, the link between her and my 
account isn’t that direct. Nevertheless the idea that belief-ascription don’t mark causal, but 
contextual explanations, is something that we share. 
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further information about the agent than that which concerns her explicit 
assertions or even her dispositions to assert. 
This doesn’t mean, though, that the explanatory role of the concept of belief 
is limited to explaining why absent assertions on the behalf of others can be 
appropriate. The fact that belief attributions pick out the dispositional profiles of 
the attributees can be exploited in various situations. For instance, the 
attribution can identify the real reason why the agent acted, even if she asserts 
something different. In other cases the belief attribution simply gathers together 
patterns in the behaviour of the agent. But this can still be taken as a form of 
explanation because it brings forth the overall biographical background of the 
person to which that person’s actions belong. What’s more, one can rely on this 
attribution in future situations when someone asks about the person in question. 
The dispositional profile that grounds the belief attribution can involve various 
dispositions that have different manifestations in different conditions. Because 
of this, it allows the ascribers to make generalizations on the basis of the 
ascriptions which then can be appealed to when explaining the behaviour of the 
attributee (Schwitzgebel 2002: 266). 
Also, the present explanation of the concept of belief can articulate the wider 
significance of belief attributions just as the explanation of the concept of desire 
did. Most notably, the extension of engaged responses of agreement/disagree-
ment to the cases of absent utterance enables agents to subject each other to 
rational criticism when the person who is criticized hasn’t explicitly said 
anything. Her behaviour indicates that she should assert that p because she acts 
as if p were true and if we want to criticize her actions we can also treat her as if 
she had asserted that p. The criticism isn’t solely in the form “You shouldn’t do 
it” anymore but can also appeal to the falsity of a person’s belief as it is 
expressed in her behaviour. From the other side, the attribution of a belief, if 
one agrees with it, can be relied on to express reason-based support for the way 
someone has acted although she hasn’t explicitly said anything. 
There is still a gap in the current account. It doesn’t say enough about the 
conditions under which vicarious assertions in the form of belief attributions are 
appropriate. This is basically what the problem of grounds was all about. It was 
the problem of grounds that motivated one to seek amendments to the original 
communicative conception. In the case of desires the gap was bridged by 
connecting the vicarious requests with the hedonic profile of those who were 
being interpreted so that desire-ascriptions would have a firm grounding. But in 
the case of belief attributions the appeal to behavioural dispositions is more 
vague because it doesn’t pick out anything specific. It seems that such 
dispositions often underdetermine which belief attributions are appropriate. 
Let’s take, for instance, the well-known example that has been used as an 
intuition-pump in research on the theory of mind. It is about a man who runs 
towards a train that is beginning to leave the station. The explanation to this is 
couched in terms of a belief that there is a train that is just departing (Scholl & 
Leslie 1999: 131). Or take the much discussed case when a dog chases a cat 
and, after the latter has climbed on a tree, stays under it and barks. This seems 
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to allow explanation of its behaviour by attributing a belief that the cat is up 
there to the dog (Malcolm 1977, Davidson 1982). These are cases when mental 
state attributions have their sources solely in the nonverbal behaviour of those 
being interpreted. However, it is also apparent that these examples don’t seem 
to motivate a particular belief attribution. Instead there seem to be various 
attributions available that equally fit the behavioural evidence (Stich 1983: 104; 
Putnam 1992: 28). 
Since the modified communicative conception presupposes that the attribu-
ters and attributees are able to utter and comprehend assertions, there seem to be 
some additional means to delimit the range of acceptable belief attributions. The 
modified communicative conception can also treat the example of attributing 
beliefs to nonhuman animals as irrelevant because animals don’t engage in 
linguistic practice. In the case of human beings one can make sense of a 
determinate assertion on another’s behalf if this can be inferred from the speech 
act she has already performed herself. To take a rather boring example, if a 
person asserts that p & q we can usually assert on her behalf that p. We can also 
presumably make vicarious assertions by relying on nondemonstrative infe-
rence. Consider the case when someone asserts that Quine is the most important 
philosopher of the 20th century. Then we can also tentatively assert on her 
behalf that deconstruction as a philosophical method shouldn’t be taken 
seriously. But what can we say about the cases of absent utterance when there 
are no actual speech acts available. Such was the example of the man running to 
catch the train which was about to leave the station. These are supposed to be 
the situations wherein the conceptual need for the belief attributions first reveals 
itself. But what justifies making a particular assertion on another’s behalf?  
The question is quite tricky. I admitted that behavioural dispositions 
determine what kind of assertions on others’ behalf count as belief attributions. 
But it doesn’t seem to be the case that simple behavioural cues from the other 
can be used as a ground for asserting on her behalf. Something further is needed 
in order to do that. For instance, if I see a man running towards a train this 
information in itself doesn’t suffice for asserting on his behalf that the train is 
leaving. If a postulationist is right and beliefs can be defined as causal 
postulates then the attribution of attitudes on the basis of behavioural cues 
seems to be easy – one must only make an inference to the beliefs. Things 
aren’t actually that simple, though, because it is also necessary for a postula-
tionist to bring in additional assumptions so that the explanation could be 
arrived at. These assumptions would include theoretical information, for 
instance, and possibly knowledge about the social setting. But it is still possible 
to see how the explanation can be worked out on the postulationist account – by 
using behavioural information coupled with theoretical and social knowledge. 
The communicative conception dispenses with the causal inference which 
naturally leaves a certain gap that needs to be fulfilled. If the ascription isn’t 
based on causal inference, what could be a sufficient condition for ascription? I 
have already modified the original communicative conception so that it isn’t in 
tension with our explanatory concerns. But the danger here is that there 
102 
wouldn’t be any explanatory work left for vicarious assertions when it comes to 
accounting for the process by which we attribute beliefs if we allow for 
theoretical information. This would mean that some crucial questions would fall 
out of the purview of the communicative conception, at least when the 
attribution of beliefs is the issue. 
How, then, can we constrain belief ascriptions in a satisfactory manner? It 
may seem surprising but the answer is that the proponent of the communicative 
conception may have to embrace a form of simulationism (Gordon 1986). We 
can assert on behalf of the man that the train will be leaving by considering his 
situation and thinking of what we would assert in that context. If we are ready 
to assert that the train is leaving then the corresponding belief can also be 
attributed to another person. This kind of proposal can supply a satisfactory 
constraint for the attribution because it enables us to see why I should assert this 
proposition – it is reasonable to perform those speech acts in the situation that 
interests us. Otherwise, the question would remain: why should I make exactly 
those attributions and not different ones? I could in principle also say that the 
man running after the train believes that the train is beautiful. But this doesn’t 
(usually) seem to be a reasonable attribution. 
One may argue that making assertions on the behalf of others can be more 
automatic than that. We just produce them under relevant occasions without any 
deliberation on the reasons for making them. But this kind of suggestion still 
owes us an explanation of why the automatic response to the question about the 
man running turns out to be as it does. Adopting a simulationist strand into the 
communicative conception seems, then, explains how one can assert something 
on another’s behalf without the reliance on any verbal cues.85 This conception 
of belief attribution is reminiscent of Jane Heal’s account of co-cognition which 
involves the idea that we attribute to other people beliefs by thinking through 
the same subject-matter (Heal 1998). The crucial elaboration here is that the 
process of co-cognition is about imagining what one would assert if one were in 
another’s position.  
One can maintain, then, that the idea of beliefs as vicarious assertions 
survives as an important component in the modified communicative conception. 
In addition to Gauker’s original idea, the present account claims that the need to 
talk specifically about beliefs arises in communicative contexts wherein we 
need to extend our engaged responses to the cases of absent utterance. Besides 
the simulationist proposal about how the process of belief attribution might 
work and besides the concession that the belief attributions should be seen as 
explanatory, the present account doesn’t steer that far away from Gauker’s 
original proposal. But as with desires, one can’t remain so deflationist – the 
attribution of beliefs also explains why it is appropriate to assert on the behalf 
of others. 
 
                                                 
85 I don’t think that simulation is always necessary for constraining interpretation. For 
instance, when verbal cues are in place, co-cognition isn’t needed. 
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5.4 Comparisons 
5.4.1 Desires and the hedonic theory 
Before exploring a few possible objections to the current account I compare it 
with some approaches that have the similar spirit. The aim of the comparison is 
to locate the communicative conception among likeminded theories and to show 
that its concerns are not cut off from theirs. 
The account of desire given here doesn’t seem to have any obvious 
precedents. It still takes some inspiration from the hedonic (pleasure-based) 
theories of desire according to which it is not essential for having a desire to 
instantiate a disposition to act. Rather, according to such theories, the more 
important connection is between desires and feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure. If someone has a desire that p the content of her desire is presented 
to her as something pleasurable. Galen Strawson is a well-known proponent of 
the pleasure-based theory. His main motivation comes from a thought experi-
ment in which he envisages an intelligent race of creatures, the Weather 
Watchers, who lack any dispositions to act yet nonetheless have desires for 
various states of affairs and various things that please them. This seems to 
indicate that the capacity to feel pleasure can enable persons to want things even 
if they are not able to act (Strawson 1994, Ch. 9). 
The modified communicative conception of desires and the pleasure-based 
theory differ in their overall aims. The first is about the ascription of desires 
while the second pretends to give an account of what desires are. Nevertheless, 
the pleasure-based theory, as Strawson conceives it, is based on the intuitively 
believable facts about desire attributions. Because of that one can still draw 
comparisons between the two accounts. Both reject the view that desires should 
be seen to be constitutively tied to actions and this rejection comes from 
intuitive considerations. Because of this they are largely in agreement about the 
negative. As for the relation between desire and pleasure, the modified com-
municative conception is more cautious. It admits the idea that the ascription of 
desires plays an explanatory role in accounting for the appropriateness of 
vicarious requests because it assumes that the subject would feel pleasure when 
the request is fulfilled. But this doesn’t entail that the ascriptions of desires 
always need to take into account the pleasurability of the outcome. That doesn’t 
make the explanatory connection between desire and pleasure superfluous. This 
connection still identifies the normal conditions under which the ascription of 
desire is appropriate. The modified communicative conception explained why a 
concept different to request was introduced. It doesn’t exclude the possibility 
that the new concept couldn’t be ascribed in cases when that explanatory 
condition doesn’t hold. The condition for possessing the concept of desire is 
that the subject can associate the fulfilment of desire with positive hedonic 
states. It is not a necessary condition for the success of a particular desire 
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attribution that desire be associated with pleasure. That being said, the pleasure-
based theory of desire is still the most similar to my account that I could find.86 
 
 
5.4.2 Beliefs and deontic scorekeeping 
We will now move on to the belief attributions. Some similarities can be found 
between Robert Brandom’s account and mine. In Brandom’s deontic score-
keeping model of communication, the ascription of propositional attitudes is 
meant to distinguish between different inferential commitments that agents 
attribute to others and undertake themselves. Before drawing some comparisons 
I need to devote some space to introducing his theory (which is very elaborate). 
It revolves around the idea that in participating in the communicative game the 
players attribute inferential commitments and entitlements to those commit-
ments to one another. They also undertake such commitments themselves which 
they often need to justify to others to show that they are actually entitled to 
those commitments (Brandom 1994: Ch. 8). According to Brandom, then, 
linguistic communication is a normative enterprise where every move is an 
attempt to make a difference to one’s normative status. So how does belief 
attribution enter the picture? The concepts of propositional attitudes in 
Brandom’s account are in general meant to articulate the perspectivality of 
discourse. This means that attitude attributions make it possible for interlocutors 
to track the difference between commitments that they have and commitments 
that they attribute to others (Brandom 1994: 503). 
The participants in communicative practice are individuals and they don’t 
always share the commitments that others have. To make those differences 
explicit, they can speak of each other in terms of different beliefs and intentions. 
Belief attributions explicate the difference between theoretical commitments 
that people have and intention attributions make explicit the difference between 
practical commitments. Since what we are interested in is the concept of belief 
we should make this idea a bit more precise. As in the communicative con-
ception, in Brandom’s account the practice of asserting (or claiming) is the 
place where the belief-talk originates. People wouldn’t have the status of 
believers without this (Brandom 1994: 153). So it’s the tension between the 
                                                 
86 Sander Voerman (2009) has proposed that the method of checking whether we got our 
practical judgements right proceeds through affective evaluation of the effects that come 
about when these judgements are followed. For Voerman, affective states can disconfirm 
practical beliefs. This doesn’t directly connect this view with mine, because, after all, one 
could state that the knowledge about affective profiles can only inform the attribution of 
practical beliefs, but not desires. But still, if we interpret Voerman’s view so that it also 
applies to desires – and practical belief can be taken as a type of desire -- it would be almost 
identical with the account I’ve defended. What’s more, Voerman also takes the affective 
profile to reveal what a person really wants, thus making the similarities with my approach 
even more salient. A crucial difference of Voerman’s approach from mine is that he defines 
desires as attitudes towards action-types. 
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doxastic commitments carried by assertions that forces us to speak about 
ourselves and others as believers.  
One property of belief ascriptions that Brandom takes to be relevant for 
articulating the tension in question is that they can be given both a de re and a 
de dicto reading. When we read the ascription de re we can substitute the co-
referring terms in the content-clause without changing the truth value of the 
ascription. In the case of de dicto reading substitutions may change the 
ascription’s truth value. For Brandom the important aspect of that distinction is 
that ascriptions that are read de re express what we as attributers are talking and 
thinking about while de dicto ascriptions specify how the thought’s object is 
being thought about by the attributee (Brandom 1994: 503). By ascribing a 
belief to another person the attributer can articulate the perspectival difference 
between the two of them. For instance, let’s take a case wherein subject A 
ascribes to person B the belief that Cicero was a famous Roman orator. On the 
de re reading “B believes of Cicero that he was a famous Roman orator” A can 
substitute “Cicero” with “Tully” in the content-clause. On the de dicto reading 
“B believes that Cicero was a famous Roman orator” this can’t be done. In the 
first case, A undertakes the substitutional inferential commitments of the term 
“Cicero”. In this way she makes explicit her way of representing Cicero. In the 
second case, she only attributes the commitment to B and thus expresses B’s 
perspective. Belief ascriptions, then, can be used to articulate the commitments 
of others in relation to one’s own. 
What is the wider pragmatic significance of belief-talk (and also desire-talk) in 
Brandom’s account? It seems that, for Brandom, the difference in propositional 
attitudes of agents is something that gives communication its function in the first 
place. As he says: “if two interlocutors did (per impossible) have exactly the same 
beliefs and desires, communication would be superfluous” (Brandom 1994: 510). 
Without the difference between commitments that the agents undertake and 
attribute to each other, there would be no point in making any communicative 
moves. This may sound a bit excessive because communication doesn’t seem to 
be only about challenging each other’s inferential commitments. But when we 
acknowledge that Brandom includes also so-called language-exit moves (those 
that pertain to action) and language-entry moves (those that pertain to perception) 
among inferential commitments, his conception of communication and pro-
positional attitudes professes to be comprehensive. 
Inferential commitments, according to Brandom, have normative signifi-
cance because they imply that the agent should do what she is committed to. My 
account locates belief attributions in a situation wherein the ascriber should 
assert something given her dispositional profile. Because of that, there seems to 
be certain parallels between Brandom’s account and mine. Also in the modified 
communicative conception belief attribution makes explicit the doxastic 
commitments that the other has given her behaviour. Brandom’s theory could 
perhaps even be interpreted as a more elaborate account of the communicative 
conception. Although he does not define beliefs in terms of vicarious assertions, 
Brandom’s analysis of the de re and de dicto readings of belief attributions and 
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his more general description of the way in which the attributer can distinguish 
between one’s own commitments and the commitments of the attributee don’t 
contradict the communicative conception. It might rather give a more 
substantial account of how asserting on other’s behalf is structured. 
But there are at least two advantages that the modified communicative 
conception has over the deontic scorekeeping model. The first thing to note is 
that the picture given by the communicative conception seems to be a bit 
simpler. It requires less conceptual baggage than the deontic scorekeeping 
model (i.e. the whole commitment-entitlement structure). But what’s more 
important is that the modified communicative conception has the explanatory 
dimension which Brandom’s account seems to lack. The original communi-
cative conception had a problem with specifying the conditions under which it 
was appropriate to make vicarious assertions. An analogous information 
problem may arise for Brandom’s theory. One could ask when it is appropriate, 
especially in the case of absent utterance, to attribute different inferential 
commitments to other people. This seems to be an explanatory question. The 
modified communicative conception offered an answer to the problem of the 
grounds for attitude attributions while Brandom’s account hasn’t done that. In 
this sense the first has an advantage over the second. 
This brings us quite smoothly to the second advantage. In the case of the 
original communicative conception, it was possible to doubt whether that 
conception was able to articulate the difference between (vicarious) assertions 
and beliefs. By modifying it, a more substantial difference was established 
which was largely related to the explanatory role of belief attributions. Bran-
dom’s theory of belief attributions may face the same initial problem. It isn’t 
clear why the difference in inferential commitments and the de re/de dicto 
distinction couldn’t be articulated solely in terms of assertions. After all, 
assertions can also be read both de dicto and de re, and Brandom himself uses 
assertions (or claims) to exemplify that distinction (Brandom 1994: 507). Also 
by simply ascribing an assertion to someone, it is possible to make the 
distinction between one’s own inferential commitments and those that are 
attributed to the other. My modified communicative conception grappled with 
that problem and made the difference between assertions and beliefs more 
explicit. For that reason, Brandom’s conception has a lacuna which the 
modified communicative conception doesn’t have.87 
All in all, the modified communicative conception has some similarities to 
other accounts, namely, the hedonic theory of desire and the deontic score-
keeping model of belief. Nonetheless, it is irreducible to them. I will now move 
on to consider the most salient possible objections that might be raised against 
my account. 
                                                 
87 As for desires, Brandom’s account is quite different from mine because he overlooks the 
connection between desires and hedonic states. He also seems to take the attribution of a 
desire to consist only in the acknowledgement of a type of practical commitment to an 
action. (Brandom 2000: 90). 
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5.5 Problems 
5.5.1 Language first? 
After the genealogical account of beliefs and desires has been established one 
may still have a nagging doubt that explaining attitude attributions in terms of 
linguistic acts puts the cart before the horse. At least in the light of empirical 
research, the claim that prelinguistic creatures are unable to ascribe propositio-
nal attitudes is less than certain. One can point towards the implicit false-belief 
tasks in developmental psychology which are meant to probe prelinguistic 
infants’ putative ability to ascribe beliefs. The results of that research are under 
heated debate but for many authors they demonstrate that infants have such an 
ability (Baillargeon, Scott & He 2010; Kovács et al. 2010; Träuble, Marinović 
& Pauen 2010). This is a wide-reaching topic and the analysis of the develop-
mental data would require very lengthy treatment. Here the right response is to 
stress the point that the present approach seeks to understand why reflective, 
adult subjects would need to ascribe beliefs and desires to each other and also 
recognize that need themselves. Having a language seems to be a precondition 
for asking that question in the first place.88 This isn’t meant to disparage the 
research in developmental psychology. I am just stressing that such research has 
different explanatory aims from those of the present approach.  
This strict distinction between the two explanatory projects might raise a 
question if it amounts to the claim that adults, at least in their reflective 
moments, have different concepts of belief and desire than do children. 
Wouldn’t they be thinking (and talking) about different kinds of attitude if this 
were so? This might raise the concern that the seeming univocality of those 
concepts gets lost. Why think that there’s a strong conceptual discrepancy 
between the concepts that adults and children have? This is a rather intruiging 
problem and I will deal with the conceptual discrepancy in the next section 
because this topic does not strictly depend upon the relation between linguistic 
understanding and the attribution of propositional attitudes. But to anticipate a 
bit, research in developmental psychology contains results which support 
substantial conceptual differences between children and adults.89 It shouldn’t be 
dismissed at the outset. 
 
 
                                                 
88 In that respect the current approach can perhaps be compared to Stanley Cavell’s project 
of defending ordinary language philosophy as contributing to our self-knowledge by inviting 
us to projectively imagine what we should we say in imagined contexts (Cavell 1979: 146). 
The comparison of the current approach and Cavell’s would require further analysis which 
unfortunately doesn’t fall under the purview of this work. 
89 Most noticable in that regard is Susan Carey’s work on children’s understanding of the 
concepts of number and matter, compared to adults (Carey 2009). 
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5.5.2 Right kind of attitudes? 
I have now acknowledged the possibility that the modified communicative 
conception may account for specific concepts which may not be the object of 
interest for developmental psychologists, for example. Conceiving of the 
concepts of belief and desire as devices for explaining certain communicative 
moves might have the result that these concepts are different from those that 
young children have. I have responded to this concern. But the worries don’t 
stop there. It may be also possible that the concepts of belief and desire that are 
explained here differ from those that are employed in certain areas of the 
philosophy of mind and philosophy of action. Because the present approach is 
basically constructionist – the question has been when it would be reasonable to 
introduce a new concept – it is possible to doubt that the constructed concept 
differs from the one we actually have. This wouldn’t shake the communicative 
conception completely but might cut it off from the more usual philosophical 
endeavours. 
It is interesting to notice that in the philosophy of mind belief and desire 
aren’t always seen as univocal terms. It has been claimed that they don’t refer to 
a single kind of attitude, thus expressing different concepts.90 There being 
different kinds of belief and different kinds of desire isn’t then such an uncom-
mon idea after all. The present question is this. If the terms that are employed in 
the communicative conception express concepts that are identifiable with one of 
those kinds, do they cover both of them (the luckiest result!) or do they form a 
separate kind? In what follows, I will consider the basic distinctions between 
the kinds of concepts that belief and desire are meant to express, or at least 
those that I take as basic. I will start with desires. 
 
 
5.5.3 Different kinds of desire 
In the case of the concept of desire, one doesn’t have to search for long to find 
claims about the ambiguity of the corresponding term. For instance, G. F. 
Schueler distinguishes between two kinds of desires: pro-attitudes and proper or 
real desires.91 Desires in the pro-attitude sense include all those attitudes that 
move people to act. This sense of desire is usually employed when one gives an 
account of practical reasoning (Davidson 1963). Real desires, on the other hand, 
form a specific psychological kind that is only one among many motivators of 
action. Having the first kind of attitude consists in the subject approving (in 
some minimal sense) of a certain state of affairs. It is implied by any ratio-
nalizing explanation of action. Unlike pro-attitudes, real desires don’t arise in 
the organism in virtue of rational deliberation but are caused by an environ-
                                                 
90 I’ll give the examples below. 
91 For similar distinctions, see Nagel’s (1970: 29) distinction between motivated and un-
motivated desires and Alvarez’s (2010: 53) distinction between rational and nonrational 
desires.. 
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mental impulse (Schueler 1995: 36). In the case of pro-attitudes one can’t ask if 
a person has done something intentionally, although one didn’t have a desire 
(pro-attitude) to do that. The relevant pro-attitude is implicated by the intentio-
nal action in question. A real desire to do that need not be implicated in such a 
way (Ibid. 29). One could say, for instance, that a boy left the house because he 
was told that he should go to school, believed that he should do what his parents 
tell him to and wanted1 (had a pro-attitude) to go to school but he didn’t want2 
(didn’t have a real desire) to go to school. By his reasoning he approves of 
going to school but he doesn’t really want to do that. He only has a pro-attitude 
towards the action. 
Schueler’s distinction is somewhat difficult to follow because real desires 
seem to be defined largely negatively as states that are not merely pro-attitudes. 
The paradigmatic real desires are for him simple cravings like hunger and thirst 
(Ibid. 34). But this seems too restrictive. One can’t build an account of desires 
on such a limited set of needs. My impression is that the notion of proper desire 
seems to be "thicker" than the notion of a pro-attitude. The attribution of it has 
stronger psychological commitments. There may have to be some sort of 
psychological structure in place to have a real desire and there also might be a 
phenomenal character that pertains to that kind of desire. We could identify the 
relevant psychological structure and the phenomenal character with the hedonic 
state of the subject. This would make the notion of real desire resemble the 
concept given by the modified communicative conception.92 In the example of 
the boy going to school the reason why we can say that he actually didn’t want 
to go to school may be that there was no pleasure or positive feeling associated 
with such an action. 
But what can the modified communicative conception say about pro-
attitudes? Do they fall under a different concept than the one that the modified 
communicative conception aims at explaining? For Schueler pro-attitudes were 
necessarily implicated in the explanations of intentional action. Whenever X 
performed an action it was supposed to be explainable in terms of X wanting 
(having a pro-attitude) to achieve a certain state of affairs and believing that 
performing the action in question brings about that state of affairs. It seems that 
the modified communicative conception employs a thicker concept of desire 
and can’t account for the concept which designates pro-attitudes which don’t 
have such an inferential commitment. This is probably a surprising result. The 
original communicative conception seemed to be much more in line with the 
pro-attitude approach because it didn’t say anything about the connection 
between desires and pleasure. But let’s assume that the modified conception is 
to be preferred here. What does it have to say about pro-attitudes? 
One possible response here would be to claim that the genealogical account 
wasn’t meant to cover desires in the sense of pro-attitudes which are concocted 
by philosophers and aren’t of much interest in the study of our commonsense 
practice. But I do think that pro-attitudes can be accommodated in the present 
                                                 
92 This is a very loose interpretation of Schueler’s position. 
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account if we consider what the communicative conception is about. As already 
noted in §4.4.1, desires’ connection with pleasure doesn’t require that the 
attribution of desires always associates a positive hedonic state with their 
fulfilment. The explanation was only meant to bring out the primary rationale 
for the introduction of that concept by articulating the conceptual connections it 
enters into in normal situations. Unlike the traditional conceptual analysis, the 
modified communicative conception doesn’t determine the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the concept’s employment.93 Minimally speaking, the 
attribution of a desire that p to X is simply a request that p on X’s behalf. The 
attribution can always be paraphrased into the corresponding vicarious 
command. This also applies to explanations of intentional action which appeal 
to the desires (i.e. pro-attitudes) of the actors.94 
There is one obvious objection to the present attempt at accommodating pro-
attitudes in the modified communicative conception. The complaint is that by 
allowing desire attributions that don’t commit the attributer any assumption 
about the attributee’s hedonic profile, my account collapses back into Gauker’s 
original proposal. This proposal didn’t make any assumptions about the 
connection between desire and pleasure. If the communicative conception is 
meant to cover both pro-attitudes and real desires, the original account seems to 
achieve that more smoothly. 
I disagree. Aside from answering the question about the pragmatic signifi-
cance of the concept of desire (which is already an important achievement) my 
modification of Gauker’s account also explains why desire attributions are 
normally governed by the assumption that the subject should be subjectively 
satisfied when the desire is fulfilled. There is still something wrong with the 
desire-attribution when she isn’t. Even in cases when only the pro-attitude is 
attributed and no explicit assumption is made about the subject’s hedonic states, 
the attribution can still be implicitly governed by such an assumption. This 
becomes apparent in situations when the fulfilment of the desire and the 
subjective satisfaction don’t match – the concept of desire doesn’t seem to play 
its proper role in such a case. The assumption that the attributee should be 
subjectively satisfied with the desire’s fulfilment can be explained by the 
modified communicative conception. It can’t be explained by the original 
version of the communicative conception which didn’t distinguish between 
commands and desires sharply enough. This is an intuitive point about what is 
assumed about desire attributions but the idea of a fulfilment of desire without a 
subjective satisfaction seems to be very alienating. If the concept of desire were 
entirely disconnected from the idea of such a satisfaction – something that the 
original communicative conception would allow – it loses its distinctive 
meaning. 
                                                 
93 Similar point about knowledge was made by Edward Craig in his genealogy (Craig 1990: 
14). 
94 I actually doubt that an explanation of an intentional action necessarily appeals to some-
thing like pro-attitudes – an acceptable explanation can perhaps be also accounted by the 
actor submitting to relevant norms - but I am not going to speculate about that here. 
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It seems, then, that the modified communicative conception is able to 
account both for real desires and pro-attitudes. That being said, I have to admit 
that I’m not fully convinced that admitting ambiguity in the term “desire” is 
avoidable. One can argue that the original communicative conception accounts 
for desires in the sense of pro-attitudes, while the modified version applies only 
to desires proper. A possibility of such a division of labour should also be kept 
in mind in the next section with regard to beliefs. 
 
 
5.5.4 Different kinds of belief 
In the case of the concept of belief there are also distinctions that can be drawn 
which would make the concept ambiguous. For instance, one could distinguish 
between occurrent and dispositional beliefs and see these as different kinds of 
mental states. Following Frankish (2004), one could also map this distinction 
onto the difference between explicit and implicit or personal and subpersonal 
beliefs. I suspect that commonsense conceives of beliefs in the dispositional 
sense while the idea of an occurrent belief has its use in certain philosophical 
accounts. Having a belief is a state not an event (according to Williamson 2000: 
35) and merely entertaining that p or even judging that p doesn’t amount to 
believing that p. If someone talks about occurrent beliefs she can be taken to be 
speaking about something that shouldn’t be equated with proper beliefs. That 
being said, these remarks don’t suffice to preclude using the notion of occurrent 
belief for technical purposes in the philosophy of mind. But they give a reason 
in the current context to limit oneself to discussing beliefs in the dispositional or 
standing-state sense. The communicative conception of belief should account 
for them. 
It does seem that the modified communicative conception that I’ve defended 
is able to explain the same facts that the theory of dispositional beliefs seeks to 
understand. It is well suited to account for the attribution of dispositional beliefs 
because those assertions on the behalf of others which constitute belief-
ascriptions take into account more than the actual utterances of others. They are 
meant to pick out the behavioural dispositions of the attributees. This explains 
the need to talk about dispositional beliefs in a way that transcends what the 
attributee actually asserts. This, of course, doesn’t mean that the communicative 
conception, even its modified version, can be equated with the dispositional 
theory. Rather, the communicative conception can account for the fact that the 
ascribers of belief take into consideration the dispositions of the attributees. But 
it doesn’t claim that beliefs are complex behavioural dispositions as the 
dispositional account does (Gauker 1994: 275). 
But it is also possible to distinguish between two kinds of dispositional 
belief. There is the idea of beliefs that relates them more closely to occurrent 
judgements, so that the attribution of a belief that p to X relies on X’s 
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disposition to consciously judge that p (Gendler 2008).95 One of the most 
obvious routes to the attribution of a belief that p to a person does seem to be 
answering the question whether she tends to affirm p. A deeper reason for 
individuating beliefs in terms of explicit judgements is that in judging we are 
responsive to evidence and this would also explain the responsiveness of beliefs 
to reasons. Another way to employ the dispositional concept of belief is to 
consider the more inclusive dispositional profile of the person whose beliefs we 
are interested in. In that case we don’t take explicit judgements to be the only or 
even the main determinant of having a belief. According to such a view, the 
explicit judgement that p can be rather insignificant and other kinds of beha-
vioural dispositions are much more important when we individuate beliefs 
(Hunter 2011).  
We can express the difference between these two positions in terms of the 
first-personal and third-personal approaches. The view that individuates beliefs 
in terms of explicit judgements stresses their first-person accessibility. The 
position according to which broader dispositional profiles are central, on the 
other hand, focuses on the role of belief attributions in action-explanations and 
is third-personal (Zimmerman 2007). I draw attention to this distinction because 
we get differences between attributions in these two cases. Consider (again) the 
implicit racist who claims that she believes in the equality of all races but who 
acts towards people from a different race in such a way that is degrading or 
disrespectful. According to the first-personal approach, we should take the 
assertions of a person at face value and attribute to her the belief that all races 
are equal - after all, he would consciously judge that all races are equal. He is is 
consciously aware of what he judges. According to the third-personal approach, 
the attributions of belief rely on the facts about the attributees’ behaviour. The 
implicit racist believes that all races are not equal. The facts about his 
behavioural dispositions need not be consciously accessible to him and other 
people might be in a better position to know about them. The two approaches, 
then, decide differently on whether we should attribute a belief. How should the 
modified communicative conception treat those cases? 
I already hinted above that the communicative conception accommodates the 
third-personal standpoint and claims that it is proper to attribute to the implicit 
racist the belief that all races are not equal. The reason is that the modified 
communicative conception acknowledges that the attribution of a belief is 
appropriate when the attributee’s behavioural dispositions indicate that she 
should endorse the relevant assertion. This is a result that we should want. The 
first-personal approach according to which beliefs are ascribed on the basis of 
mere dispositions to judge is controversial because one can imagine cases 
wherein people do believe that p but are not disposed to judge that p. For 
                                                 
95 For Gendler, instantiating a mere behavioural disposition in relation to a state of affairs p 
which doesn’t include the disposition to consciously judge that p, shouldn’t be taken as a 
case of having a belief that p but rather an alief. I am not entirely sure that Gendler can be 
neatly associated with the view under consideration here but she surely dismisses the 
broader dispositional profile as being irrelevant in determining what a person believes. 
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instance, sometimes a person is too psychologically damaged to affirm the 
content which she believes (Cassam 2010: 83). One could try to elaborate on 
the first-person disposition to judge by stating ceteris paribus conditions. But it 
seems more reasonable to simply infer that there are behavioural dispositions 
that are also relevant in determining when the attribution is appropriate. We 
shouldn’t limit evidence in favour of vicarious utterances to only the explicit 
judgements of the attributee. The third-personal approach is more in line with 
the modified communicative conception.96 
Notice that the communicative conception doesn’t equate beliefs with broad 
behavioural dispositions. Instead it sees the latter as forming a relevant 
attribution-base. Doubt may be raised whether it is a too wavering position 
because of that. In the dispositional account the identification of beliefs with 
dispositions also fully explains why belief attributions which rely on disposi-
tions are true. In the case of the communicative conception it isn’t totally trans-
parent why attributions that rely on dispositions reveal the beliefs of others.  
But the indeterminacy of belief attributions can actually be an advantage. It 
enables a certain amount of negotiability about belief attributions. The 
ambiguity of a concept need not be taken as something negative so that it has to 
be made more precise. The fact that the self- or other-interpretation isn’t fully 
determined by the underlying dispositional profiles of agents enables us to 
maintain a kind of interpretive openness. The contestability of belief attributions 
need not be their weakness. Admitting that doesn’t defeat or cancel the point 
that broader dispositional profiles are relevant for determining whether the 
attribution is appropriate. This is exactly what distinguishes belief ascriptions 
from mere vicarious assertions. The modified communicative conception, then, 
clearly fits better with the idea that beliefs are individuated in terms of 
behavioural dispositions, not merely dispositions to judge or assert. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I criticized Gauker’s communicative conception of beliefs and 
desires by challenging him to explain the difference between attitude ascriptions 
and speech acts on others’ behalf. Although Gauker wanted to keep his 
commitments minimal he still had to explain the need for separate concepts, and 
my complaint was that he wasn’t able to do that. To amend this problem I 
proposed a modified version of the communicative conception. According to it 
the attribution of beliefs and desires allows us to have engaged responses of 
agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval to other people even in 
situations when they haven’t performed the respective speech act. These 
attributions make intelligible why it is appropriate to assert and request on 
others’ behalf in the case of absent utterance. They have to take into account 
                                                 
96 What about first-person authority of belief attributions according to the communicative 
conception? This is a question for a separate chapter. 
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certain facts about the attributees, namely, their behavioural and hedonic 
dispositions. Nevertheless, the modified communicative conception still retains 
the central idea of Gauker’s original account, namely, that belief and desire 
attributions involve assertions and requests on the behalf of others, thus making 
possible the engaged responses to the attributees. In the following chapter I will 
ask whether the modified communicative conception (qua an account of mental 
state attributions) is also an account of the nature of beliefs and desires. 
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6. THE COMMUNICATIVE  
CONCEPTION AND ONTOLOGY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Analysing some area of vocabulary in terms of what it enables us to do and 
what needs it fulfils can certainly be a fruitful exercise. Another question is 
whether this kind of approach could also say something substantial about the 
phenomena which this vocabulary is supposed to refer to. Especially since 
Kripke and the postulation of a posteriori necessities, it is common to distin-
guish between the nature of a phenomenon and the way in which we speak and 
think about it. Our epistemic approach to some thing or property is mediated 
through our conception of what other properties relate to it. But it is possible 
that the essence of the thing or property in question is independent of the 
descriptions that we associate with it. The properties of being drinkable and 
transparent don’t reveal the nature of water. The property of being yellow 
doesn’t reveal the nature of gold and the property of having a minor interest in 
stamp-collecting doesn’t reveal my nature. 
Can a similar distinction be drawn in case of propositional attitudes? Do the 
facts about the ascription of beliefs and desires underdetermine the nature of 
those states? In a certain sense, the underdetermination applies trivially because 
the facts about attribution can also include the errors that the subjects make, for 
instance. This already suffices for concluding that the nature of mental states 
can’t be simply read off from the facts about their ascription. A choice has to be 
made by asking which ascription-facts are relevant for understanding the 
ontology of mental states. This implication of a posteriori necessities goes even 
deeper. It might be argued that no set of ascription-facts can fix the facts about 
the nature of mental states. For instance, a robust causal theory of reference 
could claim that we can refer to beliefs and desires even when the attribution of 
mental states as a whole proceeds only through a contingent, and possibly false, 
understanding of those states. The idea that the nature of mental states is 
determined by the facts about their attribution seems to put the cart before the 
horse and bring us to a dubious form of anti-realism. According to this view the 
world needs to respond to our concepts, not the other way around. So at least a 
preliminary look at the issue may pull us towards the view that the nature of 
beliefs and desires can’t be inferred from facts about their attribution. Let’s call 
it the Ontology-without-Epistemology view (OwE for short) 
OwE seems to be a radical view because it severs the link between what the 
folk think of attitudes and what these attitudes really are. The present chapter 
seeks to find a more moderate position on what ontological conclusions can be 
drawn from the version of the communicative conception of beliefs and desires 
I am defending. According to the modified communicative conception (MCC), 
the attribution of a desire that p to X can be identified with requesting p on X’s 
behalf, on the assumption that p would please X. The attribution of a belief that 
p to X, on the other hand, can be identified with asserting p on X’s behalf on the 
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assumption that X should assert that p herself. These claims were meant to 
bring out the practical significance of those concepts by articulating their 
application conditions. How ontological conclusions can be drawn from such 
application-conditions is an open question. OwE is only one possible (and 
negative) answer.97 In this chapter I will tackle this question and investigate 
some alternatives to OwE. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. First, I will reject the view that we can 
(largely) dismiss the facts about the attribution of beliefs and desires when we 
are interested in their nature. Second, I will present two opposing views of the 
connection between attribution-facts and ontology. The first is conceptual 
analysis, exemplified by analytic functionalism. The second is the view that we 
can read off the nature of beliefs and desires from the use of the respective 
concepts. I will argue for the second approach and claim that it helps us 
articulate the minimal ontological commitments that the attributers of belief and 
desire have. In the second part of this chapter I apply this approach to the 
question, what does the modified communicative conception entail about the 
ontological status of beliefs and desires? I reject the (strong) interpretationist 
interpretation of MCC according to which interpretation-dependence follows 
from the communicative conception and settle for a dispositionalist and realist 
(non-interpretationist) view according to which the (true) attributions of beliefs 
and desires can be true and that they reveal interpretation-independent facts 
about behavioural and hedonic dispositions of persons.98  
 
 
6.2 From epistemology to ontology 
We started this chapter by sketching out OwE. This is the claim that our folk 
psychological practice of attributing beliefs and desires works on assumptions 
that might misconceive the nature of those states to a large extent, so that one 
can’t infer anything about the latter from these assumptions. Nevertheless, we 
succeed in referring to those states and it is the task of the natural sciences to 
discover their nature.99 This view can be motivated by the causal theory of 
reference which maintains that a term’s reference is determined by its original 
introduction and the causal chain that connects the use of the term with its 
original introduction. According to this view, a term can maintain its reference 
even if various descriptions that are associated with it turn out to be false. A 
                                                 
97 Gauker himself takes the communicative conception to be both about the attribution and 
about the ontology because he adopts an interpretationist position (Gauker 1994). One of the 
purposes of this chapter is also to investigate whether Gauker is justified to do that. 
98 What realism about an area of discourse actually amounts to is a contested issue, of 
course. Here I simply follow what I take to be an intuitive understanding. 
99 A more accurate expression for OwE would probably be Ontology-without-Folk-Episte-
mology view because it is hard to believe that no kind of epistemic access to a property is 
relevant in trying to give an account of its nature. 
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good example of this outlook can be found from the rather famous passage by 
William Lycan: 
 
I am entirely willing to give up fairly large chunks of our commonsensical . . . 
theory of belief or of desire (or of almost anything else) and decide that we were 
just wrong about a lot of things, without drawing the inference that we are no 
longer talking about belief or desire. (Lycan 1988: 31–32)100 
 
This kind of outlook can be found in the work of various authors. For instance, 
Robert Cummins (2010: 68) argues against anti-individualism about belief 
content by claiming that if we want to understand what beliefs are we should look 
into scientific psychology. This means that many commonsense assumptions 
about belief can be dismissed. Or take Timothy Schroeder who tries to give an 
account of the nature of desires that doesn’t need to respect every aspect of our 
folk conception and relies on neuropsychology instead (Schroeder 2004).101  
For instance, if the communicative conception assumes that attributing 
beliefs and desires consists of vicarious utterances that can be made in specific 
situations, a proponent of OwE could perhaps even accept such an outlook. 
Nevertheless, she might argue that beliefs and desires can still be identified with 
some brain structures and assume what Gauker calls “postulationism” at the 
ontological level. I do think, though, that this would be a highly unstable posi-
tion to hold. After all, the communicative conception was originally meant to 
counter the postulationist view that identified beliefs and desires with causally 
efficacious inner states. Conceiving of attitude-attributions as vicarious utteran-
ces and then claiming that the attitudes should be taken as inner states, the 
nature of which is discoverable by neuroscience, isn’t tenable. We would need 
to introduce further assumptions that would explain why this kind of move is 
necessary. 
This still leaves open the issue of whether OwE as such is tenable but in the 
present context, where the communicative conception of mental states is on 
focus, it is a secondary question. In any case, OwE expresses an entirely 
different sentiment to that expressed by my project as a whole. I assume that the 
nature of beliefs and desires should be recognizable by us so that we can take 
them as our attitudes. An account of the nature of attitudes that is cut off from 
our pragmatic concerns simply doesn’t gain a foothold here. The question we 
face now is how exactly the folk psychological practice reveals our ontological 
commitments.  
Nonetheless, I will briefly consider OwE for completeness’s sake and ask 
whether it is a tenable position. If it is, the communicative conception faces a 
larger set of possible approaches to the nature of beliefs and desires. To put it 
bluntly, I reject OwE but I do that not on the basis of arguing for or against a 
                                                 
100 Lycan’s quote functions only as an exemplification, I don’t intend to offer an adequate 
interpretation of his general approach. 
101 It isn’t clear whether Cummins could claim that all folk assumptions could be onto-
logically incorrect. Schroeder certainly doesn’t claim that. 
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specific theory of reference. I argue that Lycan’s intuition can be dismissed 
because it’s quite vague and difficult to explicate. The vagueness comes from 
the fact that Lycan doesn’t make a full-blown claim that the folk conception is 
entirely irrelevant to sorting out commitments about the nature of belief. He 
talks of the willingness to give up only “fairly large chunks” of our folk con-
ception of attitudes but not of giving it up as a whole. A question can be posed: 
what are the remaining “chunks” that Lycan is not willing to give up? Acknow-
ledging that there are assumptions that can’t be given up would take him too 
close to philosophers who admit that there are connections into which belief and 
desire enter which are definitive of the functional role of these attitudes. The 
commonsense conception would still largely determine what these attitudes  
can be. 
Another problem with Lycan’s intuition becomes apparent when we consider 
how it would look to give up the “chunks”. Could we give up the idea that 
beliefs and desires are semantically evaluable when future neuroscience 
dispenses with that idea? Or could we give up the idea that beliefs and desires 
rationalize people’s actions? Or the idea that we can respond to our attributions 
of beliefs and desires by agreeing/disagreeing with the former and satisfying/ 
frustrating the latter? Note that by presenting these questions I am not implying 
that these possibilities are excluded. After all, philosophers already argue what 
belongs to the nature of those attitudes and what doesn’t all the time (in fact, I 
am going to propose my own way to dismiss certain intuitively acceptable 
assumptions about beliefs and desires later in the analysis). The reason why 
these questions pose a difficulty here is that without being explicit about what 
the rejectable “chunks” are, the intuition remains too unarticulated. One should 
have at least some idea of how the progress of science would gradually 
challenge those assumptions so that some of them would remain accepted and 
others wouldn’t.  
Owing to these considerations, I assume that OwE is mistaken, if not 
confused. Our practice of attribution remains relevant to our project of saying 
something about the putative nature of beliefs and desires.102 The question we 
face now is how exactly this practice reveals our ontological commitments. In 
what follows, I will consider two possible approaches to that issue: the afore-
mentioned functionalist approach, inspired by Lewis’s work and the approach 
that I, for the lack of a better word, call the “pragmatic view”. I will eventually 
defend the latter but first I need to articulate the difference between the two. 
 
                                                 
102 One should tread the ground carefully and stress the notion “putative” here because by 
admitting the importance of folk assumptions we can’t say that the attributions of beliefs and 
desires can be true. This would require responding to eliminativism which I haven’t done 
yet. 
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6.3 Two ways to understand folk commitments 
6.3.1 Lewis/Jackson view 
The first way to understand what our folk ontological commitments amount to 
is closely related to the programme of conceptual analysis. The latter need not 
be understood in terms of providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the concept-application. It can also be taken to probe our intuitions about the 
concept in order to reveal our tacit folk theory. This theory is supposed to be the 
source of those intuitions (Lewis 1972; Jackson 1998: 32). A further move is to 
compare the folk theory with the one provided by scientific psychology and to 
see what the latter is committed to. If our folk theory’s commitments overlap 
with those of scientific psychology then we can claim that the posits that are 
given by folk psychology are functionally realized by those states that are 
acknowledged by mature scientific psychology. In that case the ontological 
commitments of folk psychology could be vindicated (Jackson & Pettit 1993). 
According to this picture, then, the move from the attribution of beliefs and 
desires to their ontology comes in the form of an explication of the folk theory 
behind our everyday attributions of those attitudes and then giving an account 
of the ontological commitments of such a theory. This way of approaching the 
issue makes the everyday concepts vulnerable to scientific disconfirmation but 
also opens up the possibility of vindicating folk psychology by scientific means. 
It also assumes that folk concepts need to be naturalizable in order to be onto-
logically respectable entities. 
How can we pin down the ontological commitments of a folk theory? In 
order for the commitments of scientific psychology and folk psychology to be 
comparable, the right method for identifying them should proceed in a similar 
way. I assume that the most standard way of doing it is to rely on the Quinean, 
or what is taken as Quinean, understanding of ontological commitments. 
According to Quine, in order to determine what exists we should consider our 
best scientific theories and see what has to exist for those theories to be true. By 
translating those theories into an appropriate formal language we can say what 
exists by looking at what realizes the values that variables quantify over (Quine 
1948). This programme also seems to be applicable to folk theories in which 
case we can ask what must exist for them to be true.103 Because of this 
connection the Quinian method of specifing ontological commitments can also 
be applied to folk psychology. One should simply look for what has to exist in 
order for the folk psychological theory to be true. This kind of approach can be 
seen as an attempt to compare those commitments with those of scientific 
psychology in order to see whether they are compatible. The point here is not 
that the Quinian approach to ontology and the Lewis/Jackson position are the 
same but that they share some important similarities. The second seems to be 
                                                 
103 It is completely independent question wether Quine would have taken the conceptual 
analysis even seriously, considering that he wasn’t interested in vindicating pre-scientific 
conceptions of the mind and world. 
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indebted to the first, at least in its general outlook when it comes to solving 
ontological issues.104 Although Quine is taken as an arch-enemy of conceptual 
analysis, the method of pinning down ontological commitments is common to 
them both. Existence is still equated with being a value of a variable. 
So there are two moments in the aforementioned programme that are crucial. 
First, it assumes that intuitive judgements about a concept by the folk can reveal 
the implicit theory that this concept implies. Second, such an implicit theory can 
then be investigated in order to see what entities, defined solely by their 
functional roles, it is committed to; namely, those that make the sentences of the 
theory true. But there is an additional move: in order to know whether those 
entities really exist we need to compare the folk theory with our best scientific 
theory. By doing that we can see whether the functional roles that the folk 
theory is committed to can be realized by what scientific psychology accepts. 
This final move doesn’t belong to the task of conceptual analysis. The hope is 
simply that the functional roles, specified by the folk theory, can be realized in 
some way (Jackson & Pettit 1993). Following O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price, 
let’s call this kind of approach to investigating folk commitments, the 
“Canberra plan”, on account of the movement originated in the Australian 
National University in Canberra (O’Leary-Hawthorne & Price 1996). 
As already hinted at in the introduction, it seems that the communicative 
conception of beliefs and desires that I have envisioned can’t fit very neatly into 
the Jackson/Lewis programme. The main reason is that the modified 
communicative conception (MCC) didn’t aim at providing a conceptual analysis 
which could reveal a theory in which beliefs and desires are embedded. It only 
claimed something about the way in which the attribution of those attitudes 
functions. Also, one could argue that, unlike MCC, the folk are intuitively 
committed to the view that beliefs and desires are causally efficacious inner 
states that are ascribed in order to predict behaviour. That is a position that the 
communicative conception opposes but seems to be a commonplace view in the 
literature about folk intuitions (Malle 2004; Malle & Knobe 1997). It seems that 
the communicative conception isn’t well suited to the programme in question. 
Of course, that may be the fault of the communicative conception, not the 
programme itself. The fault here is a lack of explicitness about the folk theory 
that commonsense psychology involves. 
In fact, Steffen Borge has presented the empirical studies of folk intuitions as 
direct evidence against Gauker’s theory of communication but also against his 
conception of beliefs and desires (Borge 2013). He points out that the folk view 
of beliefs and desires gives them an explanatory priority to speech acts. This is 
something that the communicative conception seems to deny. I don’t think that 
Borge’s challenge necessarily damages the communicative conception or at 
least not the modified one that I have defended. The communicative conception, 
                                                 
104 We get the taste of the Quinean spirit from the Lewis’s approach when the latter claims 
that “we have a reason to think a good theory true; and if a theory is true, then whatever 
exists according to that theory really does exist.” (Lewis 1972: 254) 
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as I envision it, just isn’t a theory about the psychological processes that 
underlie folk psychological attributions. It isn’t concerned with the intuitions 
that are supposedly an expression of such processes. Instead, it is an approach to 
the concepts of belief and desire that attempts to construe them in a functionally 
explicit manner in order to see the usefulness of those concepts. Another reason 
not to be struck by Borge’s challenge is that Borge’s arguments are intended 
mostly against Gauker’s view of linguistic communication which doesn’t give 
any substantial explanatory role to mental state attributions. The modified 
communicative conception of beliefs and desires, on the other hand, can 
acknowledge the full importance of belief and desire attributions in linguistic 
practice. But even if Borge’s challenge doesn’t directly affect the present 
version of the communicative conception, it still indicates that the latter is ill-
suited for the Canberra plan which relies on folk intuitions. Is there a way to 
understand folk commitments that doesn’t have the implication that people’s 
intuitions reveal a tacit theory?  
 
6.3.2 The pragmatic view 
Hutto proposes that when we are interested in folk commitments we should 
look at what people actually do when they attribute mental states (Hutto 2013). 
This method is an alternative to the method of probing the intuitive judgements 
about the applicability of those concepts in rather far-fetched scenarios as 
conceptual analysts usually do. It thus differs quite crucially from the method of 
conceptual analysis, envisioned above, because it doesn’t aim at representing 
folk theories of the concepts of belief and desire. It focuses on the performance 
of competent attributers instead. Let’s call it “the pragmatic view” because it 
focuses not so much on the semantics of propositional attitude attributions but 
the use of those attributions in everyday practice. One can find a similar 
sentiment also in Huw Price’s pragmatist approach to different discourses (Price 
1988; 1992). It certainly seems that the pragmatic view is better suited to be the 
methodological background of the modified communicative conception. 
Unlike the Canberra plan, though, it isn’t clear that the pragmatic view can 
even lay down any concrete proposal about how to discover folk psychology’s 
ontological commitments. It doesn’t presume that people employ a tacitly 
represented folk theory when attributing beliefs and desires. But without such a 
presumption it lacks the standard tools for pinning down ontological commit-
ments. These involve perspicuously representing the folk theory to see what the 
theory must quantify over in order to be true. The pragmatic view seems to be 
ontologically too shallow and no substantial ontological conclusions about the 
existence or non-existence of beliefs and desires can be drawn from it. 
Of course, triviality of ontological questions isn’t entirely alien to contem-
porary philosophers. Huw Price, for instance, advocates metaphysical pluralism, 
according to which an affirmative answer to existence-questions is relative to a 
linguistic framework (Price 1992). Assuming that different types of linguistic 
discourses have different functions, the question of whether entities talked about 
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in a discourse exist should be solved within that discourse. So, simply put, 
mathematical entities can be said to exist within the discourse of mathe-
maticians, moral entities exist within the discourse of morals, semantic entities 
are ontologically respectable within semantic talk, etc. It seems, then, that for 
this kind of view there can only be a purely pragmatic justification of onto-
logical commitments. Since pragmatic concerns don’t remain constant across 
different discourses, we can be ontological pluralists. In fact, questions about 
the ontology of mental states turn out to be so trivial that the whole matter turns 
on an analysis of the functions of different vocabularies (Price 2007). Price’s 
theory seems to assume a quietist approach to matters of ontology because 
different discourses don’t face any challenge from other discourses due to their 
functional distinctiveness.105  
Stephen Stich is another author whose later views represent a pragmatist 
position. He is definitely quite promiscuous in his making of ontological com-
mitments. This becomes apparent when he claims that there are innumerable 
properties such as ‘couch’, ‘war’, ‘throws’, ‘fixes’ and ‘crushes’. These are not 
naturalizable by means of identification with some respectable predicate 
postulated in natural science. This doesn’t mean that there are no couches or 
wars or that nobody ever throws, fixes or crushes anything (Stich 1996: 176). 
For something to be ontologically respectable, one doesn’t even need to explain 
how it supervenes on the intrinsic properties of a thing. Stich uses the property 
of being an original Picasso painting as an example of a property that is clearly 
instantiated but can’t supervene on the intrinsic properties of the canvass and 
paint (Ibid. 181). Stich also rejects weaker versions of the supevenience thesis 
such as those which identify the supervenience base with physical properties 
(Ibid. 184) or with nonintentional properties (Ibid. 185). It seems, then, that 
Stich takes ontological questions to be trivial. As long as the concept in 
question has a pragmatically justified use in human practice we can allow for 
the existence of the thing or the property that this concept represents.  
To be fair to Stich, he does consider one way of evaluating the ontological 
status of entities that a discourse posits. His pragmatist proposal for seeing 
whether the entities of a discourse can be vindicated, which he is ultimately 
skeptical about, is that we should look at the history of science and analyse the 
cases when some posits have been rejected (witches, phlogiston, etc.) and when 
they haven’t (mountains, tables, etc.) and try to formulate principles that govern 
those choices (Stich 1996: 64). After having done that, it is supposedly possible 
to apply those principles to the problematic discourse in question. But 
ultimately Stich rejects this possibility and sticks to his pragmatist guns by 
pointing out that picking out the right principle is an interest-relative matter and 
it is dubious whether different theorists share the same goals (Ibid. 66). The 
                                                 
105 So far I have only employed the Pricean approach in order to do the functional analysis of 
mental state concepts, not to do ontology, and it seems that the latter doesn’t give any insight 
how to answer ontological questions, rather, it suggests us to dismiss them. At least I think 
this should be taken as a default interpretation of his particular position. 
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choices of theories that have been made during the history of science have been 
driven by diverse factors (political interests among others) (Ibid. 67). Because 
of these considerations, Stich is doubtful that philosophers would be able to 
provide any clear normative advice about how to make ontological decisions.  
The only constraint on ontology that Stich really accepts is that respectable 
entities need to have a role in some successful scientific theory (Stich 1996: 
199). Funnily enough, this may already be too strong a constraint in the present 
context. We are here interested in the commonsense concepts of belief and 
desire. A claim that they are ontologically respectable only when they can be 
accommodated into some successful scientific theory is already too restrictive. 
A third place to look for the pragmatic approach is in what many call 
Ordinary Language philosophy. Its proponents are also interested in accounting 
for the use of our everyday concepts. It isn’t surprising that Huw Price is ready 
to associate his pragmatic approach both with Ryle and the later Wittgenstein. 
But again, also in the case of the latter authors, it is hard to get any suggestions 
about how to investigate ontological issues. After all, they were quite hostile to 
the idea of substantial metaphysics as such. The same applies to Austin. In the 
case of all these authors the stress is on the use of concepts and what they 
enable us to do in the context of human needs and interests (Baz 2010: 48).  
Although it is hard to pin down the commitments of the pragmatic view, it 
still can be said that there are some commitments that it does not make. For 
instance, it is plausible to assume that the pragmatic view doesn’t commit 
ordinary folk to the view that beliefs and desires are causally efficacious inner 
states or that those states need to be identifiable with or realizable by some 
physical states. As long as there are needs that these concepts can fulfil and 
criteria by which to apply them, they can remain in use. This doesn’t depend on 
whether their application is responsive to some “deeper” matters of fact. Note 
that this relation between the pragmatic view and a denial of strong commit-
ments isn’t a relation of entailment, though. Since the pragmatic approach is 
loosely defined in terms of concept-use, it is more like an agnosticism about 
ontological commitments. It refuses to stake a stand on which kinds of entities 
the folk are committed to. 
The pragmatic view also seems to involve quietism about folk concepts 
because changing or dismissing concepts on ontological grounds would likely 
have unseen consequences for the satisfaction of our pragmatic needs. To use an 
analogy, a proponent of the view in question can be compared with an indivi-
dual who is politically conservative. She has no opinion on which principles of 
government are the right ones and she thinks that it is better to retain the current 
political system because nothing could guarantee that changing it wouldn’t 
make matters worse. Quietism isn’t the same as agnosticism – one doesn’t entail 
another – but the pragmatic approach seems to be drawn to both. 
So there are two opposing or at least divergent ways of approaching the 
ontological commitments of folk psychology. On the one hand, we have the 
Lewis/Jackson programme or Canberra plan which presents quite clear 
proposals about how to inquire into metaphysics. It also allows us to be 
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revisionists about a discourse if it isn’t functionally realizable by physical 
reality. This approach seems to be unsuitable for dealing with the modified 
communicative conception. On the other hand, we have the pragmatist approach 
which is clearly more in line with the pretensions of the communicative 
conception. But this position isn’t able to present any clear guidelines for doing 
ontology besides remaining entirely quietist about that topic. Of course, 
quietism is also an answer to ontological questions but it seems like a too super-
ficial solution to them.  
Since I’ve adopted the pragmatic approach already, and my defense of the 
modified communicative conception has assumed it as an overall framework, 
what I am now going to do is to argue that the Lewis/Jackson programme is a 
problematic approach and that ultimately the pragmatic account (in its some-
what modified form) is preferable. After that we can inquire into whether the 
latter needs to remain committed to agnosticism and quietism about ontological 
matters, something that I take as a default assumption for now. 
 
 
6.4 Against the Lewis/Jackson view 
As we saw there are two main steps in the Canberra plan. First, specify the folk 
theory that a concept implies. Second, see what kind of functional roles need to 
be fulfilled in order for this theory to be true. The additional step, which 
includes seeing whether these functional roles can be realized by structures that 
a physicalist can find acceptable, doesn’t belong, strictly speaking, to specifying 
ontological commitments of commonsense. It rather belongs to the clarification 
of whether these commitments can be vindicated and I am not tackling this step 
at this point. Also, I won’t deal with the second stage of that programme which 
is the technical issue of how to interpret theoretical statements. My criticism 
will focus entirely on the first step which, if not feasible, undercuts the whole 
programme. 
The path I am not going to take is that of casting doubt upon the notion of 
conceptual truth, so that no inference is seen as essential to concept-possession 
(à la Williamson 2006). It is true that Jackson’s approach, for instance, assumes 
the feasibility of that notion. But I am not going to question this idea directly. 
Rather, I will argue that the assumption that intuitive judgements of the folk 
reveal an implicit theory is already problematic, whether or not that theory is 
supposed to consist of conceptual truths. The idea is that there is no clear-cut 
criterion for deciding which assumptions form the putative theory. For this 
reason, the first step of the Canberra plan can’t get off the ground. 
So why can’t the intuitive judgements of the folk concerning commonsense 
psychology reveal the folk theory? One reason for this is the fact that it is 
unclear what kind of judgements would settle this issue. Should we aim at the 
unreflective judgements of the man on the street or should we prefer the 
reflective judgement of a philosopher? It isn’t clear which judgement reveals 
the semantic competence of individuals. Choosing either of these possibilities 
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will spell trouble for the investigator. If we prefer unreflective judgements, we 
disparage the role of reflection in our conceptual competence. If we focus on 
reflective judgements, we are threatened with the possibility that reflection 
distorts the process of evaluating the application of the concept. Which kind of 
judgement reveals the putative theory that characterizes the concept? This 
question can’t be answered without bringing in strong assumptions about what 
should be counted as the right kind and it isn’t clear how this can be done. To 
make matters worse, there is probably a continuum between unreflective and 
reflective judgements. One can distinguish between more or less immediate and 
more or less rationally mediated responses. One could hope that people end up 
with the same judgements both in reflective and unreflective cases. This is a 
highly dubious assumption. As long as we consider the judgements of philo-
sophers, opinions about what assumptions the concepts of belief and desire 
involve are highly divergent. 
I actually think that reflective judgements should be given preference when 
one does philosophy.106 But I say this from the perspective of the pragmatic 
approach – an approach which isn’t interested in probing people’s intuitions in 
the first place. Because of that it doesn’t face the same problem. At least I hope 
to show that it doesn’t. The aforementioned dilemma arises for the Canberra 
plan, though, because the latter is aimed at revealing the folk theory that is 
supposed to belong to the semantic competence of persons. 
A second consideration against the Lewis/Jackson programme is that it is 
possible that the ability to make judgements about concept-application isn’t 
enabled by a theory at all. It is an open question whether theory theory is an 
approach that we should adopt in order to explain this ability. There are 
numerous alternative accounts on the market at the moment. Some of them deny 
that there is any role for a theory at all (Gallagher 2006; Hutto 2008). Most of 
them take theory to be only one element among many that contributes to the 
explanation of folk psychological understanding (Goldman 2006; Sitch & 
Nichols 2003; Currie & Ravenscroft 2002). I won’t delve deeper into this 
debate. It is important to note that even if a theory plays some part in explaining 
the abilities of the folk there are other mechanisms besides that. This already 
gives us a reason to think that whatever theory we can eventually glean from 
those studies reflects the folk conceptual competence only incompletely. It thus 
gives us a distorted or limited view of the concepts that we are interested in. 
My third argument against the feasibility of the first step of the Canberra 
plan is that even if we are able to identify which folk judgements are 
appropriate in this, it is unclear whether they should be given the authority to 
decide our ontological commitments. The first two arguments assumed that if 
the folk theory is explicable we have a trustworthy starting point from which to 
                                                 
106 “How can it be a definitional truth that spontaneous judgements as opposed to careful and 
reflective judgements are particularly effective for those determining whether an object is in 
the extension of a concept?” (Cappelen 2010: 210) Cappelen raises this point when he 
argues against Goldman. 
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inquire into what the folk are committed to. But even if we can discover such a 
theory, should it be taken as a satisfactory reflection of what the folk are 
actually committed to when they ascribe mental states to one another? After all, 
conceptually competent people might be mistaken in their judgements about 
concept-application if these judgements require thinking about complex 
counterfactual situations. It is possible, for instance, that even if there is a 
common pattern in the majority of folk judgements, this doesn’t really reflect 
folk commitments. It might be an outcome of a particular interpretation of what 
the folk say instead. This is something that Hutto brings out with the example of 
how the supposedly intuitive idea that mental states need to be causally 
efficacious in a strong sense may be the result of a contemporary scientific 
picture (Hutto 2011). According to this picture everything obeys causal laws, 
paradigmatically understood along the lines of the natural sciences.  
So it is possible to question, despite the folk intuitions, whether we are 
committed to the idea that beliefs and desires are inner causes of behaviour. 
This idea might be an outcome of the fact that mental states are often modeled 
on physical causes (see Ryle 1949, Ch. 1). Let’s just consider another example. 
It may be intuitive to judge that memory functions as a storage capacity. 
Remembering that p would then involve storing a memory trace, a repre-
sentation that p, in the brain since the time when this representation that p was 
originally acquired. Despite that, if Wittgenstein is right and remembering 
something doesn’t require instantiating continuous memory traces, should we 
say that the folk conception of memory has such a commitment (Wittgenstein 
1980: 220; see also Moyal-Sharrock 2009)? One could, of course, dismiss an 
alternative conception of memory because it contradicts the folk view and 
doesn’t reveal actual folk commitments. But why do we have to prefer such a 
judgement to others? We should at least leave open the possibility that the 
Wittgensteinian view captures those commitments. The storage view could be 
an outcome of a confusion that arises from the use of metaphors in descriptions 
of memory. After all, Wittgenstein also belonged among “the folk”, having 
been an adult member of homo sapiens. The storage-metaphor may be very 
common even cross-culturally (Amberber 2007). However, this doesn’t mean 
that we have to rely on this metaphor in order to sort out our ontological 
commitments. 
The point of these examples is that folk judgements about the conditions of 
concept-application need not always be trusted, at least in situations when we 
can interpret their use of concepts in less loaded terms. The question here is: 
under what conditions does a claim about a conceptual commitment have 
authority? When should we accept a putative commitment? It is doubtful 
whether authority can be conferred on a claim only because the majority of 
people tend to endorse it spontaneously. Let’s take a more radical example. One 
of the most common assumptions about beliefs and desires that is also taken as 
a crucial element in the folk theory is the law that is modeled on the practical 
syllogism. This law doesn’t have a canonical formulation but one of the most 
usual ways to put it is as follows: if a person wants that p, and believes that 
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doing X will bring about p, he will, all other things being equal, do X (cf. 
Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997: 126). Or take a more elaborate version of this law: if 
a person wants that p and believes that if q then p, and if she is able to make the 
case that q then, excluding conflicting desires, she will bring about that q 
(Churchland 1981: 71). A proponent of the Lewis/Jackson account could claim 
that the folk are committed to the belief-desire law in their mental state 
attributions. The law would then specify a necessary condition for someone to 
have beliefs and desires. 
But even this widely recognized case of a putative implicit assumption that 
governs our folk psychological attributions doesn’t have to be a guide to the 
ontology or constitutive properties of mental states. Although this assumption 
doesn’t seem to be an outcome of an implicit metaphor or a metaphysical 
picture, it isn’t something that we must treat as an inevitable component of the 
folk concept. At least this further move requires an argument. Why should we 
think that if many people find this law to be intuitive they must be committed to 
it? To find out such a commitment we should do more than probe their 
intuitions. We should observe how this concept is actually applied and what it 
provides us with. The outcome of this may well be that we find ourselves asking 
about intuitions concerning the application-conditions of the concept in 
hypothetical situations that are completely removed from any everyday context. 
In these conditions the answer might become too indeterminate (for an elabo-
ration of this danger, see Baz 2012).107 
So there are serious reasons to doubt that the Lewis/Jackson approach to 
ontological commitments will deliver the goods. There are problems with 
specifying the right kind of intuitive judgements in order to fix the essential 
assumptions of folk psychology. It is also problematic to assume that folk 
psychological judgements are subserved by a theory. Finally, one should not 
take intuitive judgements to have final authority over the ontological commit-
ments of folk psychology. This is good news for the modified communicative 
conception because the latter didn’t fit well into the Canberra plan anyway. 
Unfortunately the alternative view also has its problems. 
 
 
6.5 Problems with the pragmatic view and the solution 
Although there are serious problems with the Canberra style of philosophizing, 
the pragmatic approach I have envisaged is not without difficulties either. Aside 
from not providing any clear instructions for identifying the ontological 
                                                 
107 Considering that I expressed doubt about the predictive potential of folk psychological 
concepts (Chapter 2), one might raise suspicion that the reason why I don’t want to commit 
the folk to belief-desires is that I consider the latter to be mistaken. The folk can be 
committed to something false, I don’t deny that. Here the aim is simply to argue for being 
skeptical about the prospects of sorting out what those commitments really are by relying on 
people’s intuitive judgements. 
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commitments of the mentalistic vocabulary, there are also more imminent 
methodological issues that I need to address. 
We can clearly do various things by attributing mental states – negotiate and 
manipulate the attitudes of the attributees, simply phantasize about others, 
explain and predict their behaviour108, etc. The natural question arises how can 
we constrain this diversity so that we can see what actions are essential to folk 
psychological attributions and which can be dismissed as being peripheral to the 
commonsense practice. For instance, Hutto’s pick from the domain of different 
doings that folk psychology involves focuses on those occasions when we make 
rational sense of other people’s actions in terms of beliefs and desires. These 
explanations are not formulated in the form of general laws but they are 
responses to why-questions concerning particular behaviours (Hutto 2004; 
2008, Ch. 1). If that is true, the folk aren’t committed to there being general 
psychophysical laws. On the assumption that causality implies such general 
laws, one could draw the further conclusion that the folk are not committed to 
the causal efficacity of beliefs and desires.109 That would be an ontologically 
significant conclusion, based on the pragmatic approach. 
We might ask, why is it necessary to pick out a specific element of folk 
psychological attributions and disregard the rest? As already noted, there are 
other things we do with folk psychological attributions. The additional difficulty 
is that actions can be described in multiple ways. This is demonstrated by 
Anscombe’s well-known example of a person pumping water into a cistern but 
also poisoning the water supply and killing the inhabitants in the process 
(Anscombe 2000: §23). So even if we admit with Hutto that normalizing expla-
nations are the most salient actions that folk psychological attributions involve, 
there still remains the problem of justifying the dismissal of other possible 
descriptions that apply to those doings. 
The problem of specifying the central elements of folk psychological 
attributions doesn’t uniquely characterize the pragmatic view. Remember that 
the Jackson/Lewis approach faced similar difficulties with determining the 
central postulates of folk psychology. Nevertheless, it at least gave us a possible 
means for explicating the folk theory (viz. by probing intuitions). I argued that 
this method isn’t feasible but the question of how to identify the central 
postulates is left open entirely in the case of the pragmatic approach. Unless we 
want to fall back again on intuitions, there should be another way to specify the 
criteria for picking out the ontological commitments of folk psychological 
attributions. 
I suggest that the modified communicative conception that I have defended 
can achieve this. If we want to decide which are the ontological commitments 
of folk psychology then we should ask whether folk psychological practice can 
                                                 
108 Note that by arguing against the centrality of the predictive function of folk psychology in 
Chapter 2 I have not said that people never try to predict behaviour by ascribing beliefs and 
desires. 
109 In fact, Hutto (1999) has himself argued for the view that reasons are not causes. 
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still work if we don’t assume the putative commitment in question. So we must 
ask whether our practice of attributing beliefs and desires still makes sense after 
we have given up that putative commitment. Only those assumptions of mental 
state attributers that really are required for the practice to make sense need be 
considered as essential commitments of folk psychology. Note that this is quite 
different from OwE. The point here isn’t that beliefs and desires have a deeper 
essence for natural sciences to discover and that thanks to this we can dismiss 
many of the folk assumptions. The idea here is that the essential aspects of folk 
psychological attributions are revealed when we consider which requirements 
need to be met if attitude ascriptions are to succeed. 
The explication of the concepts of belief and desire in the previous chapters 
also helps us to understand the ontological commitments of mental state attri-
butions. The explication considered the mental state attributions in abstraction 
from the messy implications they can have in our everday life. What were 
important were the main benefits that the folk psychological attributions 
offered. The explication brought out the motivation for introducing the concepts 
of belief and desire in the first place in a way that would explain those benefits. 
These concepts were meant to extend the practice of communication and 
explain certain kinds of communicative behaviour, thus articulating the minimal 
conditions under which the mental state attributions make sense for the attri-
buters. The lesson from the explication was that the attribution of desires 
minimally requires the ability to command on each others’ behalf and a sensiti-
vity as to whether those vicarious commands would provide subjective satis-
faction for those on whose behalf the commands are uttered. The attribution of 
beliefs, on the other hand, requires the ability to utter vicarious assertions and a 
sense of which behavioural dispositions are relevant for doing that. If these 
abilities are the minimal requirement for possessing the concepts of belief and 
desire then we can also define the most crucial assumptions of mental state 
attributions: that the possessors of beliefs and desires are capable of having 
behavioural and hedonic dispositions and of participating in the practice of 
linguistic communication. These assumptions reveal what attributers have to 
commit to if the attributions are to deliver their benefits, even if the folk 
intuitions involve more. One can disregard the putative commitments to the 
causal efficacy of attitudes and specific internal strucures in agents’ brains, for 
instance, because the attribution of attitudes delivers its benefits also without 
those commitments. The explication thus realizes the pragmatic approach by 
extracting the commitments of folk psychological attributions from the (basic) 
use of the concepts of belief and desire. 
The present proposal is somewhat different from the other pragmatic 
approaches. It doesn’t merely ground the commitments of folk psychology in 
everyday concept-use. It also has a specific method of specifying which uses are 
relevant for articulating folk commitments. This method relies on the benefits 
that folk psychology offers. Hutto also picked out a particular use of mental 
state concepts which he considered to be relevant (Hutto 2008). But he seemed 
to think that in order to justify his choice it would suffice to note that this is 
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what we do. I have not settled with that. The commitments of the modified 
communicative conception can be established even if we can’t identify the main 
use of the concepts of belief and desire by merely observing folk psychological 
practice. We have to consider the benefits of this practice too. 
From the minimal assumptions about attribution-conditions one can ask what 
beliefs and desires have to be like in order for these assumptions to be true. In 
the next section I will address the possible responses to that question and argue 
for my own realist and dispositional account. Before going on, I should mention 
that by relating the ontology of beliefs and desires to the minimal assumptions 
one has to make about them, MCC isn’t a form of agnosticism about the 
metaphysical commitments anymore. The aforementioned minimal assumptions 
are such that one is committed to them if one is to make sense of the concepts of 
belief and desire. The question of quietism, on the other hand, will be answered 
at the end of the chapter. 
 
 
6.6 The ontological status of beliefs and desires 
6.6.1 Initial proposal: interpretivism 
To find an answer to the question “what does having beliefs and desires consists 
in?” (presuming that the modified communicative conception is correct) 
perhaps the most promising place to look is the original communicative con-
ception as defended by Gauker. In his 2003 book he distinguishes between three 
different ways of explaining the nature of a thing: 1) by characterizing its 
internal structure; 2) by identifying its function; 3) by finding its place in human 
conventions (Gauker 2003a: 272). In the case of propositional attitudes the first 
would be the approach of those who support Lycan’s intuition and think that 
there is an essence of beliefs and desires for science to discover. The second 
would be the approach of the Canberra planners who take the functional profiles 
of belief and desire to characterize their natures. Finally, the third view is the 
one Gauker in fact adopts. If we view beliefs and desires in such a way, their 
nature is analogous to the nature of weddings, funerals, and all those things 
whose nature is exhausted by their being socially recognized as having such a 
nature. The communicative conception in its original form, then, is an inter-
pretationist position, and Gauker himself adopts the interpretationist label 
(Gauker 1994).  
Before evaluating whether this move is successful we should ask, what does 
interpretivism as a philosophical position actually involve? It is most closely 
associated with certain philosophers, most notably Dennett and Davidson. The 
starting-point of Dennett’s interpretivism is his distinction between three 
stances by means of which we can explain and predict worldly phenomena: the 
physical, the design, and the intentional stances. The first involves the use of 
physical laws. The second consists in the attribution of functions to the system 
on the assumption that it functions properly. The intentional stance involves the 
attribution of beliefs and desires to a system on the assumption that that the 
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latter is rational and predicting its behaviour on the basis of that. If the beha-
viour of a system can be interpreted by taking an intentional stance towards it, 
the system has beliefs and desires (Dennett 1987). So interpetivism in the case 
of Dennett means that being interpretable from the intentional stance is suffi-
cient for something to have beliefs and desires. This allows also thermostats and 
chess-playing computers to have those attitudes if interpreting them by using 
the intentional stance is predictively useful.110 
Davidson’s interpretivism is tied to his theory of radical interpretation which 
postulates a hypothetical situation of learning a language from scratch, relying 
only on the behaviour of the language-users. This process also involves the 
attribution of beliefs and desires to them. Having those attitudes consists in 
being interpretable in that way (Davidson 1973). Notice that Davidson is 
pushing towards the idea that interpretability is a necessary condition for having 
propositional attitudes when he claims that “what we could not interpret is not 
thought” (Davidson 1990: 14). 
The main idea of interpretivism, then, is that having beliefs and desires 
stands in some constitutive relation to our practice of attributing beliefs and 
desires. As Alex Byrne puts it: “There is no gap between our best judgements of 
a subject’s beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject’s beliefs and 
desires” (Byrne 1998). I take this to be a minimal assumption that should 
characterize any version of interpretivism. Gauker’s idea that beliefs and desires 
are social kinds fits nicely into this characterization. After all, it is natural to be 
an interpretationist about social kinds. Otherwise we would have to make sense 
of the idea that weddings and funerals could exist without anyone treating them 
as weddings and funerals. 
We can go even more minimal in our understanding of interpretivism than 
this. For William Child, for instance, interpretivism could involve just the claim 
that we can come to understand mental states if we consider the interpretation 
by which they are ascribed (Child 1994: 9). This kind of conception doesn’t 
entail that interpretability is necessary or sufficient for having mental states. It is 
more like a methodological claim than an ontological view. Yet Child is a bit 
vague on this matter because elsewhere he claims, like Byrne, that a fully 
informed interpreter can know everything there is to know about someone’s 
thoughts (Ibid. 12). This would amount to the claim that interpretability is 
sufficent for having thoughts.  
Interpretivism is not then uniformly understood and there is a continuum 
between stronger and weaker interpretations. The strongest position claims that 
interpretability is both sufficient and necessary for having beliefs and desires. 
Positions that admit either only a sufficiency or a necessity requirement are in 
the middle. The weakest form of interpretivism makes only a methodological 
claim: looking at the facts about interpretation is supposed to provide insight 
about the objects of interpretation. Let’s see whether the communicative 
                                                 
110 It is unclear whether Dennett’s theory is justified to claim that the interpretability is a 
necessary condition, too. 
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conception could fit onto this continuum and whether a marriage of the commu-
nicative conception with interpretivism makes sense. Since methodological 
interpretivism is the most minimal position, I take it as the last opportunity for 
interpretivism to retain any substance. For this reason, I consider first the more 
substantial versions of that position. 
So the first way of conceiving the communicative conception as a form of 
interpretivism is Gauker’s suggestion that beliefs and desires can be taken as 
social kinds. This would be a quite strong form of interpretivism because it can 
be read as a claim that the social recognition of something as having beliefs and 
desires is both necessary and sufficient for it to have those attitudes. This view 
faces the immediate threat of falling back into a more realist position because it 
still needs to say what the nature of social kinds is. If the latter can be reduced 
to psychological states, perhaps even to beliefs and desires, then the communi-
cative conception wouldn’t be an interpretationist position. Even worse, it 
would be circular because it presupposes what it explains.  
Even if this worry can be fended off, I am still very skeptical about this way 
of understanding the nature of attitudes. Nothing in their definition gives one a 
reason to equate beliefs and desires with social kinds. It is true that their 
attribution is understood in the context of social interaction. But if attitudes are 
social kinds, their instantiation should be dependent on the existence of the 
practice of recognizing them as beliefs and desires. It is difficult to accept such 
a strong form of ontological dependence because it makes sense to say that 
individuals can have beliefs and desires even if a practice of interpretation 
doesn’t exist. It is highly plausible to think that there would be no weddings if 
no practice of taking something as a wedding existed. The same can’t be said 
about beliefs and desires. One can conclude, then, that social kind interpreti-
vism gets wrong the necessary conditions for having beliefs and desires. This 
concern is even more pressing for the modified communicative conception 
which made more assumptions about the ascription-conditions of beliefs and 
desires than the original communicative conception. These assumptions con-
cerned hedonic and behavioural dispositions. Since the attribution of attitudes is 
meant to respect such facts about the attributees, it is even harder to see how 
those attitudes could be identified with mere social kinds.  
Locating beliefs and desires among the social kind categories isn’t really the 
standard way to formulate interpretivism. An alternative definition that relies 
heavily on the idea of an ideal interpreter can be found in Byrne’s (1998): “x 
believes that p iff if there were an appropriately informed Ideal Interpreter, she 
would be disposed to attribute to x the belief that p.” This kind of treatment of 
interpretivism (let’s call it Ideal Interpreter Interpretivism, or III) could be 
applied to desires as well. Child also seems to assume some kind of ideal 
interpreter when he claims that what actual interpreters learn about thoughts 
isn’t all there is to learn but what they could learn is all there is to learn (Child 
1994: 30). The communicative conception could also be interpreted through that 
lens. On such an interpretation the communicative conception claims that the 
ideal interpreter can determine what can be asserted and requested on a person’s 
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behalf, thus determing what the person believes and wants. This fares better 
than social kind interpretivism because the ideal interpreter need not be actual. 
Even before interpreters were available, individuals could have had beliefs and 
desires because the ideal interpreter would have attributed these attitudes to 
them. 
The problem with this kind of approach is that it requires explaining what 
makes the ideal interpreter an ideal one, without relying on the specification of 
interpretation-independent facts. The most obvious way to sort out what being 
an ideal interpreter consists in is to specify what is the nature of the objects of 
interpretation what the ideal interpreter is capable of understanding. The success 
of the ideal intepreter could then be explained by her ability to consider the 
facts about mental states. But that would mean that we can explain the nature of 
the objects of interpretation independently of facts about interpretation. The 
interpretation couldn’t determine what it is to have mental states.111 One move 
that a defender of III could make is to claim that although the previous argu-
ment shows that the facts about mental states are explanatorily prior to facts 
about interpretation, the second are still ontologically prior to the first. But that 
would be a rather surprising move because no reason is given as to why we 
should accept it. It seems like a desperate attempt to save interpretivism, not a 
well-argued way to articulate the metaphysical dependency-relation between 
interpretation and mental states. 
Another, more promising way to respond to this concern would be to argue 
that interpretivism can be retained when we confine the facts that are relevant to 
the ideal interpreter to those that are behavioural. If the explanation that makes 
an ideal interpreter ideal doesn’t make any reference to mental states then III 
can still be an informative metaphysical position. It would explain the facts 
about mental states in terms of facts about the ideal interpreter and non-mental 
facts. It is noticeable that interpretivism in general seems to be motivated by the 
goal of understanding mental states without taking them to form an irreducible 
ontological category. This doesn’t mean that non-mental facts can’t be used to 
account for mental facts. Taking this into account, ideal interpreter interpreti-
vism can at least avoid the charge that explaining the ideal interpreter requires 
relying on facts about mental states. 
I still have a nagging concern at this point. Although this move to defend III 
is feasible, it eventually blurs the distinction between interpretivism and beha-
viourism. It is noticeable that one important motivation to defend interpretivism 
comes from epistemology. It is motivated by the need to account for the fact 
that people can have knowledge about attitudes without knowing anything 
about the internal structure of the brains of individuals. “Interpretationism aims 
to make it intelligible that an ordinary interpreter can, in favourable circums-
tances, tell what someone believes and desires.” (Child 1994: 47) This means 
                                                 
111 In a somewhat analogous manner, Kripke rejects a defense of the dispositional account of 
rule-following which relies on idealized conditions by arguing that specifying the ideal 
conditions already assumes what rule is being followed (Kripke 1982: 28). 
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that the distinctiveness of interpretivism as a philosophical position eventually 
comes from what it opposes. For instance, it does assume that sub-personal 
information processes do not play or do not need to play any role in fixing the 
facts about mental states. It is the interpretation of the observable behaviour that 
does this (Child 1994: 31). But if that is true, I don’t see why we need to take III 
to be something different from behaviourism. After all, it needs to take into 
account behavioural facts in order to explain what makes mental state 
ascriptions true. The ideal interpreter doesn’t seem to play any substantial role 
in accounting for the truth of interpretations. Her capacities should still be 
explainable by the facts about the objects of interpretation. The kind of inter-
pretivism that relies on the idea of the ideal interpreter, then, doesn’t seem like a 
very interesting position. But we can still ask whether the communicative 
conception fits into this category. 
Understanding the ideal interpreter only in terms of the facts about inter-
pretation, not about the objects of interpretation, may perhaps be possible when 
we adopt the original communicative conception. It is possible only because the 
original communicative conception says very little about the conditions under 
which something is assertable or requestable on someone’s behalf. The modi-
fied communicative conception, on the other hand, treated assertability and 
requestability conditions as a serious problem and specified them in terms of 
interpreter-independent facts – hedonic and behavioural dispositions. One could 
object that I did allow that mere assertions and requests on someone’s behalf are 
sometimes acceptable. But I’ve also stated that the practice of belief and desire 
attribution would not make sense if the dispositions and hedonic states were 
never taken into account. Because of that, the interpreter-independence is an 
unavoidable element in the specification of when it is appropriate to interpret 
someone in terms of beliefs and desires.112 
The third and the most recent way to articulate interpretivism is Bruno 
Mölder’s ascription theory. This position tries to steer away from the notion of 
the ideal interpreter and relies on the idea of canonical interpretation. This is 
understood in terms of our everyday conception of mental states which is 
available to actual interpreters. Nevertheless, the ascribability of mental states 
can often transcend the actual attributions which don’t always follow the 
conditions of ascribability. In this way, it allows for errors in interpretation 
(Mölder 2010: 172–173). Ascription theory, then, seems to exist somewhere in 
the middle between social kind interpretivism and ideal interpreter inter-
pretivism. It assumes that the folk have the competence to discern which are the 
correct ascribability conditions but they may not always perform in accordance 
with this competence.  
Another aspect of ascription theory that distinguishes it from other versions 
of interpretivism is its reliance on the idea of pleonastic properties in its 
                                                 
112 III faces an additional problem. It seems plausible that we could adopt III towards almost 
any area of discourse. If the ideal interpreter is really the ideal one, she should basically be 
all-knowing which means, of course, that she would know all the facts. 
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articulation of the metaphysical difference between the mental and the physical. 
According to Mölder, mental properties such as having a belief that p and 
having a desire that p are pleonastic properties. This means that whether some-
thing has them is wholly dependent on it falling under a corresponding concept 
of that property (Mölder 2010: 23). The idea of pleonastic properties, taken 
from the work of Stephen Schiffer, is about those properties that fall under 
pleonastic concepts. A pleonastic concept is a concept the application of which 
entails that the corresponding property is instantiated. Such a property is only 
instantiated in a deflationary sense which means that it isn’t a natural property. 
It doesn’t belong to the “furniture of the world” (Schiffer 2003: 57). The 
ontological status of mental states is fully exhausted by the application of the 
corresponding predicates. Since ascription theory takes mental states to be 
pleonastic it doesn’t allow for a more substantial story about those states than 
the story about the application-conditions of the corresponding predicates. 
Mölder’s ascription theory is certainly more articulated than the previous 
two. It is also a rather strong version of interpretivism. I take it that it pretends 
to give both necessary and sufficient conditions for having mental states. Both 
can be specified in terms of canonical conditions of interpretation. “Which 
mental properties one has depends solely on which mental predicates are 
ascribable to one.” (Mölder 2010: 40) A quite obvious strength of ascription 
theory is that it eschews the notion of the ideal interpreter which, as we’ve seen, 
doesn’t do any interesting metaphysical work. It still faces the same question as 
the ideal interpreter interpetivism did: how to specify ascribability conditions 
without making interpretation dependent on the facts about the objects of 
interpretation or falling into behaviourism. Of course, interpretationists need not 
deny that there are non-mental facts that the interpretation can depend upon. As 
we’ve seen, though, this dependence puts the metaphysical weight on the facts 
about behaviour and behavioural dispositions, not the interpretation itself.113 
The ascriptivist can call the notion of pleonasticity to rescue. She could try 
to salvage the distinctiveness of interpretivism by noting that, unlike behaviou-
rism, beliefs are not inflationary properties that can be identified with behaviou-
ral dispositions. They are deflationary entities and their ascription only takes 
into account such dispositions. Also, ascription theory can allow that other 
physical properties function as the ascription-base, without implying that beliefs 
and desires reduce to these properties. It seems that even from the perspective 
of the modified communicative conception, beliefs and desires can still be seen 
as pleonastic. Their ascription relies on certain psychological (hedonic) and 
behavioural facts but not any facts about the attitudes themselves. But now it 
seems that interpretation has lost its constitutive role in the characterization of 
ascription theory and that the metaphysical work is done by the pleonasticity. 
Why not simply call this position anti-realism according to which there are no 
                                                 
113 The dependence of the interpretation on the facts about behavioural dispositions doesn’t 
mean that these dispositions have to be fully characterizable. It simply means that there are 
such dispositions. 
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genuine facts about beliefs and desires and these attitudes are merely pleonastic 
entities? 
Of course, if pleonasticity is defined in terms of interpretability then Mölder 
could argue that an element of interpretation does play an irreducible role in his 
theory. I grant that, but the objection still stands that the fulfilment of canonical 
interpretation-conditions requires explanation. This explanation needs to make 
reference to facts about the objects of the interpretation. If the latter are merely 
pleonastic and interpretation-dependent, then it is hard to make sense of their 
explanatory power. Ascription theory may retain its distinctiveness thanks to the 
appeal to pleonasticity but it still faces difficulties when explaining how and 
when interpretation-conditions are fulfilled. 
All three versions of interpretivism, then, have some noticeable problems: 
social kind interpretivism blurs the distinction between mental states and social 
kinds; ideal interpreter interpretivism has troubles explaining what makes the 
ideal interpreter an ideal one; and the ascription theory seems to boil down to 
mere anti-realism about the mental. But we can still take the original formula-
tions of interpretivism as a starting-point and ask whether the modified com-
municative conception is committed to the claim that interpretability is suffi-
cient and/or necessary for the attribution of beliefs and desires in the first place. 
Furthermore, we can ask whether the modified communicative conception is 
committed to anti-realism about the mental. 
 
 
6.6.2 Interpretability and the modified communicative conception 
The problems with defending interpretivism appeared to be quite pressing. But 
let’s have a look at whether the modified communicative conception even needs 
to be committed to some version of interpretivism as Gauker seems to presume. 
It does seem that the proponent of MCC should accept methodological inter-
pretivism. I’ve maintained that investigating how we ascribe beliefs and desires 
to each other is the way to understand the nature of these attitudes. As we’ve 
seen, William Child was actually quite sympathetic to that kind of inter-
pretivism. Yet it doesn’t seem to be a very informative position. After all, a 
behaviourist or a functionalist could also be a methodological interpretationist 
in this sense. Another weak version of interpretivism would be the claim merely 
that beliefs and desires do not entail anything specific about the internal 
properties of agents (Mölder 2010: 40). In that case the modified communi-
cative conception is a version of interpretivism. But understood in such a way, it 
doesn’t say anything distinctive about the ontology of beliefs and desires 
because a behaviourist could state the same. 
As for stronger versions of interpretivism, the modified communicative 
conception doesn’t entail that assertions and requests on a person’s behalf are 
sufficient conditions for that person to have beliefs or desires. The facts about 
hedonic and behavioural dispositions have to be in place, too, and these facts 
determine ascribability-conditions, not the other way around. The dependence 
of correct interpretations, even ideal interpretations, on facts about the objects 
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of interpretation is an assumption that is very difficult to avoid. The sufficiency-
claim is thus a non-starter for understanding MCC as a form of interpretivism. 
The necessity-condition is more plausible because without that the commu-
nicative conception would seem to be indeterminate between different theories 
on the ontological level. It seems, then, that the modified communicative 
conception could retain its interpretationist credentials, at least when we take 
interpretability to be a necessary condition for having beliefs and desires. This 
interpretability is not understood in terms of an ideal interpreter but in terms of 
conditions that are set by our shared folk psychological ability to assert and 
request on the behalf of others. 
But what do I mean by the claim that without the necessity-condition the 
modified communicative conception would be indeterminate on the ontological 
level? The answer is that if interpretability weren’t the necessary condition for 
having beliefs and desires, MCC would seem to allow for almost any kind of 
metaphysical theory about the mental. But the distinctiveness of MCC can be 
retained without taking it to be ontologically distinct. It is, in the first instance, 
an account of the ascription of beliefs and desires, not an account of their 
nature. Its distinctiveness is wedded to the former, not the latter. Although it 
makes only minimal ontological commitments, it doesn’t entail that these mini-
mal assumptions exhaust the nature of attitudes. So if the only motivation for 
adopting interpretability as a necessary condition is that otherwise MCC would 
be an ontologically indeterminate position, this motivation doesn’t amount to an 
argument for the interpretability being a necessary condition. And I am 
skeptical about whether the modified communicative conception itself can pro-
vide that argument. So we seem to be stuck where we began: the communica-
tive conception doesn’t entail anything specific about the nature of proposi-
tional attitudes. 
But maybe it’s a good thing. After all, we have seen from the discussion 
about different interpretationist theories that they have serious problems. If the 
modified communicative conception isn’t committed to interpretivism then it 
doesn’t face the same challenges. That still leaves open the matter of which 
metaphysical view of propositional attitudes we should adopt. In what follows, 
instead of going through different theories and analysing their strengths and 
weaknesses, I will propose what I consider to be the most promising account. 
Perhaps surprisingly it relies largely on Daniel Dennett’s theory without being 
interpretationist in any interesting sense. 
 
 
6.6.3 The communicative conception and  
motivations for interpretivism 
For the purposes of laying out my own proposal, it will be useful to take 
interpretivism as a starting-point. It reveals two motivations which help us see 
in which ways theorizing about the mental can go wrong. I suspect that the main 
motivation for interpretivism is that mental properties are taken to be 
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metaphysically more “shallow” than the physical ones – facts about their nature 
do not in any way transcend the ability of competent concept-users to ascribe 
them. This also clarifies the reason there is for supposing that mental properties 
are merely pleonastic and that their existence is dependent on the corresponding 
concepts being introduced into the discourse. I suspect, then, that the first 
motivation for interpretivism comes from the implicit assumption that the talk 
about beliefs and desires isn’t ontologically fully respectable and that we need 
to give an account of mental discourse that explains how we can still employ it 
without hurting our rational conscience.  
It is doubtful, though, that the modified communicative conception needs to 
go along with the idea that mental properties are somehow ontologically less 
respectable than physical properties. It is a superfluous assumption. When we 
consider how it is determined whether someone has certain beliefs or desires 
(whether certain assertions or requests can be uttered on her behalf), there seem 
to be facts of the matter about those mental states. Mental properties are not 
really ontologically different from such properties as height or weight, for 
instance. One main idea behind the notion of pleonastic properties is that these 
are properties which are introduced by “something-from-nothing transfor-
mations” through the application of corresponding predicates. This idea is 
sensible when we consider fictional entities which exist in only a deflationary 
sense. But to say the same about mental properties seems to be quite ill-
motivated. After all, those who assert and request on the behalf of others need 
to take into account coarse-grained facts about others’ dispositions in order to 
count as successful belief and desire attributions. 
What might give the impression that the modified communicative con-
ception is committed to the view that mental properties are pleonastic is that it 
doesn’t identify beliefs and desires with any particular physical property. It is 
true that beliefs and desires are specified in terms of their ascription-conditions. 
They are not identified with any particular physical or mental property or any 
complex of them. This might give an impression that by avoiding the question 
of what beliefs and desires are I have committed myself to a form of anti-
realism about propositional attitudes. This is the idea that, strictly speaking, 
there are no interpretation-independent facts about what one believes and 
wants.114 But I simply reject that view and maintain that if the application-
conditions for mental predicates are established there is a fact of the matter as to 
whether a person has a given belief or desire.115  
However, the motivation for anti-realism might not only come from an 
ontological worry. The second motivation for interpretivism is that it gives an 
                                                 
114 One can also express anti-realism about beliefs and desires in terms of them only existing 
in some deflationary sense. I find this kind of talk having the uncomfortable implication of 
making beliefs and desires thing-like (see Steward 1997: 253). Since I don’t think that those 
attitudes are things that need to be located in some place or time, I prefer to talk about facts. 
115 If this is enough to commit myself to interpretivism, then I am an interpretivist. But 
considering the distinctions made earlier, I think that this only counts as a version of 
methodological interpretivism. 
139 
answer to the question, “how can we know about others’ mental states?” (Child 
1994: 47). Canonical ascribability conditions are available to folk psychologists. 
Interpretivism offers an easy explanation for our knowledge of mental states 
because it equates having an attitude with being interpretable by us. It thus 
contrasts with views according to which to have a belief or desire is to have 
certain internal states, for instance. Unlike interpretivism, such a view faces 
trouble when one wants to explain how the ordinary folk who have no working 
knowledge about neuropsychology are able to know about each others’ beliefs 
and desires. 
My answer is that one can accept the modified communicative conception 
and also agree that our everyday ascriptive practice allows us to know what 
people believe and desire. The reason why knowledge of mental states comes 
(relatively) easy is because of the epistemic accessibility of the criteria of 
attribution. The epistemology of folk psychology is thus very reliable. But this 
doesn’t mean that we should be (non-methodological) interpretationists about it. 
Without the ontological worry there is no need to claim that the facts about 
mental states are somehow more dependent on interpretation than other facts.  
The modified communicative conception is consistent with a realism about 
beliefs and desires, their knowability to ordinary interpreters and rejecting 
interpetivism.116 To see how unproblematic these assumptions are let’s compare 
the situation here with the challenge faced by a realist in meta-ethics. She is 
committed to the idea that normative claims are true because of the normative 
facts. She faces the challenge of explaining how these facts fit into our general 
metaphysics, how they are epistemically accessible and how they they can 
guide our deliberations (McPherson 2011: 224). The realist about normative 
discourse faces problems on every front117. The realist about the mental, on the 
other hand, who also defends the modified communicative conception, can 
answer them quite easily. Facts about beliefs and desires are facts about 
dispositional and hedonic profiles of persons and these facts are epistemically 
accessible to competent interpreters. What’s more, the communicative 
conception need not be troubled by the third challenge which is only specific to 
meta-normative theories. MCC, then, doesn’t need to buy into a form of anti-
realism in order to hold onto its commitments. 
 
 
6.6.4 “Realistic Dennett” and the communicative conception 
To make it more explicit how realism about attitudes and MCC fit together it is 
useful to draw some comparisons with other views. It may be somewhat 
surprising but the metaphysical position about the mental that I have hinted at 
                                                 
116 It doesn’t reject methodological interpretivism, but as we’ve seen, this is not a very 
substantial position. 
117 I am not implying, of course, that a realist is inevitably unable to answer those problems. 
This example is only meant to illustrate the relative ease that a realist about mentalistic 
discourse has. 
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here is quite close to Dennett’s theory if we interpret the latter in the right way. 
According to Dennett, the question about the reality of beliefs and desires can 
be compared with the question about the reality of centers of gravity. The 
existence of such abstract entities only entails mild realism about them (Dennett 
1991b: 29). Although beliefs and desires of persons can be taken to be real 
patterns in their behaviour, there are no deep matters of fact about them if we 
compare them to the entities postulated in physics, for instance.  
Whether those patterns are discernible in the behaviour of a system for an 
attributer is dependent on an attributer’s ability to take the intentional stance 
towards that system. By intentional stance Dennett means a perspective from 
which one can predict the behaviour of a system by attributing beliefs and 
desires to it, on the assumption that it is rational (Dennett 1987: 17). This stance 
is different from the other two stances: the design stance and the physical 
stance. From the design stance we predict a system’s behaviour by assuming it 
to fulfil a certain function. The prediction of behaviour from the physical stance 
relies upon physical laws that are supposed to govern a system’s behaviour. 
Dennett takes the physical stance to be the most respectable perspective from 
which to investigate real-world systems because they inform us about the basic 
structure of reality. The epistemic credentials of the intentional stance are 
relegated to a secondary position. Nonetheless, although the intentional stance 
doesn’t reveal to us the ultimate structure of reality, it provides an economic 
way to predict the behaviour of complex systems such as humans. The patterns 
that are discernible from the intentional stance, then, are taken by Dennett to be 
real in a weaker sense than those that can be discovered from the physical 
stance. That is why he calls his position mild realism. 
When it comes to the function of folk psychology there are quite obvious 
differences between the modified communicative conception and Dennett’s 
account. According to the first, fulfilling the attribution conditions of belief and 
desire guarantees successful attribution but the success need not be measured by 
the predictive power of such attributions. Whether or not mental state attribu-
tions provide any straightforward predictions of behaviour, their communicative 
and explanatory significance is the reason why they earn their keep. Unlike 
Dennett, I would also put more stress on patterns in the linguistic behaviour of 
persons in revealing their attitudes. In these respects Dennett’s theory of the 
intentional stance is inconsistent with the modified communicative conception. 
But this doesn’t mean that we should throw the baby out with the bathwater. 
The idea of beliefs and desires as real patterns in people’s behaviour is 
something that can still be taken on board. It makes sense to talk about real 
patterns even if we can’t make any specific predictions that rely on them. As 
long as a person’s behavioural and hedonic dispositions conform to patterns that 
are characteristic to beliefs and desires, that person also has those attitudes. The 
precise characterization of those patterns may be too multifarious to be fully 
descriptively captured but we have the ability to discern them. It is rather more 
useful to rely on paradigmatic cases of such patterns. For instance, a stable 
disposition to assert and request reveals a pattern that is characteristic to the 
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corresponding belief and desire but this can be complicated by additional 
patterns in behaviour that force us to withdraw the attribution. 
The adoption of pattern-talk from Dennett doesn’t necessitate becoming a 
mild realist and taking beliefs and desires to have less than a respectable 
ontological status. As Child points out, Dennett’s theory of beliefs and desires 
actually doesn’t need to make any essential reference to interpretability in order 
to account for those attitudes (Child 1994: 51). If we give up the idea that some 
patterns are more real than others, the talk of mild realism loses its point (Hutto 
2013). For instance,the fact that mental state attributions don’t say anything 
specific about patterns in the brain doesn’t mean that one can’t be a realist about 
those attitudes. Dennett seems to assume that this fact already gives us a reason 
to adopt mild realism (Dennett 1991b: 42). However, this is a muddle. If 
something is internal to the brain, it isn’t more real than something that isn’t.118  
One reason I can think of as a genuine motivation for anti-realism comes 
from concerns about causality. One could argue as follows. Since we need to 
assume the causal closure of the physical and every physical event has a 
sufficient physical cause, mental events need to be identifiable with physical 
events in order to be causally efficacious (for a classic presentation of this 
argument, see Kim 1998). But if this identification is not possible, an inter-
pretationist solution can be that mental events need not compete with physical 
events because the properties that they instantiate are metaphysically deflatio-
nary. By taking mental properties to be merely pleonastic an interpretationist 
could retain the causal closure of the physical but still talk about mental states 
in a deflationary sense. 
The concern about causal efficacy of the mental or the lack of it also needs 
to be addressed by the communicative conception. But notice that the version of 
it that I have defended (as well as Gauker’s original account) doesn’t involve 
the assumption that the attributers of beliefs and desires are committed to any 
strong assumptions about the causal efficacy of propositional attitudes. This 
assumption is related to the idea that the attribution of beliefs and desires is first 
and foremost driven by predictive interests. If we reject this idea, the problem of 
causal efficacy is less pressing. 
Nevertheless, I have retained the idea that the attribution of beliefs and 
desires provides some explanatory understanding of others. This seems to 
require that we respond to the question: how do beliefs and desires explain 
behaviour? However, the how-question helps us out of this difficulty. Remem-
ber that attributing a belief is a way in which we can explain how an assertion 
on another person’s behalf is acceptable, considering her dispositional beha-
viour. The attribution of a desire is supposed to explain how a request on 
another’s behalf is appropriate, taking into accont her possible hedonic states. 
                                                 
118 Kenyon (2000) seems to think that the fact that it makes no sense to say that there true 
ascriptions that are unknowable in principle entails anti-realism. But I don’t see how it 
necessarily follows. It simply means that the ascriptions track patterns that are accessible to 
the ordinary folk. 
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Are these even causal explanations? My hunch is that they aren’t. Rather, 
mentalistic explanations function like forms of clarification or ways of making 
sense of other persons. They help us to understand their actual and possible 
communicative behaviour in relation to their behaviour and pains/pleasures (see 
Tanney 2009). So it is possible to argue that the worries about the causal 
efficacy of the mental are ungrounded because folk psychological attributions 
don’t have any commitments concerning the causal efficacy of beliefs and 
desires.119 
One might raise the concern that without providing a story about how mental 
state concepts refer to entities that can be precisely individuated (preferably 
with reference to certain physical states) talk of beliefs and desires capturing 
certain patterns in behaviour remains unacceptably vague. I do not think that 
this is true, though. Why doesn’t the story about application-conditions suffice 
as an account of the nature of beliefs and desires, as long as it is the everyday 
conception that we are interested in? The feeling that there has to be a more 
substantial story might stem from the idea that beliefs and desires are particular 
entities lodged in the mind-brain. Yet it is doubtful that this characterization 
even makes sense. Helen Steward has relied on grammatical considerations to 
extensively argue against the idea that there are such things as token states of 
belief and desire. For instance, explanations of behaviour that cite the attitudes 
don’t seem to function as singular causal explanations that refer to particular 
events. Rather, they are sentential explanations that appeal to relations between 
facts and it is the facts of believing and desiring that ground the truth of mental 
state attributions (Steward 1997: 253).120 Whether a mental fact holds in a 
particular case depends on the applicability-conditions of mental predicates 
being met, not on reference to some wordly particular in the mind-brain. And, 
in keeping with my account, that doesn’t require that the fact of believing and 
desiring is interpreter-dependent in any interesting sense. 
 
 
6.6.5 Comparison: Schwitzgebel 
An illustration of the kind of ontological attitude I am advocating is Eric 
Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account of belief. Schwitzgebel identifies beliefs 
with clusters of dispositional properties which are associated with belief’s 
dispositional stereotype. Unlike in more standard dispositional accounts, this 
stereotype also includes dispositions to feel and experience in certain ways 
(Schwitzgebel 2002: 250). In his later work he associates his conception of 
belief with what he calls a “superficial”, as opposed to “deep”, account of me-
ntal states. The first identifies the state with patterns of superficial (macro-
sopically observable) phenomena while the second identifies it with some 
properties that underlie such phenomena (Schwitzgebel 2013). This attitude is 
                                                 
119 These are subtle and tricky issues, of course, but since the question of causality is a huge 
topic on its own right, I won’t delve deeper. 
120 See also Alvarez (2010: 49). 
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contrary in spirit to the essentialist intuition that psychological kinds have 
essences that need to be captured by scientific investigation. I have also rejected 
this intuition. Having beliefs is not a matter of instantiating a specific neural 
structure or even being characterizable in terms of a functional profile that can 
be defined fully. It is a matter of having dispositions which have open-ended 
manifestation conditions. As Schwitzgebel puts it: 
 
To believe that P, on the view I am proposing, is nothing more than to match to 
an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects the dispositional stereotype for 
believing that P. What respects and degrees of match are to count as 
“appropriate” will vary contextually and so must be left to the ascriber’s 
judgement. (Schwitzgebel 2002: 253)  
 
This contextual variation doesn’t entail that attitudes somehow ontologically 
depend on interpretation. MCC is easily comparable to Schwitzgebel’s con-
ception of beliefs but it also adds to that an account of desires which connects 
them closely with hedonic dispositions. In any case, the idea that beliefs and 
desires have their characteristic dispositional profiles, which also reveal their 
“superficial” nature, can be taken to be a claim about the dispositional stereo-
types of those attitudes. 
It is important to stress the modesty of the present dispositionalist proposal 
which distinguishes it from reductive analyses which claim to state the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for having an attitude (Schwitzgebel 2002: 
258). What I take from Schwitzgebel is the idea that dispositions don’t enter 
into an account of attitudes as defining properties but as elements in a stereo-
type. Whether or not an having certain dispositions amounts to having a 
particular belief or desire doesn’t always have a completely determinate answer. 
By rejecting the aim of finding necessary and sufficient conditions for having 
attitudes, the present proposal avoids the standard argument against dispositio-
nalism, namely, that dispositional specifications can’t fully exhaust what it 
means to have an attitude due to other possible attitudes one might have. A fully 
exhaustive dispositional analysis of attitudes is not a feasible option here. 
However, this doesn’t mean that we need to go further from dispositions in 
order to know what beliefs and desires are. 
Adopting Schwitzgebel’s dispositionalist outlook also helps us better 
understand how attitude attributions and attitudes themselves relate to each 
other. The fact that an attribution needs to take into account behavioural 
dispositions in case of beliefs and hedonic dispositions in case of desires 
doesn’t mean that the nature of beliefs and desires is exhausted by these 
dispositions. These dispositions are only the central components of the stereo-
types that characterize the attitudes. Having a disposition to feel pleasure with 
regard to p is neither necessary nor sufficient for having a desire that p, there 
can be defeating conditions under which a person still doesn’t count as having 
the belief that p. The same applies to beliefs and behavioural dispositions.  
It can be objected that reference-fixing by a stereotype necessarily leaves the 
nature of the referent too open and undecided. A classic example would be 
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water the stereotype of which is and has been the transparent, drinkable liquid 
that can be found in lakes and rivers. Nevertheless, its essence of having the 
chemical structure of H2O was discovered relatively late in human history. This 
relation between the stereotypical/prototypical properties of a kind and its 
nature has been exploited by externalists about the mental and is an assumption 
that is quite ingrained in contemporary philosophy of mind. How are beliefs and 
desires different and why should we be satisfied with dispositional stereotypes 
as the final word on the matter?  
Schwitzgebel’s own answer seems to be that his approach helps us to 
account for in-between cases where a person instantiates a stereotypical 
dispositional profile only partially (see Schwitzgebel 2001). In such cases it 
isn’t evident that the subject really has or lacks the belief. This makes sense if 
having the attitude consists of having certain dispositions which can be 
possessed only partially. Schwitzgebel adds that the identification of beliefs 
with stereotypical dispositions explains how the attribution of attitudes can be 
used as a normative tool to motivate people to conform to stereotypes (Schwitz-
gebel 2002: 262; 2010: 546).121 If we treat the belief’s stereotype only as a 
guide to belief’s deeper nature and not as constitutive of that nature itself then 
shaping one’s dispositions won’t be sufficient for living up to the normative 
requirement. But that seems strange. Why wouldn’t conforming to the 
disposition be sufficient for fulfilling what the normative attitude-attributions 
require?122 
I think that the second answer is actually more promising than the first, 
although it might seem merely pragmatic by nature. The appeal to in-between 
cases may easily backfire. One might take the ambiguity of these cases to show 
that the everyday concept of belief isn’t crisp enough and needs to be specified 
in a way that avoids the possibility of in-between cases. The second response, 
on the other hand, can help us to see how a concept of such an attitude is 
actually important. The contentious assumption here is that the ontology of the 
mental can be informed by pragmatic considerations but this has been the 
framework of this thesis anyway. In any case, from Dennett and Schwitzebel we 
can acquire enough resources to argue that there are interpretation-independent 
facts about beliefs and desires, without having to commit ourselves to the view 
that those attitudes have a deeper nature to be discovered.123 
                                                 
121 Schwitzgebel isn’t explicitly using the normativity-considerations as an argument for the 
shallow ontology. The following is a quite contentious interpretation. 
122 Since dispositional properties are not usually taken as proper relata of causal relations, 
Schwitzgebel’s position excludes mental properties from having causal efficacy. As already 
noted I am willing to endorse this position. 
123 I’m thus in full agreement with Schwitzgebel when he says: “The metaphysically inclined 
may wish to ask whether, useful or not, the present account accurately describes what belief 
really is. I must admit that I fail to feel the impulse that drives questions such as this—and 
corresponding questions in other areas of philosophy, such as, What is a person, a cause, or 
free will, really? There are useful and less useful ways to think about such topics, ways that 
correspond better with divisions and tendencies of the sort reported by empirical sciences, 
ways that promote or hinder a particular vision of human flourishing and the development of 
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6.6.6 Affectability and ontology 
There still remains a question that needs to be responded to. Remember that 
attributions of beliefs and desires were analysed in terms of vicarious utterances 
and attributers’ responses to them. Here, in the chapter about ontology, the 
account I have given has been basically a dispositionalist one. The question is: 
if I buy into the dispositional account of beliefs and desires, what ontological 
relevance, if any, is left for affectability and the communicative role of folk 
psychology? These aspects of beliefs and desires primarily concerned their 
attribution, not their nature. Yet one might argue that only by ignoring the 
affectability of folk psychological attributions can I claim that my account of 
beliefs and desires is a form of realism. After all, if affectability played a part in 
determining the nature of mental states the facts about ontology would be 
dependent upon the reactions of the attributers. This would seemingly entail 
anti-realism about the mental because the truth of mental state attributions 
would be interpreter-dependent. This isn’t a fatal problem but it seems to 
bifurcate the ontological and epistemological (or attributional) questions in a 
way that renders the facts about affectability entirely irrelevant for what the 
ontology of beliefs and desires is. 
We seem to have a dilemma, then. Either defend realism about beliefs and 
desires and pay the price of excluding affectability from the ontological game or 
claim that affectability has ontological relevance in which case anti-realism 
seems to follow. I admit that the ontological irrelevance of the communicative 
significance of mental state attributions is a consequence which may be hard to 
stomach, considering how important it was for understanding folk psychology.  
The issue here might not be that black-and-white, though. The notion of 
‘ontological relevance’ isn’t completely clear. The modified communicative 
conception can be taken to identify the paradigmatic uses of the concepts of 
belief and desire. In this case the assertability and requestability on others’ 
behalf and the pertinent responses of agreement/disagreement and endorsement/ 
disapproval play a part in fixing the reference of the concepts of belief and 
desire. They would thus provide us with insight about the dispositional stereo-
types that are associated with these attitudes.124 So affectability is ontologically 
relevant at least in that sense. This is still a relatively limited sense of relevance 
because it doesn’t entail that having the attitudes of belief and desire requires 
others to have or be able to have engaged responses to them. But it isn’t that 
                                                                                                                       
moral community. A philosophical account or concept may prove useful in one context or 
relative to one set of goals and a hindrance in another context or with other goals.” 
(Schwitzgebel 2002: 270) 
124 The stereotypical disposition can be taken as an anchoring instance of the concept (see 
Kriegel 2011: 14). Unlike Kriegel, though, I don’t think that intentional states form a natural 
kind. Commonality across the instances of belief and desire doesn’t derive from the 
underlying nature but from the features of the stereotype (or anchoring instance, if one 
prefers), the possibility which also Kriegel actually allows (Ibid. 55), although he doesn’t 
give it much attention. 
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surprising, considering that the notion of affectability was meant to capture first 
and foremost the facts about the attribution of those attitudes. 
Somewhat more speculatively, in some cases the pragmatic factors of an 
attributional context may defeat the ascription that is called for by facts about 
dispositions. In other words, there may be cases when an assertion or request on 
a person’s behalf is not appropriate and thus an attitude ascription isn’t true, 
despite the other person having all the pertinent dispositions. This is in harmony 
with the claim that having the pertinent dispositions shouldn’t be taken to be the 
necessary and sufficient condition for having the respective attitude. As I’ve 
said, it is quite a speculative suggestion because I don’t have any clear example 
nor argument in its support. Nevertheless, it should create some space for a 
proponent of the communicative conception to argue that facts about beliefs and 
desires are not completely determined by facts about behavioural and hedonic 
dispositions, but also by pragmatic factors. It also explains why I don’t want to 
identify attitudes with disposition-clusters. Such an identification would 
preclude the possibility that facts about dispositions don’t always determine 
facts about attitudes. 
 
6.6.7 Ontological quietism? 
The final question I want to address in this chapter is whether the present 
account amounts to a dubious form of ontological quietism. I rejected pure 
agnosticism about the nature of beliefs and desires. One must accept the 
minimal assumptions according to which belief and desire attributions need to 
take into account behavioural and hedonic dispositions and these assumptions 
have to be acknowledged as capturing something about the nature of those 
attitudes. But it seems that when we accept that the instantiation of stereotypical 
dispositional profiles suffices for persons to count as having beliefs and desires, 
it is impossible to argue against the idea that beliefs and desires exist or that 
belief and desire ascriptions are true. This seems to entail a strong form of 
quietism according to which one simply has to take our everyday attributional 
practice for granted and to be in no need of repair. But surely, the objection 
might go, it is possible that advances in scientific psychology show that folk 
psychology is naïve and mistaken. One may feel that our shrugging off of 
ontological worries has been too hasty.  
To this I can only respond that merely feeling that folk psychology has more 
substantial commitments doesn’t amount to an argument. That feeling probably 
stems from the intuitions about the causal efficacy of the mental, modelled on 
the relation between physical occurrences. I have already rejected this intuition. 
Nevertheless, I wouldn’t say that my position is a form of absolute quietism 
because it allows for different ways in which folk psychological attributions can 
be mistaken. First, there is the quite trivial fact that those attributions can be 
sometimes false. Since quietism, in order to be contentful, should be considered 
as a more global thesis about folk psychological attributions the possibility that 
particular attributions are false doesn’t really pose a challenge. But there are 
further possibilities. For instance, there are cases when a scientific discovery 
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can have some undermining effect on a whole class of attributions that we 
make. Among them can even be those that are considered by competent ascri-
bers to be adequate. For instance, the well-known confabulation data from 
psychological research indicates that people are prone to rationalize their 
actions by making up mental states that supposedly motivated them but which 
they actually didn’t have (Gazzaniga 1985; Hirstein 2005). This seems to count 
as evidence against folk psychological self-attributions that are taken to be true 
also by competent ascribers. It seems, then, that folk psychology is not entirely 
impervious to scientific data. 
But notice that even if the confabulation data disconfirms many attributions 
that people make, this doesn’t amount to eliminativism as a global thesis. It still 
presupposes the truth of many mental state attributions. Confabulation is a 
contrastive notion and requires the background of true attributions. Nonetheless, 
it speaks against a strong form of quietism which implies that scientific 
psychology can’t really speak against competent folk psychological attributions 
at all and it demonstrates that the present account isn’t completely quietist. 
Psychological research can affect the commonsense picture of the mind with 
regard to questions about the extent of ascriptions’ reliability and their relation 
to other cognitive abilities. It doesn’t threaten the basic assumption of folk 
psychology that people have beliefs and desires.  
The lesson of all this is that scientific theories challenge commonsense 
conceptions only when there are continuities between them. One reason why 
eliminativism failed to dethrone folk psychology was because beliefs and 
desires belonged to the level of coarse-grained dispositions. The motivaton for 
eliminativism, on the other hand, came from considerations about the neural 
level. If they belong to different explanatory levels, there is hardly any real 
challenge from one side to another. Those strands of psychology that invoke 
contentful mental states when explaining behaviour, on the other hand, can 
challenge the commonsense assumptions. They can do that (to some extent) 
because they explain human beings on the same level of description. There can 
be tensions between the two approaches. Something goes wrong when the threat 
to folk psychology is seen to come from anti-representational accounts of the 
mind, not from classical cognitive science. The threat from the latter, however, 
doesn’t threaten the elimination of folk psychology. The “worst” it can do is to 
challenge some ingrained assumptions about beliefs and desires, not their reality 
as such. The answer to the question as to whether the present account is quietist, 
then, isn’t a straightforward “yes” or “no”. 
 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
As I’ve noted, the modified communicative conception of beliefs and desires 
that I have defended is first and foremost an account of the attribution of those 
attitudes. This has probably become apparent in the present chapter where the 
investigations of the ontology of mental states led us to a rather modest 
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position. Although it is a form of realism, it doesn’t provide us with any insight 
into the deeper nature of beliefs and desires, if there even is any. It is most 
relatable to the dispositionalist approaches to attitudes. Still, during our inquiry 
we hopefully managed to dispel some of the temptation to provide such an 
insight in the first place. Belief and desire attributions are responsive to reality 
and this is all we need. 
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7. THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters I have presented an account of the attribution of beliefs 
and desires which stresses the affectability of such ascriptions and their con-
nection with assertions and requests. I have so far dealt only with third-personal 
(and second-personal) attributions of attitudes. The question has been what do 
we do when we think about what others believe and want. But it’s clear that 
beliefs and desires are also attributed to onself. If my account doesn’t take these 
into account, it can only do partial justice to the facts about folk psychological 
understanding. It is within first-person ascriptions that mental predicates have 
been taken to play a peculiar role that makes them difficult to understand.  
Probably the most common way to articulate such a peculiarity has been to 
point out the epistemic immediacy and trustworthiness of self-ascriptions of 
mental states. Unlike third-person cases, first-person attribution seems to 
usually guarantee the knowledge that one has the ascribed mental states. In 
other words, people seem to have privileged access to their own mental states. 
Self-ascriptions enjoy a special kind of reliability when we compare them with 
third-personal attributions. This kind of immediacy and reliability may be 
explained by invoking some metaphysical relation of acquaintance between the 
subject and her mental life (as found for instance in Fumerton 2005) or by 
postulating some cognitive mechanism that allows reliable inferences to be 
made about one’s mental states (Nichols & Stich 2002), for instance. It may 
seem that the modified communicative conception lacks the means to explain 
such a first-person authority. Although it defined the attribution of beliefs and 
desires in terms of assertions and requests, the mere assertion or request on the 
part of an attributee is not sufficient to grant her the respective belief or desire. 
Also the relevant dispositional and hedonic profiles have to be instantiated. 
Since it is far from clear that subjects are authoritative about the latter they 
seem to lack privileged access. Other subjects might know about their 
dispositions better than they do. In this chapter I will try to argue that one must 
and can learn to live with such consequences. 
But the current account may face an even more immediate problem which is 
also related to self-ascriptions. One may suggest that it is phenomenologically 
implausible that we relate to our beliefs and desires through assertions and 
requests, be they implicit or overt. For instance, the proponents of cognitive 
phenomenology, at least those who defend the existence of attitudinal 
phenomenology, would claim that beliefs and desires can be recognized by the 
subject by their specific phenomenal feels. But even those who reject cognitive 
phenomenology might argue that the ascription of an attitude to oneself need 
not be mediated by any speech acts. Although the modified communicative 
conception doesn’t reduce the ascription of beliefs and desires to assertions and 
requests, it sees the latter as a necessary component in an act of attribution. This 
might speak against one’s everyday experience. 
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I address the phenomenological worry first and then move on to consider the 
question of epistemic privilege. In the course of addressing these issues I 
compare my account of self-ascription with two potentially opposing concep-
tions. One is the approach of cognitive phenomenology and the other is the 
account defended by Peter Carruthers’. In a nutshell, what I want to show is that 
the modified communicative conception I have defended is actually well placed 
to allow us to understand the relative authority, but also the fragility, of self-
understanding.  
 
 
7.2 The phenomenology of beliefs and desires 
7.2.1 Affectability and self-ascriptions 
As is the case with third-person ascriptions, first-person cases don’t give us any 
reason to be confident about the predictive model of folk psychology. For 
instance, if I say or think “I want some coffee’” and “I believe that it can be 
bought from the shop nearby” do I really predict my behaviour? Predicting 
one’s own behaviour seems to imply that I don’t conceive the forces that drive 
me as my own but in the “coffee-situation” I am not detached from my belief 
and desire. I identify them as my own. In the present context the question is 
whether affectability also fails to characterize self-ascriptions. By affectability 
of mental state attributions I meant the basic responses one can have towards 
the attributed attitudes: agreement/disagreement in the case of beliefs and 
endorsement/disapproval in the case of desires. At first glance, it may seem 
quite absurd to say that when one self-ascribes such attitudes one agrees or 
disagrees with them and endorses or disapproves of them. The relation to one’s 
own attitudes is much more immediate and a person who was so distant from 
them would seem to count as abnormal. But instead of seeing this as a problem 
for my account, we can take the implicit agreement and endorsement to be the 
constitutive elements in self-ascriptions of beliefs and desires. By “implicit” I 
mean that the response is automatic and doesn’t require conscious consideration 
by the subject. A person need not take an explicit reactive attitude towards her 
own attitude as in the third-person cases. By attributing a belief that p to oneself 
one already agrees that p and by self-ascribing a desire that p one already 
endorses p. That is one crucial difference between first-person contexts and 
those wherein the other person is the attributee. In the second case both the 
positive and negative responses are open to the attributer. Nonetheless, we can 
talk about affectability both in the first- and third-person cases. 
Since these responses are implicit, one might ask: how does this picture of 
self-ascriptions actually relate to phenomenology if agreement and endorsement 
are not experientially apparent. The answer is that from the phenomenological 
point of view there seems to be an immediacy to self-ascriptions that is absent 
in the case of third-personal ascriptions. Implicit agreement and endorsement 
are meant to explain this, even if these responses are not introspectively 
apparent.  
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Let’s try to elaborate the affectability of self-ascriptions further. The 
reactions that can follow the implicit agreement with or endorsement of the 
content of one’s own belief or desire mirror the reactions in the case of other-
ascriptions. Since implicit agreement or endorsement in the case of self-
ascription are positive reactions this mirroring is partial. The divergent attitudes 
are excluded from the normal cases of self-acription. For instance, in a normal 
context one can feel resentment towards another’s attitude but in the case of 
self-ascription resentment would be a mark of abnormality. Also, the adoption 
of one’s own attitude (cf. Ch. 3) isn’t possible because this applied only to the 
divergent attitudes. Nonetheless, some possible consequences of self-ascriptions 
are the same as those that characterize other-ascriptions – having self-ascribed a 
belief the subject can seek further evidence for it and express it as a pre-
condition for cooperating with other agents. Having self-ascribed a desire the 
subject can try to satisfy it and express it to others. This again might seem 
trivial but it’s important to keep it in mind because these are the basic con-
sequences of mental attributions. 
The explication of mental state ascriptions in terms of assertions and 
requests is also applicable to self-ascriptions.125 Let’s take the self-ascription of 
desires first, in the form: “I want that p.” By making such an utterance a person 
usually conveys a request to her audience or at least makes it clear that it should 
be the case that p. Gilbert Ryle might have got it right when he pointed out that: 
”…in its primary employment ‘I want...’ is not used to convey information but 
to make a request or demand. It is no more meant as a contribution to general 
knowledge than ‘please’. To respond with ‘do you’ or ‘how do you know?’ 
would by glaringly inappropriate. (Ryle 1949: 183)” One might object that this 
is only relevant when overt expressions of desire are at issue. But even in the 
cases when a person makes a first-person attribution without addressing other 
people it can be taken as having a communicative significance for the subject 
herself. She implicitly endorses the desire. There need not be any explicit 
utterances or audience involved. The agent is her own audience.  
A first-person attribution, then, carries a communicative function on its 
sleeve and it is quite clearly characterized by affectability, whether the person 
being affected is the attributee or the attributer herself. An analogous picture 
applies to belief-attributions. In their first-person employment they can be taken 
as assertions to oneself that are to be agreed with by the asserter. If a person 
says “I believe that p” she can be taken as making a claim that p, even if she 
says that silently in her privacy. But unlike in the case of other-ascriptions of 
belief, the subject implicitly agrees with the content of the assertion. It thus 
gives the impression of immediacy to the subject. 
Taking the agent of ascription to be her own audience might sound strange to 
many. It is as if the person who performs the assertion that counts as a belief-
ascription believes what she says. But as Richard Moran notes: “It has been 
                                                 
125 One should keep in mind that assertions and requests in the present sense can also be 
uttered in private and without vocalization. 
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noted by more than one philosopher that the relation of ‘believing someone’ 
does not have a reflexive form; it is not a relation a person can bear to himself.” 
(Moran 2005: 21) Doesn’t the present account claim exactly that? I don’t think 
that “believing what one says” counts as an accurate characterization of the 
first-person belief-attribution. The assertion itself already should count as a 
belief-ascription, as long as an implicit agreement is in place. It does not 
involve forming an additional belief, the content of which is the speech act. The 
agreement that the self-attribution involves doesn’t amount to such a belief.126 
It is important to keep in mind that self-ascriptions should be taken as first-
level assertions and requests. The self-ascription of a belief that p is an assertion 
that p and the self-ascription of a desire that p is a demand that p. This may not 
seem right to many. After all, one might have an intuition that there is more to 
self-ascribing attitudes than making the respective speech act. But I do claim 
that this is exactly what happens when a reflective individual asks herself “Do I 
(really) believe that?” and “Do I (really) want that?” In order to answer that 
question, a person should try to assert that p and endorse that p, respectively. If 
she can do this wholeheartedly, this counts as a self-ascription.127 My proposal 
is, then, that if she is able to whole-heartedly assert that p, she counts as having 
ascribed herself the corresponding belief and the wholehearted demand that p 
counts as the self-ascription of the desire. At this point I take the notion of 
“wholeheartedness” for granted but I will address the question about its nature 
in the next section. 
Before going further it may be useful to compare this account of self-
ascriptions with Robert Gordon’s notion of ascent routines. When we think 
about our own beliefs from a deliberative standpoint, we don’t usually seem to 
look inward for the attitudes we have. At least in normal cases, the way to check 
whether I believe that p is to ask if p holds (Evans 1982: 225). This method is 
also known as the ascent routine (Gordon 1996). In deliberating about what I 
am to believe about X I must give attention to the facts about X, not myself (see 
also Moran 1994: 161). A person needs to ascertain whether it is the case that p 
in order to decide whether to believe that p. It would be irrational for her to 
believe that p unless p holds and she cannot maintain that she should believe 
that p while p is false. From the first-person standpoint, thinking about my 
beliefs includes thinking about what is true. This connects quite nicely with my 
account because in asserting that p and implicitly agreeing with it the subject 
counts as having ascribed herself the belief that p. Self-ascription is thus 
oriented towards the state of affairs that is represented by the belief. 
What about desires? Are they also transparent? Bob Gordon has offered 
ascent routines for them also (Gordon 2007). As it was in the case of beliefs, 
one might start from considering the content of the desire that p. If she is 
                                                 
126 Someone might object that it is simply a matter of conceptual or metaphysical necessity 
that if a person agrees that p, she forms the belief that p. But I am not aware of any argument 
for that claim. 
127 Note that this doesn’t count as having the attributed attitude. 
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willing to endorse p she can simply “ascend” to a higher, meta-representational 
level and make a self-ascription in the form “I want that p”. One serious 
difficulty of this account concerns the nature of the content that is being 
endorsed. The ascent routines were initially modelled on beliefs in the case of 
which the attitude towards the content p is simply holding it to be true. That 
doesn’t seem to work with desires because in order to want a certain state of 
affairs one can’t take it to be already so. But the latter would be implied if one 
takes p to be true. Wanting something seems to be possible only when the 
desired state of affairs doesn’t yet obtain. Because of that, the ascent routine for 
desires should have a different kind of input than the ascent routine for beliefs. 
In other words, in order to attribute to oneself a desire that p through the ascent 
routine one cannot ask “is it the case that p?” and then attribute to oneself the 
desire that p when the answer to that question is affirmative. This problem 
hasn’t gone unnoticed. Goldman, for instance, has objected that ascent routines 
can only be applied to beliefs and thus aren’t theoretically interesting (Goldman 
2006: 240). 
Gordon is much more optimistic and thinks that ascent routines can be 
understood as automatic redeployments of first-order utterances, so that they 
can be applied to every type of propositional attitude (Gordon 2007: 154). In 
order to do that he distinguishes between attitude-expression and attitude-
ascription. The first doesn’t imply knowledge about one’s mental states but 
simply expresses the attitude in question. In that case, an attitude-expression 
could be redeployed in higher-order self-attribution. For instance, in the case of 
hope one can use an expressive utterance “I hope that p” as the input for the 
ascent routines. The ascent routine then produces the corresponding self-
attribution “I hope that p” (ibid. 157). Although Gordon doesn’t mention 
desires, the corresponding ascent routine for desires would probably correspond 
to the previous example. 
A serious problem with Gordon’s account (which can be avoided if we adopt 
mine) is that the input to the ascent routine already involves both the attitude 
and its content. Yet the original idea of an ascent routine revolved around the 
possibility of starting from considerations about content and then moving to the 
level of the attitude ascription. In Gordon’s account, the input stage seems to be 
already as complicated as the higher-order stage.  
I think that it is still possible, at least in the case of desires, to hold on to the 
idea that the first stage of an ascent routine involves only the content of the 
attitude that will be ascribed in the second stage. The self-attribution of a belief 
that p involved the agreement with the assertion that p is true. The self-attribu-
tion of a desire through an ascent routine, on the other hand, could start from 
asking if p should be true. This would mean considering whether one can 
sincerely request that p. If the answer is affirmative then I can also ascribe to 
myself the corresponding desire that p. At least on occasions when a person is 
consciously deliberating over the question of what she wants, this kind of 
method seems to be feasible and even natural. I don’t claim to be less 
speculative here than Gordon but my suggestion at least maintains the initial 
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idea behind ascent routines; that the attribution starts from the first-level 
utterance. I also dispense with the problematic notion of a non-descriptive 
expression of a mental state in an utterance. The first stage of the ascent routine 
doesn’t involve any reference to desire nor does it express it. What’s more, I 
don’t want to state that this way of ascribing desires to oneself is the only 
possible method. It is just meant to account for the peculiarity of the first-person 
perspective. It doesn’t necessarily apply to verbally incompetent children. The 
self-attribution of a desire by means of a request may be confined to a person 
who is at a certain level of development.  
With this initial picture of the self-ascription of beliefs and desires in place, 
we can now consider certain difficulties it might face. In the end I aim to show 
that my account isn’t inconsistent with the overall phenomenology of beliefs 
and desires. I insist on separating questions about phenomenology and 
epistemology. My attention will turn to the latter only in the second part of this 
chapter. 
 
7.2.2 Alienated attitudes 
It seems that there are occasions of alienation when a subject ascribes to herself 
a belief or desire but can’t agree with or endorse its content. The present 
account treats these cases as abnormalities. It’s important to note that here I am 
not arguing for the claim that alienated belief or desire is impossible or that 
alienated belief- or desire-ascriptions are impossible. I’m simply claiming that 
alienated belief or desire ascriptions are abnormal cases of self-attribution 
because normal cases involve the agreement or endorsement of the content of 
the attributed attitude. Still, the possibility of an alienated ascription are some-
thing that needs to be explained. I try to show that my model of folk psychology 
can do that if we add some further requirements for self-ascriptions. This is 
exactly the point at which wholeheartedness steps onto the stage. 
So what are cases of alienated attitude? For instance, David Hunter has 
argued that it is possible to take oneself to have a belief while judging that one 
ought not to have it (Hunter 2011). This would be exactly the case when the 
subject ascribes to herself a belief that p yet isn’t (fully) able to agree with it. 
Although in my account this case is taken as an abnormality, it is perfectly 
possible. One normally agrees with the self-ascribed belief but there are cases 
when the normal self-relation is disrupted and the agreement isn’t whole-
hearted. But what could stop a person from wholly agreeing with the self-
ascribed belief? I am not sure if the present account can and needs to answer 
this question because it is ultimately an empirical question. A different question 
is whether the inability to disagree with the self-ascribed belief is really a 
common characteristic of the cases of alienated belief. Hunter’s examples form 
quite a diverse bunch. They include both Descartes’ alienation from his belief 
that “one plus two is three” is a necessary truth (Hunter 2011: 223) and a 
mother’s alienation from her belief that her son is doing drugs because she 
doesn’t want to accept it (ibid. 224). In Descartes’s case he did seem to agree 
that “one plus two is three” is a necessary truth while his alienation came from 
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his other beliefs. The mother, on the other hand, seems to have difficulties with 
agreeing that her son does drugs. So it seems that only the second case 
corresponds to the explanation that I’ve given for alienated belief-ascriptions. 
But this is not really a problem. It only shows that the case of alienated belief 
may not cover all of Hunter’s examples. Still it is a phenomenon that merits 
consideration. 
The possibility of alienated desires has been much more widely recognized 
in the philosophical literature. This is quite unfortunate because I don’t think 
that beliefs and desires can be treated asymmetrically. Most notably, Harry 
Frankfurt has presented a case for alienated desires in his seminal article 
“Freedom of the will and the concept of a person” (Frankfurt 1971). There he 
drew a distinction between desires that are the objects of second-order desires 
and those which are not. The second possibility can be illustrated with the case 
of an unwilling addict who is aware of herself wanting to do drugs but doesn’t 
want to have such a desire. Although in that paper Frankfurt didn’t rely on the 
term “alienated desire”, his discussion can still be taken as a blueprint. The case 
of an alienated desire exemplifies a situation wherein a person, although having 
self-ascribed a desire that p, isn’t fully able to endorse its content. Frankfurt’s 
cases can be seen as drawing the distinction between wholehearted and 
alienated self-ascriptions (see also Frankfurt 1992).128 I propose that the notion 
of wholeheartedess also explains what is missing in the case of alienated self-
ascriptions. Although the agent implicitly agrees with or endorses the content of 
the assertion or request, she doesn’t do that whole-heartedly. She is thus unable 
to fully recognize the attributed belief or desire as her own. 
What exactly constitutes wholeheartedness and non-alienation is not an easy 
question to answer, of course. Frankfurt himself explicates the difference 
between the willing and unwilling addict in terms of a second-order desire to 
want or not to want to take the drug. A person would then not be alienated from 
her desire if she also wanted to have it. I, on the other hand, am not eager to 
explicate wholeheartedness in terms of second-order attitudes as Frankfurt does 
because the machinery of assertions and requests, agreement and endorsement, 
was meant to explain attitude ascriptions. Explaining the wholeheartedness of 
those attributions in terms of additional attitudes seems to make the account of 
the first-person perspective quite bloated. Although I haven’t aimed at a 
reductive account of attitude attributions, for the sake of conceptual economy it 
is still preferable to account for wholehearted self-ascriptions without postu-
lating any higher-level acts or attitudes. 
What’s more, the higher-level attitude approach is threatened by regress 
because it pushes us to ask what is it about the second-level mental state that 
makes first-level ascription wholehearted? This also requires explanation and if 
                                                 
128 It must be stressed that for Frankfurt, this question is motivated by his attempt to explain 
what the freedom of the will is supposed to be about, he doesn’t see this question in the 
context of self-ascriptions. This means that using his account in the present context needs 
some translation. 
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the latter proceeds through the postulation of a third-level attitude then we are 
on the road to regress (cf. Anderson 2008). Somehow implicit agreement or 
endorsement of p on the first level should already be characterizable as 
wholehearted or not. The case of an unwilling addict, for instance, should be 
analysed so that the person in question doesn’t wholeheartedly endorse the idea 
that she should take drugs. Whether she wants to want to take drugs or not isn’t 
crucial in determining whether she has an alienated desire or not. An additional 
reason to reject the higher-level approach is that wholeheartedness should 
characterize all normal cases of self-ascription. It isn’t realistic to assume that 
higher-level attitudes are necessary for such cases. Finally, the higher-level 
account is simply phenomenologically implausible. It just doesn’t seem to be 
the case that we need to invoke second-level attitudes in order to make the 
whole-hearted first-level ascription “I believe that p”, or “I want that p”. 
What is needed, then? To get out of this pickle, one should observe Frank-
furt’s alternative observation that wholeheartedness can be understood in terms 
of being satisfied with oneself and one’s attitudes. Although this still seems like 
a second-order account, Frankfurt has also offered the suggestion that a 
sufficient condition for being satisfied is that the person isn’t actively interested 
in changing her attitudes (Frankfurt 1992: 12). Since this defines wholehearted-
ness only negatively, there doesn’t seem to be a second-order element included. 
Although this might not be a fully satisfactory account of wholeheartedness, I 
accept it for present purposes because the question of interest is whether my 
conception of self-ascription can allow cases of alienation.  
I actually find this negative characterization of whole-heartedness helpful129 
because cases of whole-hearted self-ascription should be seen as a standard 
condition of relating to oneself. In relation to this, alienated beliefs and desires 
are abnormalities. It is exactly the latter that demand an explanation and 
positive characterization. If the agent’s self-ascriptions proceed smoothly and 
involve already implicit agreement and endorsement there is no question of 
alienation. If, on the other hand, the subject starts to question this implicit self-
relation reflectively then agreement and endorsement are still effective but open 
to explicit questioning. In a way, then, any amount of explicit and conscious 
reflection about one’s beliefs and desires might already bring about an alienated 
self-relation. 
So the overall picture is this: the self-ascription of beliefs and desires 
proceeds through an implicit agreement and endorsement of the relevant speech 
act. If the attributer doesn’t form any additional attitude of dissatisfaction with 
these implicit responses then the self-ascription is wholehearted. One becomes 
alienated from one’s attitudes if one does form an additional attitude of 
disagreement or disapproval. The self-ascription only requires implicit agree-
ment or endorsement. Although wholeheartedness in Frankfurt’s sense is 
explicit, it is more reasonable to see it as a default condition which goes awry 
                                                 
129 As Moran notes: ”...wholeheartedness or trust are themselves tacitly defined by the 
absence of certain thoughts”. (Moran 2001: 45) 
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exactly when the subject’s relation to her attitudes becomes her explicit 
concern. 
An objection might be raised, though, that the process of self-ascription I’ve 
depicted here does not really concern phenomenology. However this is what is 
crucial, if we are to understand the first-person perspective on attitudes. This 
objection forms a natural bridge to the issue of cognitive phenomenology which 
I will handle in the next section. 
 
 
7.2.3 Cognitive phenomenology? 
An account of mental states and their attribution which starts with facts that can 
be approached from the third-person perspective (i.e. the causal-functional 
relations between those states and behaviour; the criteria for attributing mental 
states, such as normative requirements of rationality, or the acts of assertion and 
request) can face an immediate objection. One might argue that by focusing on 
what is publicly available such accounts overlook an essential aspect of the 
mind: it subjectivity. Surely, the objection might go, it is exactly the qualitative 
and intrinsic character of mental states that presents the most important descrip-
tive and explanatory challenge for theorists who want to understand the nature 
of mental states. The present account has also been third-personal in this respect 
and might face a similar objection. 
Approaches to intentional attitudes such as belief and desire have faced less 
pressure to account for their qualitative aspect. It is quite common to claim that 
attitudes, unlike sensations, are not individuated by their phenomenal character. 
Nevertheless, especially in recent years, the idea of attitudes having characte-
ristic phenomenal properties has gained popularity among those who defend the 
existence of cognitive phenomenology (see Bayne & Montague 2012). In the 
present case, desires would also be brought under this label, at least as long as 
we take them to be propositional attitudes. If the proponents of cognitive 
phenomenology are right then the account I have defended is fatally deficient. It 
doesn’t seem that I have made any reference to the phenomenal character of 
attitudes. Isn’t there a characteristic feeling of what it is like to believe or want 
something which is over and above the facts about speech acts and engaged 
responses? For instance, aren’t approval and endorsement already individuated 
in terms of what it feels like to approve and endorse? 
In order to gain some foothold in the whole debate, one should clarify what 
the thesis of cognitive phenomenology actually amounts to. First, there’s the 
question of what kinds of cognitive state are we talking about if those states are 
supposed to be endowed with such phenomenology. For instance, Klausen 
(2008) concentrates on propositional perception and occurrent acts of thinking, 
and argues that both the content of those acts and the mode by which they are 
given have a phenomenal character. Chudnoff (2010) has even proposed that 
there is something that it’s like to understand entailment relations. In the present 
context the question about cognitive phenomenology doesn’t really concern 
beliefs and desires as such. I haven’t construed them as occurrent states and the 
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debate over cognitive phenomenology doesn’t deal with the dispositional states 
(Horgan 2012: 57). Since phenomenal properties are supposed to be intro-
spectively accessible and dispositional states are not like that, it is natural that 
the latter aren’t usually endowed with phenomenal properties. Because of this, 
the salient question is whether acts of agreement and endorsement have a 
phenomenal character. They seem to be acts that are present to conscious 
subjects who seem to have immediate access to them. 
Another relevant question is: what is meant by phenomenology? From the 
perspective of everyday language, it seems like that no one would deny that 
people experience their beliefs and desires. It is difficult to cut believing or 
wanting something off from the overall flow of experience people have. This 
experience is described in relational terms which involve the various ways in 
which one responds to events in one’s environment and these descriptions can 
be felt as natural and unproblematic.130 In this regard cognitive phenomenology 
would be a trivial position and also my description of self-ascriptions would be 
a description of cognitive phenomenology. After all, I’ve explained how self-
ascriptions of attitudes involve wholehearted agreement or endorsement and 
how a lack of it makes people feel alienated from their attitudes. Relational 
descriptions are not what the proponents of cognitive phenomenology have in 
mind, though. What seems to be at least implicitly presupposed is that the 
phenomenal character that the cognitive states are supposed to be endowed with 
is intrinsic and qualitative. It is not characterizable in relational terms.131 Only 
when this presupposition is accepted is it possible to make the substantive claim 
that the relational description of attitudes is not sufficient to fully characterize 
what constitutes them. Deniers of cognitive phenomenology, on the other hand, 
can be identified with those who deny that the attitudes have intrinsic pheno-
menal qualities. For those like me, who hope for a deflationary account of 
phenomenal character which identifies it with relational properties, entering the 
whole cognitive phenomenology debate carries commitments that are hard to 
stomach. 
                                                 
130 A lovely description of experience from a perspective that is by no means friendly to 
phenomenology can be found from Dennett: “What impresses me about my own 
consciousness, as I know it so intimately, is my delight in some features and dismay over 
others, my distraction and concentration, my unnamable sinking feelings of foreboding and 
my blithe disregard of some perceptual details, my obsessions and oversights, my ability to 
conjure up fantasies, my inability to hold more than a few items in consciousness at a time, 
my ability to be moved to tears by a vivid recollection of the death of a loved one, my 
inability to catch myself in the act of framing the words I sometimes say to myself, and so 
forth.” (Dennett 1996: 5) 
131 The cognitive phenomenology has also been defined in terms of „what it’s likeness” 
(Bayne & Montague 2012: 8). But this is a property that can be understood in different ways 
(Lycan 2008), and I don’t see why a functional-dispositional analysis wouldn’t suffice to 
account for what it’s like to believe or desire something. At least it’s an open question. 
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I don’t think it’s possible to settle here the issue whether phenomenal 
character can or can’t be reduced to relational properties.132 Nevertheless, the 
previous remarks illustrate how debatable the whole issue of cognitive pheno-
menology is. As a further example, consider David Pitt’s suggestion of a 
general way of convincing a skeptic about the irreducible phenomenal character 
of some types of mental state, using sensory states as an example: 
 
A natural response to the antirealist about sensory phenomenology is to induce in 
him a particularly vivid experience (say, a sharp pain), and then to point out that 
what he was just aware of is what you claim exists. That is, you acquaint him 
with the phenomenon you wish to defend the existence of, and argue that the 
thing just experienced exists. This is admittedly a somewhat crude form of 
argumentation (if in fact it is really argumentation at all). But I think it does have 
a significant effect on the polemical situation: it forces the skeptic to deny the 
obvious. (Pitt 2004: 26). 
 
I find this move on Pitt’s part quite revealing because it shows that there might 
be something wrong with the whole intuition that phenomenal character is a 
special property of experience. The question one should ask is why Pitt stresses 
the vividness of an experience as an especially good indicator of the pheno-
menal character of sensory states. Why doesn’t pain simpliciter already indicate 
that phenomenal character is being instantiated? It seems as if the experien-
tiality of mental states (which, after all, no-one denies, at least in some vague 
sense) should make a more convincing case for skepticism about the intrinsic 
phenomenal character when the experience is intense. But one should suspect 
that if it really “forces the skeptic to deny the obvious” then this is merely an 
nonrational force? Pitt makes a rhetorical move: “You deny the existence of a 
phenomenal properties but you surely can’t deny that you feel intense pain?” 
When a skeptic hears it, she is put in an uncomfortable position. It may seem 
that the denial that pain has intrinsic phenomenal properties also implies the 
denial that one feels pain. But surely this inference isn’t valid. For the debate 
over cognitive phenomenology to be impartial one should avoid simply pointing 
to a vivid experiential character of beliefs and desires as a way of arguing for 
their intrinsic qualitative properties.  
Let’s consider a further example that illustrates why the debate about cogni-
tive phenomenology carries uncomfortable commitments. I have in mind here 
Christopher Shields’s parity argument for cognitive phenomenology. It exploits 
the following assumption: if there is a reason to endorse the phenomenal 
character of certain kinds of mental state, such as sensations, then it’s equally 
reasonable to endorse it in the case of cognitive states (Shields 2012: 217). For 
instance, sensations seem to have determinate intensities which we can ascribe 
to their qualitative-phenomenal properties. Since cognitive states can also have 
                                                 
132 I agree with Robert Wilson that “phenomenology itself is a contestable phenomenon, and 
what one can and can’t imagine about it inherits that contestability” (Wilson 2003: 427). 
Because of that, it is hard to say anything conclusive on the matter. 
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various intensities, it is only reasonable, for Shields, to also endow cognitive 
states with qualitative properties (ibid. 231). The relevance of the parity 
argument doesn’t have an univocal interpretation, though. If we understand the 
thesis of cognitive phenomenology in the trivial, relational sense then the parity 
argument supports the view that believing and wanting, even when construed 
dispositionally, have an experiental dimension. But this is also quite 
uninformative because the experiental dimension is assumed from the get-go. If 
the argument is supposed to strengthen the case for the claim that cognitive 
states have intrinsic, qualitative properties then this argument is rather dubious. 
First, it isn’t clear that even sensory or perceptual states have such properties.133 
Second, even if we take sensory and perceptual states to have such properties 
there are further considerations that speak against ascribing those properties to 
attitudes. For instance, one can rely on an understanding of human cognitive 
architecture (Carruthers 2009). One can also cast doubt on the putative 
introspective evidence. Finally, one can do both (Prinz 2012b, Ch. 5). 
My strategy thus far has been to cast doubt on the claim that my account of the 
self-ascription of belief and desire needs to have a response to the question 
about cognitive phenomenology. If one is a deflationist about phenomenal 
character then it is quite unproblematic to say that people experience themselves 
having beliefs and desires and agreeing with and approving their contents. But 
that is a harmless claim that doesn’t commit us to the existence of intrinsic 
phenomenal properties. The feel of beliefs and desires amounts to the fact that 
the ascription of them involves agreement and endorsement, respectively, but 
these acts can be understood relationally. By articulating the self-ascription of 
beliefs and desires in terms of implicit agreement and endorsement I have 
already characterized the first-person phenomenology. 
A relatively well-articulated argument for cognitive phenomenology is the 
argument from self-knowledge: since we seem to enjoy privileged access to our 
propositional attitudes the knowledge of one’s own attitudes is immediate. The 
only way to explain this immediacy is by supposing that the phenomenal 
character of those attitudes is present to us. Again, Pitt (2004) has made such an 
argument, for instance.134 This might be more relevant for the present account 
of beliefs and desires because I haven’t yet explained how we gain knowledge 
about our own attitudes. If an acceptable explanation needs to appeal to 
immediate access to one’s mental states, there might still be a need to endorse 
intrinsic qualitative properties that ground such a knowledge. But since the 
argument from self-knowledge is about the epistemology of first-person 
ascriptions, I will deal with it in the later section about the epistemology of self-
ascriptions. 
 
                                                 
133 Actually, Shields himself acknowledges this because he takes his arguments to convince 
only those who believe in qualia. 
134 See Levine (2012: 107), who responds to Pitt’s argument by trying to explain the intuition 
of immediacy with reliable monitoring mechanisms. 
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7.2.4 Desires and the apparent good 
Before moving on to provide an epistemology of self-ascriptions, we should 
note a certain strand in theories of desire that deserves to be brought out and 
responded to. Some contemporary authors think that having a desire that p 
involves having a cognitive attitude that the object of desire is good (Johnston 
2001; Oddie 2005; Scanlon 1998).135 This idea has a rather long history because 
it can already be seen in the work of Aristotle: 
 
The object of desire (ὀρεκτόν) always moves, but this is either the good or the 
apparent good. (de Anima, 433a27–29) 
 
Among modern authors, probably the most common motivation for the view 
that desires relate to the apparent good is that the mere dispositional construal of 
desires doesn’t provide a phenomenologically satisfactory account of how 
desires reveal certain aspects of the world to us. Desires aren’t merely brute 
causal processes. They seem to present something as worthy of being pursued 
(Schapiro 2009: 239). Another, related consideration is that without presenting 
states of affairs in that way, desires couldn’t rationalize actions. For instance, 
Warren Quinn presents a thought experiment in which a person is in a functio-
nal state which causes her to turn on radios whenever they are in the vicinity 
and are turned off (Quinn 1995). Even if this functional state is combined with 
certain beliefs about how to turn on radios, it still doesn’t seem to constitute a 
desire to turn on radios. According to the apparent good view, what is missing 
is that the state should present turning on radios as a worthwile endeavour. 
Although this particular thought experiment might be somewhat dubious, I 
share with the apparent-good theorists the view that in order to understand the 
first-person perspective to one’s own desires it isn’t sufficient to characterize 
desires merely in terms of behavioural dispositions. But the modified communi-
cative conception of desires isn’t committed to the view that desires are such 
dispositions anyway. 
If the apparent good view is correct and if we retain the present account of 
the first-person perspective then the self-ascription of desires should involve a 
readiness to assert that p is also good. This readiness explains why the apparent 
good view is attractive because endorsing p seems to indicate assent to the 
claim that p is good. The self-ascription of desires quite naturally, although not 
inevitably, involves responses that are pertinent to belief-ascriptions. This 
hopefully becomes clearer when we consider that agreement and endorsement 
are modeled on assertions and requests. At least in normal conditions wherein a 
person requests that p she also is disposed to assert that p is, prima facie, good. I 
don’t think that this act necessarily accompanies self-ascriptions of desire, 
though. This would be a too strong claim. There are cases when a person isn’t 
                                                 
135 This attitude need not be belief. Oddie, for example, is explicit that to desire something is 
to experience it having value (Oddie 2005: 46). 
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ready to assert that the content of the self-ascribed desire is good. Just take the 
case of an unwilling addict, for instance. 
However, doesn’t the apparent good view exclude infants and animals from 
having desires? Note that I am not discussing that view in relation to the 
ontology of desires here. I am only stating that the self-ascription of desires 
seems to involve the appearance of their content being good. This probably 
excludes animals from self-ascribing desires but allows the ascribability of 
desires to them. By operating on the level of attribution, not ontology, I need to 
interpret the apparent good view in such a way that it could be applicable on 
that level. This means that I am probably moving away from its proponents’ 
original intentions anyway. A more interesting objection to the apparent good 
view is that it excludes nihilists from self-ascribing desires. A nihilist thinks that 
every evaluative judgement is false (Friedrich 2012: 292). The view that self-
ascribing desires that p involves the implicit agreement that p is good seems to 
exclude the possibility of nihilists who think that nothing can be judged to be 
good. But that seems absurd. On the present account, though, this objection is 
also avoidable. An assertion that p is good isn’t a necessary response to a 
desire-attribution. 
One might still doubt, though, if this explanation of the attractiveness of the 
apparent good view goes deep enough. I have given assertions concerning p’s 
goodness only a contingent status. This assertion isn’t really a necessary 
response. But the apparent good view pretends to be a constitutive account or so 
it at least seems. So let us consider another way of making sense of the intuition 
behind this view. 
We should start with the fact that Friedrich himself wants to explain the 
apparent good intuition not in terms of belief that p is good but in terms of what 
he calls “mental force”. He models this on the force of sentences. The content 
of desire is given in an “evaluative manner” which, for Friedrich should explain 
why desires involve the appearance of the object being good.136 By simply 
stipulating it, this characterisation is quite uninformative. One shouldn’t be 
satisfied with the explanation of the appearance of the good which simply states 
that the object of desire is presented in an evaluative manner. But Friedrich’s 
proposal is relatable to the account given here. Implicitly endorsing the content 
that p in the case of desire ascriptions can explicate what is meant by mental 
force. To be fair to Friedrich, he himself wants to understand mental force in 
terms of phenomenal character (Friedrich 2012: 299). We can reject this but still 
insist that the notion of mental force can be put to work. Perhaps, then, it is 
unnecessary to suppose that one normally has a belief-like response to the 
content of one’s desire and it suffices to point out that endorsing p already 
creates the appearance of p’s goodness.  
I leave open the question of which response is more satisfactory because I 
don’t have any direct argument that would force us to prefer one view over the 
other. Nevertheless, the second proposal has the advantage of relating the 
                                                 
136 Friedrich himself calls it “the alluringness” of desires. 
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phenomenology of wanting to expected hedonic states. According to my theory 
the main consideration that has to be taken into account in the case of desire-
attributions is whether the request made tracks the hedonic states of the subject. 
One way to conceive of the mental force of desires is to take it as the 
expectation of pleasure in relation to the state of affairs that is represented. One 
may object that the appearance of the good shouldn’t be equated with the 
expectation of pleasure but I won’t delve deeper into that question. If we dont 
buy into a certain form of platonism about pleasure then it is natural to assume 
that pleasure exemplifies a kind of good.  
Although I haven’t provided a definite explanation of how we can deal with 
the appearance of the good thesis, it doesn’t pose any grave difficulties to the 
account of self-ascription that is presented here. Having characterised the 
phenomenology of belief and desire it is now time to answer question, how 
subjects gain knowledge about their attitudes and whether this question is a 
problem for the modified communicative conception? 
 
  
7.3 The epistemology of self-ascriptions 
7.3.1 From ascribing to knowing 
Thus far I have considered what it is to self-ascribe an attitude. How these 
attributions can be true and provide knowledge is a further question. In this 
section I will look at the epistemology of self-ascriptions of beliefs and desires. 
I try to clarify whether the considerations about the peculiar way in which these 
ascriptions are made also confers an epistemic privilege on them. It has been a 
quite common understanding in philosophy that first-person access to one’s 
own mental states is epistemically more trustworthy than access to the attitudes 
of others. This asymmetry has been articulated in various ways: from that 
access being infallible to it simply being subserved by a reliable cognitve 
mechanism. What’s more, there isn’t even a consensus on which kinds of 
mental states the privileged access thesis is meant to cover. Different kinds of 
mental state need not be characterized by the same epistemology. Our access to 
our sensations or emotions, for instance, might be quite different from our 
access to our attitudes (Moran 2001: 10). 
I will try to show that my account of beliefs and desires doesn’t need to buy 
into any strong version of the thesis of privileged access. It only merits its 
weakest version according to which the epistemic asymmetry exists but only as 
a contingent feature of the human condition. This feature is rooted in the fact 
that people usually have more information about themselves than others. This 
was basically Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) position and the following discussion can 
also be taken as a defence of his views. My arguments are limited to beliefs and 
desires as dispositional states, though. I won’t say anything about the possibility 
of strong privileged access to sensations, for instance.  
As already noted, first-person access to one’s own mental states is usually 
taken to be in some sense epistemically more guaranteed than access to the 
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others’ mental states There isn’t really any agreement on how this should be 
understood. Let’s consider three ways of articulating the epistemic asymmetry 
between the first- and third-person perspectives:137 
1)  Epistemic security (ES): if a person (sincerely) self-ascribes a mental state 
M, her ascription is infallible and incorrigible;  
2)  Self-intimation (SI): If a person has a mental state M, she is disposed to 
know that she has that state. 
3)  Privileged access (PA): people have an epistemically special sort of access 
to their own mental states and not to those of others; 
Each of these three ideas could be formulated in numerous different ways. 
Already incorrigibility and infallibility are quite different characterizations of 
epistemic security. How does the present account of mental state ascriptions 
relate to them? ES seems problematic. It is far too strong because it is quite 
common that people are mistaken about their beliefs and desires. This fallibility 
should be acknowledged whichever view of self-ascriptions one adopts. It might 
seem that if self-ascriptions require only sincere assertions or requests, they are 
reliable because they only require the ascriber’s linguistic competence. But note 
that this doesn’t entail that the competence with self-ascriptions guarantees their 
truth.  
As for SI, the first problem is that the conditions of having beliefs and 
desires, assertability and requestability on a person’s behalf, can sometimes be 
accessible to other people without the subject herself being aware of them. This 
means that situations should be possible wherein a person has a belief or desire 
but isn’t disposed to self-ascribe it. For instance, I might be hungry and want to 
eat something nutritious but the hunger isn’t intense enough for me to be aware 
of the desire to eat. What’s more, even if we allow for this kind of disposition, a 
person might only count as having self-ascribed an attitude. This might not 
count as the knowledge that she has it. True self-ascription doesn’t entail 
knowledge. Again, as in the case with ES one can doubt that the connection 
between having an attitude and knowing that one has it can be so tight as the 
formulation claims. The least contentious articulation of the epistemic 
peculiarity of the first-person perspective is PA. It is also the least informative 
one. However, it is reasonable to take it as our starting-point, without pre-
supposing any stronger view like ES or SI. The question about the self-
knowledge of beliefs and desires, then, amounts to asking, what could the 
privileged access consist in? 
Remember that when I articulated the way in which we self-ascribe attitudes 
I compared my account favorably with Robert Gordon’s idea of ascent routines. 
This went back to Evans’s transparency proposal, i.e. that we ascribe beliefs by 
focusing on their contents. I also defended the possibility of applying ascent 
routines to desires, although in a somewhat different manner than Gordon did. 
One could argue that the method of ascent routines that underlies self-
                                                 
137 The labels have been taken from Bar-On (2009: 54-55) but aren’t intended to accurately 
represent her use of them. 
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ascriptions might also bear upon the issue of privileged access and self-know-
ledge. Alex Byrne, for instance, has proposed the following rule for making 
self-ascriptions of beliefs which is also supposed to have epistemic import: 
 
BEL If p, believe that you believe that p. (Byrne 2005: 95) 
At first glance this seems to be a reliable rule because even if p is false, it still 
seems to give a reason to think that one believes that p. BEL is self-verifying in 
that sense. After all, assenting to p seems to involve forming a belief that p. It 
also relates well to the present account according to which a wholehearted 
assertion that p is sufficient to count as an ascription of belief. Assenting to p 
thus gives a prima facie reason also to believe that one believes that p or to 
sincerely assert that one believes that p. 
Byrne proposes a similar rule for the ascription of desires. In order to self-
ascribe a desire one needs to consider reasons that count in favor of the state of 
affairs in question. 
 
DES If φing is a desirable option, believe that you want to φ. (Byrne 2012)138 
Byrne considers a possible objection; namely that his account of desires is 
circular. Knowing what is desirable seems to imply knowledge about what one 
desires. Byrne rejects this implication. Considering whether a certain option is 
desirable doesn’t require focusing on one’s desires. It can also proceed through 
the weighing of reasons for the option in question. I am not sure how successful 
Byrne is in fending off this objection but note that the present account of desire-
attributions provides a way to see desire-ascriptions in a different light. The 
process of attribution doesn’t require considering whether p is desirable. It is 
sufficient to sincerely demand that p in order to count as having ascribed the 
desire. This action can also involve the consideration of reasons but there’s less 
temptation to accuse this account of already presupposing the knowledge of 
one’s desires. This picture is still very similar to Byrne’s conception because it 
also suggests that the self-ascriber focuses on the content, not the attitude itself. 
So it seems that Byrne’s account of transparent self-ascriptions is largely in 
harmony with my account when it comes to the way that the self-ascriptions are 
made. Nevertheless, it is an open question whether this method explains the 
strong epistemic asymmetry between the first- and third-person cases. Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly I am going to suggest that it doesn’t.  
Byrne’s hope, when he presents his account, is to explain why people are 
reliably able to know what beliefs and desires they have. Since reliability is a 
graded notion I even grant that the subject who follows the method of 
transparency can have some confidence that her self-ascriptions are accurate. 
But this may be inherited from the fact that she has had more opportunities to 
reflect about her attitudes and has more information about herself. The main 
problem is that I take beliefs and desires to be dispositional, not occurrent, 
                                                 
138 Although Byrne takes desires to be relations to action-types, BEL can be translated into a 
rule about desires as propositional attitudes. 
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states. This means that sincere assertion and request are not sufficient for the 
subject to know that she has the self-ascribed attitudes. I should note that Byrne 
himself doesn’t seem to have any problems taking beliefs and desires to be 
occurrent states. At least he isn’t very explicit about it which means that in a 
way we are talking past each other. But this isn’t really a problem because I can 
use his account simply as an example of a possible way to articulate the 
epistemic privilege in contrast with my own. 
Remember that in order to count as having beliefs and desires one must 
instantiate the relevant behavioural and affective dispositions. According to the 
modified communicative conception, mere assertions and requests are not 
sufficient for that. This requirement shouldn’t be confused with the conditions 
of having self-ascribed those states. Self-ascriptions only required wholehearted 
assertions and requests by the ascriber.  
The relevance of the dispositional basis for the first-person epistemology of 
beliefs has been often noted. Nicholas Silins claims: “Judging that p is in-
sufficient for believing that p, I take it, because believing that p requires having 
various dispositions, where judging that p is insufficient for having those 
dispositions.” (Silins 2012: 308) Although my account of belief attributions has 
been formulated in terms of assertions, I take it that knowledge that the relevant 
dispositions are instantiated is required for knowing that one believes that p. If 
the sincere assertion contradicts the dispositional belief (like in the case of an 
implicit atheist) then the method of transparency fails. So unlike Gendler 
(2008), for instance, I don’t think that a true belief-ascription needs to track the 
endorsement of its content on the part of the subject. Instead, the dispositional 
profile that is characteristic of the belief can sometimes have a priority over the 
explicit judgement of the subject in determining whether the latter has the belief 
or not. If one is mistaken about instantiating the relevant dispositional profile, 
one is also mistaken about having the belief. 
I insist on the claim, then, that there are cases of failed transparency. This 
applies also to desires. Their epistemology inherits the possible problems that 
the epistemology of hedonic dispositions has. One might try to argue that 
people know what they are disposed to enjoy and have reliable knowledge 
about what they want because of that. This reliability is more fragile than it may 
seem, though, because of the failures in affective forecasting. When people self-
ascribe desires they give expression to what they think will satisfy them. But 
there is the threat of being mislead by the seeming pleasurability of certain 
options. From the results of empirical research on predicting the pleasurability 
of future outcomes, we can see that people make frequent errors in estimating 
how strong their affective reactions to different scenarios will be (Wilson & 
Gilbert 2005). I claim that this also has repercussions for the reliability of self-
knowledge about desires. An error in affective forecasting of a state of affairs 
which one thinks that one wants implies that one actually does not want it. 
The difficulty of knowing what really satisfies us and gives us pleasure was 
already noted by Plato. In Protagoras, Socrates admits to his opponent that it is 
difficult to estimate how distant pleasures can actually be more fulfilling when 
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compared with immediate pleasures because the latter are more salient (Prot. 
356c5-d4). This means that people are prone to diachronic illusions about 
pleasure (Moss 2006). Plato (at least as interpreted by Moss) seems to take 
privileged self-knowledge of desires for granted and only pleasure from their 
fulfilment seems to be epistemically opaque for him. But I suggest that if one 
can be mistaken about the pleasurability of the outcome of the self-ascribed 
desire then one can be mistaken also about the desire itself. The fact that one 
self-ascribes a desire doesn’t mean that one has it. I take it, then, that the 
failures of transparency characterize both beliefs and desires. 
Note that cases of failed transparency don’t necessarily imply that the 
transparency method can’t be reliable to a moderate extent. Given that the 
subject usually has more experience with her reactions and dispositions than 
other people, her self-ascriptions of attitudes might still be relatively more 
trustworthy than the ascriptions of mental states to her by others. But this seems 
to be a contingent feature of our epistemic situation, and also Ryle would 
acknowledge this.139  
By rejecting the thesis of strong epistemic privilege I am not denying that 
there isn’t any nonepistemic asymmetry between the self- and other-ascriptions. 
There are notable differences between these two kinds of mental state 
attributions and I have already laid out these differences in the first part of this 
chapter. I even grant that self-ascriptions can enjoy a distinctive status in the 
eyes of others. If one asserts or requests wholeheartedly one is counted as being 
responsible for living up to one’s self-ascription. For instance, Jane Heal (2002) 
exploits the analogy between self-ascriptions and promises in which case this 
ability is realized. Unlike Heal, though, I don’t think that ability entitles us to 
endorse any strong epistemic privilege in relation to one’s own attitudes. The 
dispositions one has take a lot of effort to be moulded in accordance with self-
attributions and the success of this ability is quite fragile. Heal’s proposal only 
exemplifies the way in which self-knowledge is a matter of achievement. The 
ability to live up to one’s self-attributions doesn’t entail any strong epistemic 
privilege when compared with other-ascriptions.140 It doesn’t confer any 
epistemically privileged position on the subject because self-attributions can be 
as fallible and corrigible as other-ascriptions. Nevertheless, the ability to live up 
to such ascriptions confers on the subject a peculiar access to her beliefs and 
                                                 
139 Actually, Byrne himself might be happy with this kind of analysis. In my eyes, it simply 
shows how epistemologically modest his account is. 
140 There are also some similarities between my account of self-knowledge and the one 
proposed by José Medina: “Because of its performative aspect, because it is an acknow-
ledgement, a self-ascription is usually regarded as prima facie evidence for the subject’s 
commitment and entitlement to the intentional state she claims to have. But of course 
acknowledgement does not guarantee entitlement” (Medina 2006: 589). Although I haven’t 
explicated my conception in terms of the normative structure of commitments and entitle-
ments, the quoted view relates to mine quite well because it also denies any strong epistemic 
asymmetry. 
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desires. The others don’t have such an access because they simply lack such a 
first-personal ability.141 
But what about a weaker form of epistemic privilege? Thus far I have been 
quite vague concerning what the denial of epistemic privilege exactly amounts 
to. A different way to do that would be to articulate the privilege in terms of 
self-ascriptions having a special kind of justification. The justification-based 
account has been developed by Declan Smithies, for instance. Smithies postula-
tes a special kind of justification, introspective justification. Only the attribution 
of those states which are individuated in terms of their phenomenal character 
are introspectively justified (Smithies 2012: 277). Although beliefs as 
dispositional states lack phenomenal qualities, the self-ascriptions of them are 
introspectively justified because beliefs are individuated in terms of dispositions 
to cause acts of conscious judgement. The self-ascription of such judgements is 
introspectively justified. Introspective justification comes from the fact that 
states with phenomenal character are supposed to be both the source and the 
subject matter of introspective justification. If I consciously judge that p, I am 
justified in believing that I’ve made such a judgement because of that judge-
ment itself. 
There are many aspects of Smithies’s proposal that are unacceptable. The 
first of them is the endorsement of the notion of phenomenal character which I 
find ontologically too inflated. The second is Smithies’s definition of belief in 
terms of a disposition to consciously judge and his dismissal of the role of 
general behavioural dispositions in individuating beliefs. The third is his 
conception of introspective justification which I find very obscure and 
unexplanatory. What is it a about phenomenal character that it confers so strong 
a justificatory status to the state that has it? But I am willing to accept that the 
idea that self-ascriptions have a special kind of justification has some potential. 
My proposal is that the introspective justification of self-ascriptions is inherited 
from the fact that, unlike third-person attributions, the first-person attribution 
doesn’t require performing a vicarious speech act on the behalf of someone. The 
speech act as such is enough. The justification comes from the fact that there is 
a kind of immediacy to self-ascriptions that the other-ascriptions lack. I take it 
to be a weak form of epistemic privilege because it only implies differential 
responsiveness by others towards the subject in the case of self- and other-
ascriptions. Others acknowledge that the subject has made up her mind and 
intends to live up to the self-attribution.142 But justification doesn’t amount to 
knowledge. 
There’s also one advantage which my account of justification has over 
Smithies’s. It relates to the notion of justification. Unlike Smithies, I see 
                                                 
141 The difference between privileged and peculiar access is noted by Byrne (2011: 106), for 
instance. 
142 An objection might be raised that this isn’t actually a form of epistemic justification at all. 
I am willing to grant that. The only reason why I take the notion “epistemic” to be applicable 
here, is that the the self-ascriber acknowledges herself as a subject who commits herself to 
the project of self-knowledge. 
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justification in intersubjective terms. The paradigmatic cases of some claim or 
belief being justified belong to the social context wherein the source of 
justification is the actual or ideal agreement by other people who have evaluated 
the claim or belief in question. This is simply a remark about ordinary language 
use. It seems unnatural to say that a belief is justified because facts pertaining to 
the intrinsic states of the subject. A person justifies her thoughts and actions to 
others and earns the justificatory status only when the others acknowledge that. 
In that sense justificatory status seems to be an extrinsic property which is 
inconsistent with Smithies’s account according to which that status is deter-
mined by intrinsic phenomenal character. This is certainly a contentious issue 
but I won’t dwell on it further because it isn’t crucial in the present context. 
Before going on to respond to possible objections to my account, I try to turn 
one seeming shortcoming of my account to my advantage. The inability to 
explain (strong) privileged access is usually taken as a theory’s weakness. But 
in the case of attitudes one can argue that the lack of privileged access is 
actually a positive fact about our self-conception. The fact that we need to take 
into account and possibly transform our behavioural and affective dispositions 
in order to know what we really believe and desire lets us see how self-
knowledge is a matter of effort and work. As Josep Corbi puts it:  
 
It seems /.../ that a satisfactory account of first-person authority must take into 
consideration that there is a significant number of cases where a third party may 
know better than the agent herself whether she is in a certain psychological 
condition. In other words, there are some cases where self-knowledge must be 
regarded as an achievement, and not a trivial one. (Corbi 2009: 326)143  
 
For this to be possible postulating strong privileged access may even distort the 
picture of one’s self-relation. 
In this subchapter I have argued against the claim that there is a strong 
epistemic asymmetry between self- and other-ascriptions of beliefs and desires. 
There isn’t a separate and especially trustworthy method of self-ascription. The 
self-ascription of beliefs and desires through sincere assertons and requests 
requires behavioural and affective dispositions to be in place in order to be true. 
This means that the use of the method of transparency doesn’t really guarantee 
reliable self-knowledge. The ability to live up to self-ascriptions may provide a 
form of epistemic privilege for first person attributions of occurrent acts but 
self-knowledge of beliefs and desires is still a matter of reflective effort. 
 
 
                                                 
143 The claim that the self-knowledge of beliefs and desires can be a matter of genuine 
cognitive accomplishment has also been defended by Krista Lawlor (2008; 2009). 
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7.4 Objections? 
7.4.1 Two kinds of self-knowledge? 
There is a strong tendency to give occurrent assertions or requests pride of place 
in determining whether the subject has the respective attitude. This kind of 
prioritization isn’t usually expressed in terms of assertions or requests. Rather, 
in the case of beliefs, judgements are taken to be the central acts which function 
as guides to subject’s beliefs. This was already apparent in Smithies’s account. 
As far as I know there hasn’t been any clear suggestion about what the respec-
tive mental act for desires is. In any case, requests haven’t been suggested to 
play that role. Nevertheless, taking for granted the present account of self-
ascriptions, where dispositions have epistemic priority, we may ask how it 
should deal with such a tendency.  
To this I can only answer that beliefs and desires have been simply construed 
in the way that reflects the broad epistemic symmetry between self- and other-
ascriptions. There can be different ways of understanding what the concepts of 
belief and desire refer to and I can’t condemn those who understand them in 
different ways. For instance, one can also postulate “decision-based attitudes”, 
the self-ascription of which is self-verifying. These could be identified with pro-
attitudes (desires) and dispositions to judge (beliefs), which were considered in 
5.5.3 and 5.5.4, respectively. In such a case wholehearted assertions and re-
quests do suffice for having the respective attitude. Only pragmatic conside-
rations can decide which kinds of attitude the concepts of belief and desire 
should pick out. The discussion in the present chapter may provide a reason 
why we should think that my construal of beliefs and desires tracks attitudes 
which are pragmatically more interesting. The reason is that knowledge of 
decision-based attitudes seems to come too cheaply to the subject. As long as 
we want to construe the self-knowledge of attitudes as an achievement, which 
provides a reason to commend the subject who possesses it, adopting a 
“thicker” conception of beliefs and desires is more reasonable. 
Admitting the possibility of different kinds of belief and desire might still 
make one suspicious. Instead of speaking of different attitudes, why not 
postulate a difference in access? For instance, Richard Moran maintains the 
univocity of mental concepts but argues for a distinction between two stances 
towards one’s own mental states. One is the deliberative (or non-observational) 
stance and the other is theoretical (or observational). Instead of invoking 
something I’ve called “decision-based attitudes”, Moran claims that there is a 
special kind of non-observational stance to one’s attitudes. This involves 
making up one’s mind on the content of the attitude. To the extent that the 
knowledge about one’s own beliefs and desires arises from deliberation, it is up 
to oneself to decide whether to believe that p and desire that p. Knowledge of 
these attitudes doesn’t seem to require any kind of observation or perception. 
First-person access can be non-evidential. This doesn’t mean that the decision 
to believe or desire something isn’t based on reasons. Evidence here means 
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perceptual evidence and this seems to be unnecessary for self-knowledge from 
the first-person perspective.144  
The vehicle of self-awareness for Moran is awoval (Moran 2001: 107). An 
avowal means explicitly endorsing one’s belief and expressing commitment to 
its truth (Moran 1997: 152). This should imply that self-ascriptions through 
avowals obey the transparency condition (Moran 2001: 101). One cannot 
coherently believe that p and consider p to be false which means that once I 
claim that I believe that p I am also commited to its truth. This is also where the 
responsibility for one’s beliefs comes in. While the avowal of a belief differs 
from attribution based on evidence about one’s psychology, Moran still holds 
that the same type of mental state is tracked both by avowals and attributions 
(2001: 89). Although he doesn’t analyse the avowals of desires, the same point 
should also apply to them.  
Moran’s proposal is in agreement with my account when it comes to the 
question of what is involved in self-attributions. I appealed to the ability to 
make wholehearted assertions and requests by agreeing with or endorsing their 
respective contents. These acts can be identified with avowals in Moran’s 
sense.145 Because of that I can also acknowledge deliberative stance as an 
element in self-ascriptions. But since I denied that peculiar access implies 
epistemic privilege I can’t really say that the deliberative stance (mere whole-
hearted assertion or request) provides any epistemically privileged access to 
beliefs and desires.146 It can only provide such access to decision-based 
attitudes, if any. The modified communicative conception, then, simply rejects 
the idea that the occurrent acts of assertion and request, or avowals, provide any 
strong epistemic privilege to self-attributers. The deliberative stance can be 
incorporated into my account,without granting it more than is necessary. 
Another, similar objection to my account is what I call “the expressivist 
objection”. According to it the picture of self-knowledge I have presented 
creates an epistemic distance between the subject and her attitudes. There is the 
intuition, going back to Wittgenstein, if not earlier, that sincere avowals of 
attitudes are such that it doesn’t make any sense to ask: “You avowed the 
attitude but do you really have it?” or “You avowed the attitude but how do you 
know you have it?” As Matthew Boyle puts it, “If confronted with the question 
how I know, I want to reply ‘Well, it’s my thought (my belief, my intention, my 
toothache, etc.)!’” (Boyle 2010: 13) My answer to the expressivist objection is 
basically the same as the one I gave to the previous objection. I can agree that 
these questions aren’t really appropriate in the case of decision-based attitudes, 
                                                 
144 Insofar as thinking whether to believe that p includes thinking about p itself, self-
knowledge is also based on evidence, often the perceptual sort. The claim is that ascending 
from “p” to “I believe that p” doesn’t require evidence. 
145 This kind of identification might invoke many objections. Still, the similarities between 
the two accounts are salient enough for bringing them together. 
146 To do justice to Moran, in his 2001 book he didn’t really concern himself much with the 
epistemological asymmetry between the two stances, so at least the book might be in 
agreement with my account. 
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the self-ascription of which is self-verifying. But it is entirely appropriate in the 
case of the attitudes that I have treated here. The intuition behind the 
expressivist objection is simply wrong.  
But how to explain such an intuition? I suggest that the explanation should 
appeal to the fact that self-ascriptions have a peculiar justification. Remember 
that this kind of justification doesn’t imply any strong epistemic privilege but 
still plays a role in our social life. It motivates certain attitudes and expectations 
towards one another. I am willing to speculate that the acknowledgement of 
introspective justification might motivate people to exaggerate their epistemic 
privilege. After all, there is a strong phenomenological asymmetry between 
self- and other-attributions. The first require mere speech acts. The second 
involve speech acts on another’s behalf. This may give the misimpression that 
self-attributions also involve some sort of special epistemic guarantee. But 
phenomenological dissimilarity doesn’t imply epistemic difference.147 
 
 
7.4.2 Desires and satisfaction 
For completeness’s sake I want to address a possible objection to my account of 
self-knowledge. It only concerns the attribution of desires. This relates to the 
assumption that a true desire-attribution requires an accurate judgement that the 
represented state of affairs will offer subjective satisfaction. The latter is under-
stood in terms of a positive hedonic state. A potentially counterintuitive 
consequence of such an assumption is that a person can’t know whether she has 
the desire that p, unless she also knows that p will satisfy her. Let’s call this 
condition the “satisfaction requirement” (SR). Without the latter the truth of the 
self-attribution would be accidental at best and accidentally true beliefs don’t 
amount to knowledge. Yet it seems that it is entirely acceptable for a person to 
self-ascribe a desire that p. It is also acceptable to say that she knows she has 
that desire, even if she doesn’t know that p will offer her satisfaction. It seems, 
then, that the present account of self-knowledge of desires is too demanding. 
Those who take this problem seriously might turn their attention to desires as 
decision-based attitudes, the ascription of which disregards the satisfaction 
requirement. 
In this subsection I try to dispel this worry and argue that the satisfaction 
requirement is a reasonable demand on desire-ascriptions. It is noteworthy that 
a similar question became a focus of debate between Russell and Wittgenstein 
in the early 20th century. In his “The Analysis of Mind”, Russell argues that 
desires announce themselves to the subject by the feeling of discomfort which 
                                                 
147 I must admit, though, that I have left the question of knowing what one asserts or 
requests, agrees with or endorses, out of the purview. Such occurrent acts have a place in my 
account and the question of knowing that one has performed these acts is an important aspect 
of self-ascriptions. It might be that explaining such knowledge requires more theoretical 
machinery. But since the knowledge of one’s beliefs and desires has been the main issue, I 
won’t address that further question in this thesis. 
173 
causes her to act in order to terminate that sense of unease (Russell 1921: 32). 
Russell’s view could be interpreted as implying that in order to know what I 
desire I need to infer what could put an end to the discomfort. This inference 
should presumably be based on my knowledge about what offers me 
satisfaction. 
Wittgenstein doesn’t accept Russell’s analysis. For him the absurdity of 
Russell’s view is apparent because it allows the possibility of a desire for X 
being satisfied by some other state of affairs than X, as long as it puts an end to 
the discomfort. Such a sense of absurdity is indicated by Wittgenstein’s ironic 
remark: “If I wanted to eat an apple, and someone punched me in the stomach, 
taking away my appetite, then it was the punch that I originally wanted” 
(Wittgenstein 1975: 64). Assume that the self-knowledge of a desire for X were 
only possible when one had the anticipatory knowledge that X would be 
pleasing. A person could then be mistaken about attributing that desire if X 
didn’t satisfy her or if she found fulfilment in some other state of affairs. Yet 
the relation between a desire and its content seems to be tighter, as Wittgenstein 
notes. 
I claim, though, that SR is acceptable, although the phenomenology of desire 
is not as passive as Russell takes it to be. The satisfaction requirement isn’t 
absurd. It applies to cases wherein adult persons reflect on their desires. It is 
exactly the reflective standpoint towards one’s own attitudes that is the issue in 
the present context. If such a person stands before the question “Do I really 
want that X?” she has to consider whether the represented state of affairs will 
satisfy her. If she is familiar with that type of state of affairs she can be more 
confident in her desire. After all, she is aware of her hedonic responses to that 
kind of state of affairs. On the other hand, when it’s something unfamiliar, she 
has a reason to doubt that she really has the desire in question.  
Take two persons, A and B, both of whom claim that they want to eat ice 
cream. Person A has never tasted ice cream before, whereas person B has often 
eaten it and is aware that she likes it. In the first situation A can ask herself 
whether she really knows that she wants to eat ice cream, despite the fact that 
she doesn’t fulfil SR. It is entirely conceivable that after having been presented 
with that question, A begins to doubt her desire. In the case of B, on the other 
hand, the ascription of the desire is much more certain. The familiarity with the 
hedonic value of the represented state of affairs implies greater certainty 
concerning one’s desire.148 
It is important to stress that accepting the relevance of SR doesn’t mean that 
a person couldn’t ever claim that she desires a state of affairs when she doesn’t 
know whether it satisfies her. It only gives her a reason to doubt her desire 
report. The acceptability of self-ascriptions may not require knowledge.149 But 
                                                 
148 There might be other reliable ways to know that the state of affairs satisfies us, of course. 
149 Such a dismissal definitely requires further argument, but in the present context I will 
simply take for granted that the acceptability of self-ascribing a desire doesn’t require 
knowing that one has the desire. 
174 
she can be fully confident only retrospectively after the state of affairs has been 
realized. Only after A finally gets to eat ice cream and enjoys it, can she be 
certain that she really wanted it. If she finds ice cream repulsive she can say that 
she only thought that she wanted to eat ice cream but actually didn’t know 
whether she did. Reflective individuals have here a perfectly reasonable 
criterion of self-doubt.  
The idea that we can be certain of having a desire for an unfamiliar state of 
affairs only retrospectively may sound unbelievable. Nonetheless, I am ready to 
accept the counterintuitive consequences of my claims without giving them up. 
I will conclude with considering and responding to some possible problems 
with SR. 
First, an opponent may point out desires that seem to contradict SR by 
definition. Take, for instance, a situation wherein A claims to want to take some 
drug because she has never tried any before. Why should she have any doubts 
about her desire when she seems to be motivated by the fact that the state of 
affairs in question is unfamiliar to her? But this is actually a very good example 
with which to illustrate SR and its scope. First, it is important to stress that not 
conforming to SR doesn’t exclude the possibility that A really did want to 
consume the drug. She wanted it if it turns out that the drug really does offer 
satisfaction. Still, person A, as long as she is an individual capable of reflection, 
has a reason to doubt her desire attribution. When she discovers that the drug 
didn’t offer her any satisfaction, she can ask if she really wanted to consume it. 
The example here, then, doesn’t really shake my claims. It plays with the same 
intuitions that I have already denied. 
The second problem with SR is that it is ambiguous as to whether it should 
apply to pre-existent desires or to the formation of new desires. Is the question 
one should ask when considering SR whether I know that I want that p or rather 
whether I should want that p? The second question concerns the formation of a 
new desire, not the issue of whether one has a pre-existing desire. If SR is 
meant to help answer the second question it loses its epistemic relevance. My 
account of the epistemology of self-attributions requires the theoretical reading. 
Fortunately, the purely practical interpretation doesn’t capture the contrast 
between situations wherein SR is fulfilled and where it is not. It leaves a 
beguiling impression that people could be always able to decide what desires to 
form: when SR is met, the subject is given the green light for her desire-
formation but nothing speaks against her deciding not to. When SR doesn’t 
hold, she has a reason to be careful if she wants to achieve satisfaction. But in 
both cases the question about one’s desires seems to be a purely matter of 
choice. Epistemically interpreted, SR doesn’t presuppose that. In the case when 
SR is met, the subject can’t simply renounce her desire by denying it. Its reality 
would resist her denial.  
In conclusion, we can maintain that self-knowledge of desires requires 
knowing the relevant hedonic dispositions that determine whether the fulfilment 
of the attributed desire offers subjective satisfaction or not. One can maintain 
that even in the case of desires which may seem to be among the least dubitable 
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elements of the human psyche, self-knowledge is a matter of reflective 
achievement. In the final subsection of this chapter I will compare my account 
of self-knowledge with the one defended by Peter Carruthers, to better articulate 
the level of analysis on which the present project is located. 
 
 
7.5 Comparison: The Interpretivist Sensory-Access 
account of self-knowledge 
In his impressive book on self-knowledge, Opacity of Mind, Carruthers argues 
for what he calls the Interpretivist Sensory-Access theory of self-knowledge 
(ISA). According to it our access to our attitudes and thoughts is enabled by the 
same Theory-of-Mind (ToM) mechanism that makes possible our access to the 
attitudes of others. Only access to sensory states is immediate and the attri-
bution of attitudes relies on that sensory information. Early in the book, 
Carruthers formulates the three central assumptions of his theory: 
 
a) there is a single mental faculty underlying our attributions of propositional 
attitudes, whether to ourselves or to others; 
(b) this faculty has only sensory access to its domain; 
(c) its access to our attitudes (or rather to most kinds of attitude) is interpretive 
rather than transparent. (Carruthers 2011: 2) 
 
Carruthers draws from many different sources to argue for his view. First, there 
are considerations about human cognitive architecture. Carruthers accepts the 
model of global workspace (Baars 1988) according to which outputs of sensory 
systems are broadcast across the cortex and thereby made available to different 
modular conceptual systems which draw domain-specific inferences from those 
outputs. In the case of self-attributions (and also other-attributions), the relevant 
conceptual system is the ToM mechanism. The arguments of the second type 
come from evolutionary considerations. Carruthers argues that it is reasonable 
to postulate selection pressures for building the ToM mechanism but the 
evolution of a specific metacognitive mechanism is much less plausible. This 
indicates that there is probably no separate system which is responsible for self-
attributions (Carruthers 2011: 65). Third, evidence from autism, schizophrenia 
and alexithymia indicates that the ability to make self-attributions isn’t dis-
sociated from an understanding of the attitudes of others (Ibid. 293). Fourth,150 
the fact that people are prone to make frequent confabulatory self-attributions 
when sensory information is misleading seems to demonstrate that access to 
one’s attitudes is interpretive and not direct (Ibid. 325). Carruthers, then, relies 
on cumulative empirical evidence in arguing for his theory and covers most of 
the pertinent psychological literature. In the present context I am not going to 
argue against his general psychological theory. The aim is to explicate the 
overall differences between his account of self-knowledge and mine. 
                                                 
150 Carruthers’ arguments are not limited to these four. 
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One noticeable similarity between Carruthers’ account and mine is that his 
conception of self-knowledge also rejects the epistemic asymmetry between 
knowing one’s own mental states and those of others. Both ISA and my account 
state that the difference between self- and other-knowledge boils down to the 
contingent difference in the quantity of information persons have about their 
own and others’ dispositions. Carruthers doesn’t deny that there is more sensory 
information available to the subject to make inferences about her own attitudes 
than to others.  
There are crucial differences, though. Carruthers mostly focuses on occur-
rent attitudes. It is true that epistemic privilege towards dispositional states isn’t 
really a position that is often argued for and Carruthers’ focus isn’t surprising. 
After all, challenging the claim about epistemic privilege towards occurrent 
states is a much more potent move. The claim that dispositional attitudes lack 
privileged access may seem quite unproblematic. Still, given that according to 
Carruthers access to all non-sensory states is interpretive, his account seems to 
be in harmony with mine. The claim about interpretive access also covers 
dispositional attitudes. But there’s a difference which is even more salient than 
the similarity. Carruthers’ account is almost entirely about subpersonal pro-
cesses (above all, the functioning of ToM) that underlie self-attributions. My 
account of the first-person perspective, on the other hand, has been highly 
intellectualist. I have taken the ability to assert and request to be among the 
central abilities around which the self-ascriptions of attitudes turn. In addition, 
my approach has focused on the personal level where the attributions are 
conscious and reflective. This approach is pretty much opposed to that of 
Carruthers. But it might still be fruitful to compare his account with my own in 
order to show that the present conception can add something new to our 
understanding of self-knowledge.  
Carruthers is adamant about insisting that philosophical theories of self-
knowledge which claim to be dealing with attitudes on the personal level can be 
refuted by discoveries in cognitive science. They don’t enjoy any independence 
from the empirical work in psychology (Carruthers 2011: 25). I try to argue, 
though, that he is too dismissive of the possibility that the philosophical 
perspective on first-person authority might be (relatively) autonomous from 
psychological approaches. I must stress that this doesn’t mean that we can argue 
for immediate or privileged access to the attitudes on the personal level. I only 
want to make the point that the account of self-attributions and self-knowledge 
that I have developed here can give us insight about the first person perspective 
on one’s attitudes and this isn’t dependent upon which theory of cognitive 
architecture is true.  
So why do I think that a philosophical account of self-knowledge can be 
relatively autonomous151 with regard to psychological findings? A blunt answer 
                                                 
151 By “relatively autonomous” I mean that it is not necessary for a philosophical account of 
self-knowledge to be informed by psychological research in order to be feasible. Denying 
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to this question is that Carruthers and I deal with a different subject matter. We 
thus have different commitments concerning what a philosophical conception of 
self-knowledge should achieve. This difference doesn’t merely amount to the 
distinction between occurrent and dispositional attitudes, though, but cuts a bit 
deeper. To see this we must consider the fourth chapter of his book where he 
tries to dismantle three different accounts of self-knowledge that have proposed 
some sort of immediate access to one’s attitudes. His commitments become 
apparent when he discusses constitutivist accounts. He takes the core idea of 
constitutivism to be that “our own actions (especially in the form of inner or 
outer speech) can constitute the adoption of a novel attitude via commitment” 
(Ibid. 96). 
Formulated in these terms my account could also be taken as a form of 
constitutivism. After all, an important element that grounded the peculiarity of 
self-attributions was the ability of the subject to live up to them. I refused to 
build any strong form of epistemic privilege on that ability, though. But what’s 
important here is to see how Carruthers deals with the constitutivist accounts. 
First, he endorses the dual-process reasoning theory and the distinction between 
System 1 and System 2 processes. The first involves the processing of attitudes 
which is unconscious and fast. The second is conscious, slow, and reflective 
(for a general overview, see Evans 2008). This model has also been extended to 
distinguish between System 1 and System 2 attitudes – the latter being realized 
by the first (for the most thorough treatment of this distinction see Frankish 
2004). Carruthers then argues that even if a constitutivist claims that being 
committed to an action in accordance with a self-ascription constitutes that 
attitude on the personal level she can’t confine her attention to the System 2 
level (Carruthers 2011: 102). There are further conditions for really knowing 
that one has the attitude, and this requires the System 1 attitudes to be in place. 
However, access to the latter is in any case interpretive, which seems to mean 
that the constitutivist can’t deliver what she promises. 
This argument is telling because it indicates that Carruthers takes the System 
1, subpersonal and unconscious attitudes to be the primary objects of self-
knowledge. For Carruthers, the subject’s exercise of her ability to live up to her 
attributions isn’t sufficient to constitute the attributed attitude.152 The ToM 
mechanism needs to make the accurate attributions of the attitudes that realize 
it. We may safely assume, then, that Carruthers takes the System 1 states as 
paradigmatic mental states that are the object of self-knowledge. The present 
account, on the other hand, takes the beliefs and desires as dispositions to be 
                                                                                                                       
the necessity condition doesn’t imply that psychological findings couldn’t inform philo-
sophizing. 
152 From the previous discussion, one might have had an impression that I can’t admit that 
either. But note that I was not denying the sufficiency of exercising the ability to constitute 
the attitude. I was denying that the ability endows the subject with an epistemic privilege. 
The knowledge of one’s dispositions is fragile and the others can know them better than the 
subject, at least in principle. 
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central.153 A person having a belief that p is constituted by certain behavioural 
dispositions that determine whether asserting that p on her behalf is appropriate. 
A person having a desire that p is constituted by pertinent hedonic dispositions. 
The knowledge that one has such dispositions constitutes self-knowledge of 
belief and desire. These attitudes are clearly different from what Carruthers 
conceives of as beliefs and desires, namely, representational states “that 
causally underlie the relevant dispositions (2011: xiv). In any case, instantiating 
a mere dispositional profile is not sufficient for having an attitude for Carruthers 
because “acting as if one has a given attitude doesn’t entail that one really does 
have that attitude. (Or at least, not unless one is some sort of anti-realist or 
instrumentalist about the mental.)” (Carruthers 2011: 102). 
Pace Carruthers, the modified communicative conception takes dispositions 
to be sufficient for having an attitude. I do not think that grounding belief and 
desire attributions in dispositional profiles entails anti-realism or instrumen-
talism about the mental. I assume the view, which I defended in the previous 
chapter, that dispositions are as real as their categorical bases. An ascription of 
beliefs and desires can be true and responsive to reality. Defending this claim 
further would steer us away from the context of the present chapter, though. 
What’s important here is that if we accept the conception of attitudes I have 
presented then my account of self-knowledge can be taken as having a different 
topic.154  
So why is the comparison with Carruthers’ theory relevant here, if it is so 
different from mine? I think it is relevant because it makes explicit the gulf that 
can exist between different approaches to the question, what does self-
knowledge consist in? The gulf is real, although the objects of interest are 
seemingly the same; namely, beliefs and desires. Unlike Carruthers, I see the 
attitudes, as construed by the modified communicative conception, to be much 
more central to our everyday conception of the mind, whether or not this 
construal is also reflected in our cognitive architecture. There are many 
situations in our everyday life wherein the questions “What do I believe?” and 
“What do I want?” matter to us and I suspect that my conception of beliefs and 
desires is appropriate in such situations. Carruthers himself speaks also about 
“our ordinary conceptions” when he mentions the attitudes which he centres 
upon (2011: 110). But he doesn’t really give any arguments for the claim that 
his understanding of beliefs and desires coincides with common-sense under-
standing of them. 
He does address the possibility of construing the reflectively ascribed 
attitudes as separate kinds of attitudes but doesn’t think that it is fruitful because 
                                                 
153 Beliefs and desires as dispositions don’t correspond to System 2 attitudes. But they 
definitely contrast with the attitudes that Carruthers focuses on. 
154 Carruthers briefly considers the suggestion of redefining attitudes, but dismisses this 
proposal, largely on the grounds that these would be revisionary of the functional profiles of 
those attitudes, thus losing distinctions between them (Carruthers 2011: 108–113). I, on the 
other hand, don’t think that different attitudes need to have strictly distinguishable functional 
profiles in the first place, so I don’t share Carruthers’ fears. 
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this wouldn’t increase the explanatory power of attitude ascriptions (2011: 114). 
But contra Carruthers, in the chapter about affectability I have presented 
different advantages that the consciously and reflectively applied attitude-
concepts can provide. These advantages don’t reduce to the explanatory or 
predictive power and they aren’t merely the outgrowth of our intuitions about 
the transparency of self-attributions. Carruthers might object that he can only 
rely on theoretical usefulness as a criterion for introducing concepts. But the 
issue of self-knowledge in philosophy isn’t only a theoretical problem of 
understanding what cognitive mechanisms enable it. It is also a question about 
our general self-conception, its consequences and its possible improvement 
which means that the importance of attitude ascriptions isn’t limited to 
theoretical gains. 
A more interesting objection by Carruthers is that the reflected attitudes 
simply aren’t very important. In everyday human life one needs to rely on 
simple heuristics and snap judgements (Carruthers 2011: 116). People often 
don’t act in accordance with the commitments they have undertaken when they 
self-ascribe attitudes. To that I can only answer that reflective self-attributions 
are important enough to be accounted for when we bear in mind that we 
sometimes do think of our attitudes in such a way. My account wasn’t meant to 
cover all aspects of self-understanding anyway. I also acknowledged the fact 
that people often don’t live up to their commitments.  
We can say, then, that Carruthers’ theory of self-knowledge doesn’t exhaust 
the possibilities of understanding what self-knowledge of attitudes consists in. 
There is also the personal-level perspective that characterizes us as reflective 
agents. From that perspective the question of self-knowledge doesn’t address 
the subpersonal functioning of our cognitive system but instead more coarse-
grained features of our active and affective lives. One shouldn’t let oneself be 
distracted by the fact that both Carruthers’ account and mine deny epistemic 
privilege to the subject and that both approaches see the first-person perspective 
in interpretive terms. There is still quite a strong difference between the two. 
One can’t exclude the possibility, though, that the two accounts are actually 
compatible with each other because they are located on different explanatory 
levels. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I addressed the question how to understand the peculiarities of 
the first-person perspective to one’s beliefs and desires in the framework of the 
communicative conception. The self-ascriptions differ from the third-personal 
attributions because they circumvent the need to assert or request on someone’s 
behalf. They are constituted by wholehearted assertions and requests simpli-
citer. The wholeheartedness is defined in terms of the absence of interest in 
changing one’s attitudes. My account doesn’t presume that the self-ascriptions 
have an intrinsic phenomenal characer but understands their phenomenology 
relationally. In addition, the self-ascriptions of desire may involve the 
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appearance of the good to the ascriber which can be understood in terms of the 
expectation of pleasure. 
As for the epistemology of self-ascriptions, the modified communicative 
conception need not buy into any strong form of first-person privilege. One can 
gain knowledge about one’s desires by taking into account one’s behavioural 
and hedonic dispositions just as in the case of other-attributions. The epistemic 
authority of self-ascriptions boils down to the fact that the person usually knows 
more about her own dispositions than others do. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to articulate the notion of affectability 
and its implications. Folk psychology is an engaged enterprise in which our 
understanding of what other people believe and want shapes our responses to 
them in particular ways. This means that attributed attitudes have commu-
nicative significance. Belief attributions enable the responses of agreement and 
disagreement. Desire attributions, on the other hand, allow for the possibility of 
endorsing or disapproving of an attributed attitude. The central claim of the 
thesis is that without such communicative significance the practice of attri-
buting attitudes would be unrecognisable and alien to us. By bringing out the 
main responses that folk psychological attributions involve, I tried to show why 
we should care about having the concepts of belief and desire. The reason for 
caring wasn’t confined to the mere fact that there are engaged responses. I also 
showed how the concepts of belief and desire make it possible to treat the 
behavioural and hedonic dispositions of other people as if they had com-
municative significance. This way of understanding beliefs and desires endows 
their attributers only with minimal ontological commitments according to which 
having the aforementioned dispositions amounts to having beliefs and desires. I 
consider this to be an advantage of my account but it blocks us from radically 
criticising folk psychological discourse. Finally, my account has mostly been 
third-personal but it can also make sense of the peculiarities, even if not the 
privilege, of self-ascriptions.  
Although I addressed the ontological status of attitudes in this thesis, the 
focus has been on their attribution. This shouldn’t be surprising, given that my 
approach took inspiration from such philosophers as Wittgenstein and Ryle (and 
like-minded present day authors) who took the analysis of the use of terms in 
our forms of life to be the proper way to gain insight about the phenomena 
which these terms are supposed to designate. This thesis can be taken, among 
other things, as an attempt to vindicate such an approach. What people believe 
and want is a question that arises in our linguistic practice wherein we have 
shared modes of response to one another and this question should be answered 
in the context of this practice. I allowed for the possibility that folk psychology 
could be revised or criticised but it turned out that the benefits of applying the 
concepts of belief and desire don’t motivate any substantial ontological 
commitments. We can maintain that belief-desire psychology is a useful tool for 
thinking about one another and that there is no pressing reason to assume that 
this usefulness is grounded in any hidden essences of belief and desire that wait 
to be discovered. However, this does not mean that there are no aspects of folk 
psychology which have yet to be properly appreciated. Indeed, until now, 
affectability has been one of these aspects. 
I want now to consider briefly the more general importance of this thesis and 
to mention some open questions for further research which are motivated by 
this thesis.  
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Let’s begin with the general signficance of this thesis. First, my argument for 
the indispensability of affectability was meant to say something about the nature 
of folk psychological interpretation. The indispensability of engaged responses 
doesn’t indicate that the possibilities of agreement/disagreement and 
endorsement/disapproval are highly frequent, but still merely contingent, effects 
of mental state attributions. Rather, affectability is comparable to the principle 
of rationality, invoked by such authors as Davidson, according which the 
assumption that attributees are rational is a constitutive principle of folk 
psychological interpretation. The assumption of affectability (that it should be 
possible to be affected by one’s belief and desire attributions) should also be 
taken to be such a constitutive principle. As argued in the second chapter, the 
folk psychological practice as we know it wouldn’t exist without affectability. 
Perhaps it would be possible to argue that affectability actually expresses the 
assumption of rationality in some way but I am agnostic about that. What 
matters is that affectability is as important for understanding the nature of folk 
psychological interpretation as the assumption of rationality is. It makes the 
practice of folk psychology possible.  
One might think that the admission of affectability among the constitutive 
conditions of mental state attribution spells trouble for scientific study of the 
mind. After all, cognitive scientists speak of representational mental states with-
out assuming that they have to be able to agree or disagree with and endorse or 
disapprove of them. Scientific psychology presumably isn’t an engaged 
enterprise (with an exception of psychiatry). Furthermore, my alliance with 
ordinary language philosophy in the introduction might have left an impression 
that I want to accuse scientific psychology of distorting our everyday practice of 
mentalistic interpretation. However, by defending the indispensability of 
affectability, my aim hasn’t been to play a role of conceptual police. I presume 
that it is legitimate for psychologists to attribute whichever kinds of mental 
states they do, possibly also to creatures who don’t possess language. If they 
don’t respond to attributees in ways which are characteristic of affectability, this 
only means that they are not engaging in folk psychological practice but are 
instead doing something different. One should just be heedful of the differences 
between conceptual practices in order to realise when we are changing the topic. 
The talk of representational mental states in science can be perfectly legitimate, 
whether or not affectability is acknowledged there. Nevertheless, from a 
philosophical standpoint, it is important to keep in mind the differences between 
everyday and scientific understanding. Affectability is crucial for the first. 
The further consequences of affectability which I explored in the third 
chapter should strengthen the case for affectability’s importance. If the attri-
butee is in some way socially superior to the attributer, the latter is prone to 
adopt the attributed attitude and have a negative emotional reaction towards the 
attributee. This indicates the extent to which attitudes of other people matter to 
us and how this is modulated by social relations between attributers and 
attributees. The attributee’s beliefs and desires function as claims and demands, 
183 
respectively, and they depend on the relation the attributer reacts to them in 
different ways. 
This brings us to the second important point which can be gathered from this 
thesis, namely, that folk psychology involves speaking on the behalf of others. 
This was Gauker’s original insight. I retained it in the modified version of the 
communicative conception. This means that folk psychology has an ethical 
dimension. When people attribute beliefs and desires to one another, there is 
always the question: who has the right to speak on whose behalf (i.e. to attribute 
an attitude)? On certain occasions it may be inappropriate to attribute attitudes 
to another person. For instance, when an attributer and an attributee are in 
socially inequal positions, it is possible to argue that, by speaking on the behalf 
of another person, one is using her superior position to exclude another from 
speaking on her own behalf. The modified communicative conception hopefully 
lets us see the ethical tensions in the folk psychological practice more clearly 
than accounts which don’t recognise the communicative significance of mental 
state attributions.  
Another important consequence of this thesis is that it allows for ambiguities 
in the terms belief and desire. The modified communicative conception I’ve 
defended understands beliefs and desires in terms of behavioural and hedonic 
dispositions and the attribution of beliefs and desires in terms of assertions and 
requests on an attributee’s behalf. To many it may seem to be an counterin-
tuitive understanding of those attitudes. Although I’ve fended off the idea that 
our theory of beliefs and desires has to respect the intuitions of concept-users, I 
grant that the terms “belief” and “desire” may identify different attitudes on 
different occasions of use. For instance, I pointed out in the seventh chapter that 
one can also talk about decision-based attitudes. The terms “belief “and “desire” 
might not always identify attitudes that I have considered in this thesis. But this 
is a conclusion that is difficult to avoid if we look at the messy details of the 
application of these terms. I actually think that recognition of the ambiguities in 
the terms “belief” and “desire” is necessary if one wants to understand how they 
are applied in different contexts. Although some may be frustrated by the 
ambiguity, it is simply the price we have to pay if we want to adequately 
understand how the mentalistic discourse functions.  
What’s more, ambiguity makes it natural to consider the historical develop-
ment and cross-cultural differences in the way in which beliefs and desires have 
been conceptualized, a possibility that seems to be somewhat overlooked in the 
contemporary philosophy of mind (although the recent work in experimental 
philosophy seems to point in that direction). If it is acknowledged that 
mentalistic talk refers to a plethora of attitudes already within a spatiotem-
porally limited part of the world, it is easier to accept that there might be 
noticeable historical and cross-cultural differences as well. 
The fourth important take-home message of this thesis is that the ontological 
commitments of the folk are flexible. It is legitimate to prescribe certain 
commitments to concept-users or withdraw some from them, even if they find 
them unintuitive. This became apparent in the sixth chapter where I argued that 
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by adopting the pragmatic approach to the concepts of belief and desire we can 
argue that folk psychology should commit one to only minimal assumptions 
about the nature of beliefs and desires. We need to accept only those 
commitments which are necessary for concept-application to deliver its standard 
benefits. Instead of poking at the intuitive judgements of the folk, we can 
instead look at what they are doing when they use the concept in question. By 
minimising folk commitments concerning beliefs and desires it was possible to 
argue for a (nonreductive) dispositionalist view of these attitudes. The latter 
hasn’t been as popular an option among philosophers as a representationalist 
position, for instance. One of the reasons for this might be the intuition that the 
folk are commited to more than a mere instantiation of behavioural and hedonic 
dispositions. From the present perspective, we can now see that it is entirely 
legitimate to give a minimalist interpretation to folk commitments. 
There is one point where the intuitive judgements of the folk might play a 
role, though. This concerns what people want to achieve when they attribute 
beliefs and desires to one another. What they are committed to depends on this. 
I can imagine a possible argument according to which we can’t keep the 
commitments minimal because at least some people want to describe internal 
states of individuals when they attribute beliefs and desires. On phenomeno-
logical grounds, though, I don’t think that it is reasonable to claim that in our 
everyday interactions we (regularly) want to do this. An important thing to note 
is that a conditional claim remains plausible in any case: one can be an 
ontological minimalist and dispositionalist about beliefs and desires when one’s 
conceptual needs are modest. The needs that folk psychology expresses are 
relatively modest, as I tried to show in this thesis. The fact that they are modest, 
though, doesn’t mean that they don’t merit our philosophical interest.  
 
Before concluding, I’d like to bring out some questions for further research that 
this thesis can motivate. First, one can and should articulate further the structure 
of engaged responses which constitute affectability. In my thesis I remained 
content with a pretheoretic understanding of what agreement/disagreement and 
endorsement/disapproval consist of. But a closer look might reveal that these 
responses have quite a complicated structure. For instance, are there differences 
between having an engaged response to a content-component and having it to 
an attitude-component, or can one be reduced to another? As I noted in the 
second chapter, beliefs and desires may require asymmetric treatment in this 
regard: the response to belief is content-oriented while the response to desire 
more naturally takes the attitude as its object. In addition, there might arise 
difficulties with accounting for agreement and disagreement with certain kinds 
of belief (de se beliefs for instance, in which case it isn’t clear whether the 
attributer can entertain the content of the attributee’s belief if such a content is 
essentially self-locating).  
A further articulation of the structure of affectability is also needed for 
responses which are grounded in agreement/disagreement and endorsement/ 
disapproval. I called it affectability in the wide sense. The account of them 
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presented in this thesis (in the third chapter) has been quite speculative. For 
instance, the extent to which the adoption-through-attribution model characte-
rises everyday social interactions is open to debate. Also, the analysis of 
reactive attitudes only brought out the most basic ways in which people can be 
emotionally affected by belief and desire attributions. In addition, I only hinted 
at the possibility that the control of others’ folk psychological interpretations of 
oneself may constitute a form of social power over others. Given that the focus 
of this thesis has been on affectability in the narrow sense, the preliminary 
character of the investigations into affectability in the wide sense should be 
understandable. Its full articulation might require a separate monograph. 
Second, my thesis can motivate empirical investigations into how engaged 
responses to attitudes evolved phylogenetically. For the sake of analytic clarity, 
I have analysed them in terms of speech acts. Although I suspect that their 
functioning can’t be explained without reference to speech acts, it is possible 
that some sort of co-evolution account would be needed to explain how they 
appeared in the human lineage. The abilities to comprehend speech acts and to 
respond to attitudes with agreement/disagreement and endorsement/disapproval 
might be rooted in some cognitive ability that is itself evolutionarily prior to 
them. One place to look for such ability is gesturing behaviour. In gesturing 
behaviour it is possible to distinguish between imperative and declarative 
pointing. For instance, we can hypothesize that engaged responses that are 
characteristic of affectability arose in their rudimentary form already in relation 
to these two types of gesture. More broadly speaking, it is an open question why 
members of our species began making differential normative evaluations of one 
another’s behaviour which are expressed in the engaged responses that I have 
analysed. An answer to this question should dissolve the possible worry that 
affectability, as I’ve articulated it, lacks naturalistic credentials. Affectability is 
certainly grounded in our psychological capacities and they have an evolutio-
nary history. 
Third, I’ve relied on the method of conceptual explication (primarily 
inspired by Justin Fisher’s pragmatic conceptual analysis) to articulate the 
application conditions of the concepts of belief and desire. The explication 
started with an analysis of the benefits of these concepts and then asked what 
should be the conditions under which to apply these concepts. Methodological 
assumptions behind this approach were left somewhat implicit. For instance, 
although an explication is allowed to be counterintuitive for concept-users, there 
should be a point at which it can’t be said to deal with the same concept 
anymore. Where exactly does this point lie and is there a principled way to 
identify it? These are open questions. Also, in this thesis I’ve stressed that at 
least the benefits that are supposed to be explained by the explication (affectabi-
lity, explanations, predictions, mindshaping) should be recognisable to the 
concept-users. Still, one could inquire further into the question of how to 
individuate the benefits of a concept and to what extent it is an empirical 
question, as opposed to an armchair one. To what extent do we have epistemic 
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authority over what we want to achieve with our concepts and what we actually 
achieve?  
This last question brings us to the fourth topic of research that grows out of 
the present thesis: the first-person epistemology of beliefs and desires. Although 
my analysis didn’t reveal any strong asymmetry between first- and third-person 
perspectives, it is an open possibility that people have privileged access to what 
they assert and request. These are occurrent acts, as opposed to dispositional 
states, and they are usually considered to be epistemically accessible to their 
subjects directly. Self-ascriptions of belief and desire were understood in terms 
of assertions and requests and the epistemology of the latter is yet to be 
accounted for. I doubt, though, that this has any bearing on the question of 
whether we have privileged access to our beliefs and desires. What I actually 
find to be a more promising possibility in this regard is the possible role of 
imagination in providing self-knowledge. Although I didn’t address it in this 
thesis, one might argue that by imagining a state of affairs which is the object of 
a self-ascribed desire, and feeling pleasure in doing that, the ascriber has a 
reason to be more confident in her self-ascription. The desires were understood 
in terms of dispositions to be pleased. It might be the case that those who feel 
pleasure in imagination are at least in certain cases justified in assuming that 
they have a disposition to actually feel pleasure, i.e. they have the desire in 
question. In a similar way, one may have justification for one’s self-ascription 
of belief if one can imagine the manifestation of relevant behavioural 
dispositions in response to a state of affairs which is the object of the belief. 
However, it is an open question whether imaginings can confer any justification 
on self-ascriptions and the answer seems to depend on the extent to which 
imaginings can track the actual dispositions that people have. 
An additional topic to be investigated further is the explanatory role of 
beliefs and desires as conceived in this thesis. Since I didn’t conceptualize these 
attitudes as causally efficacious inner states, I had to endorse (in the fifth 
chapter) an account of context-placing explanations according to which folk 
psychological explanations serve to articulate more fully the situation in which 
agents find themselves. This is a controversial thesis and I was admittedly 
sketchy about it, which means that there is work to do. Finally, I will only 
mention the historical development of the concepts of belief and desire as an 
additional topic for further research. I assume that there are other topics which I 
haven’t mentioned but this should suffice to show the significance of 
affectability and the modified communicative conception. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
 
Uskumuste ja soovide kommunikatiivne tähtsus 
 
Uskumuste ja soovide omistamise võime – rahvapsühholoogia – on viimastel 
kümnenditel olnud nii psühholoogias kui filosoofias intensiivse teoreetilise huvi 
objektiks. Peaks olema selge, et teadmine iseenda ja teiste hoiakute kohta on 
inimese jaoks tähtis ning et ilma sellise teadmiseta inimest sotsiaalse olendina 
ilmselt ei eksisteeriks. Selgitamist vajab aga küsimus, milles see tähtsus täpse-
malt seisneb. Uskumuste ja soovide omistamise tähtsus on mõistetav selle pea-
miste kasulike tagajärgede kaudu omistaja jaoks. Siinse väitekirja esmaseks 
taotluseks on näidata, et nende tagajärgede hulka kuuluvad teatavad viisid, 
kuidas omistaja enda omistustest mõjutatud on, millest on senini rahvapsüh-
holoogia uurimises üle vaadatud. 
Väitekiri ei piirdu aga rahvapsühholoogiliste omistuste tagajärgede kirjelda-
misega. Viimaseid arvesse võtnuna saab juba küsida, mis hoiakute omistamise 
juures teeb just sellised tagajärjed võimalikuks. Nõnda jõuame mu töö teise 
eesmärgini, milleks on uskumuste ja soovide omistustingimuste sõnastamine 
viisil, mis aitaks mõista, miks on omistustel just sellised tagajärjed, nagu neil 
on. Väidan, et rahvapsühholoogia peamiste kasulike tagajärgede seletamiseks 
tuleb meil konstrueerida omistustingimused nii, et omistused oleksid mõistetud 
teatavat laadi kõneaktide kaudu ja et nad tugineksid tõsiasjadele isiku käitumise 
ja heaolu kohta.  
Uurimaks seda, mis on uskumuste ja soovide omistamise tagajärjed, tuginen 
tavakeele filosoofiast (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle) inspireeritud lähe-
nemisele, mis vaatleb mõiste – antud juhul siis uskumuse ja soovi mõistete – 
kasutuse tagajärgi igapäevases keelepraktikas. Neid tagajärgi arvessevõtvate 
omistustingimuste konstrueerimisel otsin aga abi pragmaatiliselt mõisteana-
lüüsilt (Justin Fisher), mis võimaldab näha, millised peaksid olema mõiste 
rakendamise tingimused, et rakendusest tulenevad tagajärjed võimalikud olek-
sid. Tavakeele filosoofiast inspireeritud lähenemine aitab seega selgitada usku-
muste ja soovide omistamise kõige olulisemaid tagajärgi ning pragmaatiline 
kontseptuaalne analüüs laseb näha nende tagajärgede võimalikkuse tingimusi 
kõige optimaalsemal kombel. Väitekirja probleemipüstituse ning metodoloogili-
se inspiratsiooni avan ma esimeses, sissejuhatavas peatükis. 
Teises peatükis uurin ma olemasolevaid käsitlusi rahvapsühholoogiliste 
omistuste peamiste tagajärgede kohta. Seal sõnastan ma ka oma keskse teesi. 
Selle kohaselt on sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimises, kus teooriate rõhuasetus on 
olnud rahvapsühholoogia seletaval, ennustaval ning vähemal määral ka selle 
ettekirjutaval rollil, üks oluline aspekt uskumuste ja soovide tähtsuses senini 
tähelepanuta jäänud. Selleks aspektiks on need eriomased viisid, kuidas 
uskumuste ja soovide omistused omistajat mõjutavad (ma nimetan seda töö 
vältel ka rahvapsühholoogilistest omistustest tulenevaks “mõjutatavuseks“). 
Uskumuse omistamise korral on võimalik omistajal sellega nõustuda või mitte 
ning soovi omistamine annab võimaluse seda soovi kas heaks kiita või halvaks 
200 
panna. See tähendab, et soovide ja uskumuste omistamine ei seleta ega ennusta 
kõigest isikute tegusid ja teisi vaimuseisundeid, vaid annab omistajale ka või-
maluse omistatud hoiakutele vastata ja nende tõesust (uskumused) või sobivust 
(soovid) hinnata. 
Nende esmaste reaktsioonide peale ehituvad edasised võimalikud käigud 
sotsiaalses interaktsioonis. Nende käikude analüüs on kolmanda peatüki 
ülesandeks. Ma keskendun seal ainult mõningatele näidetele, püüdmata ammen-
davalt kirjeldada kõiki võimalusi, mis esmastest reaktsioonidest tulenevad. 
Eesmärk on näidata, et rahvapsühholoogiast tulenev mõjutatavus on süstemaati-
liselt artikuleeritav ning selle alguspunktiks on vahetud reaktsioonid omistatud 
uskumustele ja soovidele. Vaatluse all on kolmandas peatükis ennekõike need 
edasised käigud, mis sõltuvad hoiaku omistaja ja selle, kellele omistatakse, 
sotsiaalsest vahekorrast, ning olukorrad, kus omistaja ei nõustu teise usku-
musega või ei kiida heaks teise soovi. Juhul kui esimene ei nõustu teise 
hoiakuga, teine on aga esimesest sotsiaalselt mõjuvõimsamal positsioonil, siis 
on ta kallutatud esimese hoiakut üle võtma. Kuna aga hoiaku ülevõtmine on 
tingitud ebavõrdsest vahekorrast, siis saadab seda loomuliku emotsionaalse 
reaktsioonina vimm teise suhtes. Kui aga omistaja pole teise suhtes, kelle 
hoiakuga ta ei nõustu, nõrgemal positsioonil, on suurem võimalus, et ta püüab 
teise hoiakut kas manipulatsiooni või vaidluse kaudu muuta. Omistatud hoiak, 
millega omistaja ei nõustu, mõjub kõigil neil juhtudel väljakutsena omistaja 
subjektiivsele perspektiivile, samas kui kooskõlaline hoiak kinnitab seda, ning 
omistaja edasised reaktsioonid sõltuvad tema ja teise isiku vahekorrast. 
Kui teine ja kolmas peatükk tegelevad rahvapsühholoogia kasulike taga-
järgede kirjeldamisega, siis neljandas peatükis pöördun väitekirja teise eesmärgi 
poole. Taotluseks on sõnastada uskumuste ja soovide sellised omistustingi-
mused, mis seletaksid kõige optimaalsemalt, kuidas mainitud rahvapsühholoo-
giale olemuslikud reaktsioonid (nõustumine või mittenõustumine, heakskiit või 
halvakspanu) võimalikud on. Rahuldav omistustingimuste kirjeldus peaks lisaks 
neile reaktsioonidele seletama ka omistuste seletavat, ennustavat ja ette-
kirjutavat rolli. Väidan, et hoiakute omistustingimuste konstrueerimiseks tasub 
alustada tõsiasjast, et uskumustele ja soovidele olemuslikud reaktsioonid 
peegeldavad neid reaktsioone, mis on kohased ka väidetele ja käsklustele. 
Käsku määratlen ma antud juhul natuke laiemalt, kui seda tavakasutuses mõis-
tetakse, nimelt kõneaktina, mis hindab mingit võimalikku asjadeseisu täide-
viimisväärsena. Nii uskumuste kui ka väidete puhul on kohaseks reaktsiooniks 
nendega kas nõustuda või mitte ning nii soove kui ka käske on võimalik heaks 
kiita või halvaks panna. Seetõttu tasub hoiakute omistustingimusi mõista viitega 
vastavatele kõneaktidele. Olemasolevatest autoritest leiab selle võimaluse vaid 
Christopher Gaukerilt. Tema vaimuseisundite kommunikatiivse kontseptsiooni 
kohaselt on uskumuse omistamine kellelegi sama mis väitmine selle isiku eest. 
Soovi omistamine on aga samastatav kellegi eest käsu andmisega. Kuna Gau-
keri teooria seletab ainsana rahuldavalt uskumuste ja soovide suhtes kohaseid 
reaktsioone, siis kaitsen seda kui omistustingimuste esialgset kirjeldust, mis 
annab meile hoiakuomistuse tarvilikud tingimused.  
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Viies peatükk võtab aga kriitilise hoiaku kommunikatiivse kontseptsiooni 
suhtes. Argumenteerin seal, et Gaukeri teooria seisab ühe tõsise probleemi ees. 
Kuigi ta annab meile esialgse omistustingimuste kirjelduse, ei suuda ta rahul-
davalt seletada, miks üldse uskumuse ja soovi mõisteid meile vaja on. Teise eest 
tehtavate väidete ja käskluste kasutus keeles paistab juba neidsamu tulemusi 
andvat, mis uskumustelt ja soovidelt eeldatud on. Kommunikatiivne kontsept-
sioon vajab seega täiendamist, et oleks seletatud, miks teatud olukordades enam 
teise isiku eest tehtud kõneaktidest ei piisa, vaid ka miks on vaja just rääkida 
spetsiifiliselt uskumustest ja soovidest. See tähendab ühtlasi, et Gaukeri algne 
teooria ei võimalda meil mõista rahvapsühholoogia seletavat rolli. Väitekirjas 
vastan sellele väljakutsele nii, et soovide puhul seletan nende postuleerimise 
tarvilikkust olukordadega, kus küsimuse all on, kas teise isiku eest antud käsu 
täitmine sellele isikule ka subjektiivset rahuldust pakub. Rahuldust on antud 
juhul mõistetud lihtsalt positiivse valentsiga tundena mingi asjadeseisu suhtes. 
Sooviomistus ühendab endas seega käsu andmist teise eest ning oletust, et selle 
täideviimine teist rahuldab (kalduvust tunda rahuldust mingi asjadeseisu suhtes 
nimetan ma väitekirjas “hedooniliseks seadumuseks”), isegi kui teine seda 
käsklust ise kuuldavale ei too. Uskumustest rääkimise tarvilikkus ilmneb aga 
olukordades, kus on vaja midagi isiku eest väita, arvestades tema käitumist, 
kuigi ta ise seda ei ütle. Sellistes olukordades on meil võimalik kohelda isikut, 
justkui ta oleks midagi väitnud, et siis väljendada meiepoolset nõustumist või 
mittenõustumist temaga. Uskumuseomistus võimaldab meil laiendada väidetele 
kohaseid reaktsioone ka mitteverbaalsele käitumisele. Soovide ja uskumuste 
omistamine saab seega vajalikuks siis, kui omistajal on vaja teise isiku eest 
midagi väita või käskida, võttes arvesse teatavaid hedoonilisi ja käitumuslikke 
tõsiasju tolle isiku kohta, ka siis, kui too isik vastavat kõneakti ise ei soorita. 
Uskumuste ja soovide omistamine laiendab keelelist kommunikatsiooni 
eriomasel viisil, koheldes isikuid, kellele neid hoiakuid omistatakse, virtuaalsete 
vestluspartneritena, justkui nad oleksid midagi väitnud või käskinud. Käitu-
muslikke ja hedoonilisi tõsiasju arvessevõttev kommunikatiivne kontseptsioon 
annab seega meile omistustingimuste rahuldava analüüsi. 
Väitekirja kuues ja seitsmes peatükk vastavad kahele võimalikule kahtlusele 
täiendatud kommunikatiivse kontseptsiooni suhtes. Esimene neist, millele 
vastan kuuendas peatükis, puudutab vaimuseisundite ontoloogiat. Pakutud 
versioon kommunikatiivsest kontseptsioonist on esmajoones teooria selle kohta, 
mis kuulub konstitutiivselt uskumuste ja soovide omistuste juurde, ning ei 
paista omavat vahetuid järelmeid nende hoiakute endi loomuse kohta. Sellegi-
poolest saab teatava eelduse omaksvõtu korral argumenteerida, et modifit-
seeritud kommunikatiivne kontseptsioon on ontoloogiliselt kohustunud tunnis-
tama kõigest käitumuslike ja hedooniliste seadumuste olemasolu ning ei midagi 
enamat. Kuni inimestel on säärased seadumused – ning on mõistlik eeldada, et 
neil need on – on neil ka uskumused ja soovid. Omaksvõetavaks eelduseks on, 
et rahvapsühholoogia ontoloogiliste kohustuste hulka on tarvis hõlmata vaid 
neid eeldusi uskumuste ja soovide kohta, milleta nende omistamine enam oma 
tavapärast rolli mängida ei saaks. Kuna seadumuste eeldamisest piisab juba 
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selleks, et rahvapsühholoogilised omistused oma tagajärgi (mõjutatavus, sele-
tused, ennustused, ettekirjutused) omaksid, siis pole vaja rahvapsühholoogia 
ontoloogiliste kohustuste hulka rohkemat lugeda. Saab seega väita, et kuigi 
hoiakute omistustel on võrdlemisi keerukas struktuur, hõlmates teise eest tehta-
vat kõneakti, ei kohusta selle tunnistamine meid väitma midagi ontoloogiliselt 
ekstravagantset (ekstravagantne oleks näiteks seisukoht, mille kohaselt hoiaku 
olemasolu on mingil moel omistajast sõltuv). Rahvapsühholoogia on seetõttu 
võrdlemisi immunne teaduslikust psühholoogiast tulenevate empiiriliste avas-
tuste suhtes (ja vastupidi). 
Teine võimalik kahtlus tuleneb sellest, et kommunikatiivne kontseptsioon 
kohtleb hoiakute omistuse paradigmana olukordi, mil üks isik omistab teisele 
uskumusi ja soove. Rahuldav rahvapsühholoogia käsitlus peab aga rakenduma 
ka eneseleomistustele. Viimaste puhul tundub isiku suhe omistatud hoiakutesse 
olevat mingil moel vahetum kui suhe kolmanda isiku perspektiivilt. Ühtlasi 
tunduvad eneseleomistused olevat episteemiliselt privilegeeritud: isik paistab 
olevat teistest paremal positsioonil selle teadmiseks, mis hoiakud tal on. Väite-
kirja seitsmendas peatükis argumenteerin, et kommunikatiivne kontseptsioon 
suudab seletada esimest intuitsiooni. Ta ei pea aga seletama teist, kuna hoiakute 
eneseleomistused pole tegelikult episteemiliselt privilegeeritud. Eneseleomis-
tuste kogemuslikku eripära seletan seeläbi, et erinevalt omistustest teistele 
isikutele ei kujuta need väitmist või käskimist kellegi eest, vaid tegu on lihtsalt 
väite või käsklusega. Kui keegi siiralt väidab või käsib midagi, kas avalikult või 
vaikimisi, kvalifitseerub see juba vastavalt uskumuse või soovi enesele-
omistuseks. Sellest tuleneb ka intuitsioon, et isiku uskumused ja soovid on talle 
endale mingil kombel vahetumalt antud kui teistele. Erinevalt omistustest 
teistele, on eneseleomistuste eripäraks ka see, et kohased reaktsioonid nendele 
on piiratumad. Nii oma uskumusega mittenõustumine kui ka halvakspanu oma 
soovi suhtes märgivad isiku võõrandumist oma vaimuelust. Esimese ja kol-
manda isiku perspektiivi sellised erinevused ei implitseeri aga seda, et enesele-
omistused oleksid episteemiliselt privilegeeritud. Oma uskumuste ja soovide 
teadmiseks on isikul vaja teada oma käitumuslikke ja hedoonilisi seadumusi 
ning viimastele pole tal tagatud teistest paremat ligipääsu. Kui mingist privi-
leegist rääkida saab, siis seisneb see vaid võimalikus tõsiasjas, et isikul on 
üldiselt rohkem informatsiooni oma seadumuste kohta.  
 
Väitekirja järeldused motiveerivad ka edasisi uurimisküsimusi. Esiteks, kuna 
ma võtsin omaks kommunikatiivsest kontseptsioonist tuleneva arusaama, et 
teisele isikule hoiaku omistamine tähendab tema eest kõnelemist, siis sellest 
tulenevalt väärib edasist uurimist rahvapsühholoogia eetiline mõõde. Juhul kui 
omistaja ja see, kellele hoiakut omistatakse, on näiteks omavahel sotsiaalselt 
ebavõrdses suhtes, võib see mõjutada omistuse sobivust, kuna sellistes olu-
kordades ei pruugi teise eest kõnelemine olla süütute tagajärgedega. Teine 
lahtine uurimisküsimus tuleneb sellest, et sõnad “uskumus” ja “soov” võivad 
olla mitmetähenduslikud. Oma väitekirjas avasin ma ühe võimaliku tähenduse, 
aga jätsin lahtiseks võimaluse kontseptualiseerida uskumusi ja soove teistel 
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viisidel, mis samuti kasulikuks võivad osutuda. Selle tunnistamine laseb ühtlasi 
uurida kultuurilisi ja ajaloolisi erinevusi hoiakute mõistmises, millest analüü-
tilises vaimufilosoofias on võrdlemisi üle vaadatud. Kolmandaks tasub välja 
tuua rahvapsühholoogilistele omistustele kohaste reaktsioonide edasiuurimist, 
nii seda, mis puudutab nende struktuuri kui ka nende evolutsioonilist ajalugu. 
Eriti just reaktsioonide evolutsioonilise ajaloo avamine on vajalik selleks, et 
täpsemalt aru saada, kuidas meie võime hoiakuid hinnata on välja kujunenud. 
Nõnda on võimalik suhestada väitekirjas öeldut ka rahvapsühholoogia empii-
riliste käsitlustega. Neljandaks vajavad edasist uurimist pragmaatilise kontsep-
tuaalse analüüsi metodoloogilised alused, mille näol on tegemist võrdlemisi 
ebatüüpilise lähenemisega praeguses filosoofias, kuid mille potentsiaal ulatub 
kaugemale uskumuse ja soovi mõiste analüüsist. Lahtised küsimused on näiteks, 
kui peenekoeliselt tuleks eristada mõistekasutuse tagajärgi ning mis on sobivate 
mõiste omistustingimuste hindamise juures analüüsija intuitsioonide ja empii-
rilise tõendusmaterjali vahekord. Viiendaks, eneseleomistuste käsitlus jättis 
lahtiseks, et meil võib olla privilegeeritud ligipääs oma väidete ja käskluste 
sisule, mis on uskumuste ja soovide eneseleomistuste osaks. Kuna tegemist on 
kõneaktidega, mis erinevalt uskumustest ja soovidest on episoodilised, siis 
võimalus, et isikutel on neile privilegeeritud ligipääs, tundub intuitiivselt võrd-
lemisi tõenäoline. Kas sellest järeldub midagi ka uskumuste ja soovide enesele-
omistuste epistemoloogia jaoks, on lahtine küsimus. Lahtiseks jäi ka kujutlus-
võime roll eneseleomistuste epistemoloogias, mille puhul võiks eeldada, et 
oskus kujutleda oma käitumist ja emotsionaalseid reaktsioone seoses omistatava 
hoiaku sisuga võib pakkuda teatava erilise viisi oma hoiakute teadasaamiseks. 
Samas on kaheldav, et pelk kujutlemine tagaks hoiaku olemasolu ja sellest 
johtuva tugeva episteemilise privileegi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
204 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
Name:  Uku Tooming 
Date of Birth:  21.01.1986 
Contact:  Tiigi 19–11, 50410 Tartu, Estonia 
     uku.tooming@gmail.com 
 
Education: 
2010–2014   University of Tartu, PhD studies in philosophy 
       Thesis title: “The Communicative Significance of Beliefs and 
Desires”, Bruno Mölder as supervisor 
        Visiting researcher in the Radboud University Nijmegen, 
February – June, 2013 
        Visiting researcher in the University of Hertfordshire, October – 
December, 2012 
2007–2010   University of Tartu, MA degree cum laude, anthropology of 
religion 
       Thesis title: “Religion’s Folk Psychological Context”,  
Jaan Kivistik as supervisor 
       Exchange student in the University of Helsinki, Faculty of 
Theology, 2008/2009 
2004–2007   University of Tartu, Bachelor’s Degree cum laude, philosophy 
        Thesis title: “Explanation and Prediction in Folk Psychology”, 
Bruno Mölder as supervisor 
 
Research Interests: 
Folk psychology, intentionality, self-knowledge, desires, anthropology of 
religion. 
 
Courses Taught: 
2013      Enesekohane teadmine, University of Tartu 
2011     Sissejuhatus vaimufilosoofiasse (taught together with Taavi 
Laanpere), University of Tartu 
 
Publications: 
Forthcoming  “Pleasures of the Communicative Conception”. Grazer Philo-
sophische Studien. 
       “Without pretense: a critique of Goldman’s model of simu-
lation”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 
2013      “Review of Julia Tanney’s “Rules, Reason, and Self-know-
ledge”. Philosophical Inquiries, 1, pp. 1–5.  
2012     “Enesetõlgendus ja soovid”. [Self-interpretation and desires.] 
Akadeemia 3, pp. 1099 – 1127. 
       “Religion’s folk psychological context”. In: Jackelén, Antje; 
Smedes, Taede; Fuller, Michael; Evers, Dirk (Eds.) Studies in 
205 
Science and Theology, No. 13: European Society For the Study 
of Science and Theology Conference, University of Edinburgh, 
07.04–10.04, 2010.  
2011     “Intuitsioonidest eksperimentaalses filosoofias” [About intui-
tions in experimental philosophy]. In: Mölder, Bruno; Kan-
gilaski, Jaan (Eds.). Filosoofia ja analüüs: analüütilise filosoo-
fia seminar 20. Tartu: EYS Veljesto Kirjastus 
2010     “Kuidas saab jumal tahta, teha ja tunda?” [How can God want, 
do or feel anything?] Akadeemia 6, pp. 447–472. 
 
Presentations: 
2013     “Läbipaistvuse läbikukkumine” [Failure of Transparency], IX 
Annual Estonian Philosophy Conference, December 14. 
       “Second-personal attributions of mental states”, The Second-
Person Perspective in Science and Humanities, Oxford, July 19. 
       “What to do with beliefs and desires”, Mind & Action Seminar, 
Radboud University Nijmegen, March 15. 
2012     “The communicative role of folk psychology”, Postgrad 
Seminar, University of Hertfordshire, November 26. 
       “When do we need to talk about desires” [Poster], GAP.8, 
Konstanz, September 17–20. 
       “First-person mindshaping” [Poster], Social Cognition, 
Engagement, and the Second-Person-Perspective, Cologne, 
May 25–27. 
2011     “The role of enactive imagination in Goldman’s simulation 
theory” [Poster], Understanding Other Minds – Embodied 
Interaction and Higher-Order Reasoning, Bochum, September 
20. 
       “About the function of folk psychology”, Seventh European 
Congress of Analytic Philosophy, September 1–6,  
2010     “Religion’s folk psychological context”, European Conference 
on Science and Theology, Edinburgh, April 7–11. 
 
Awards: 
2013     Akadeemia Silver Award for the article “Enesetõlgendus ja 
soovid”. [Self-interpretation and desires.] Akadeemia 3,  
pp. 1099–1127.    
2011     Akadeemia Silver Award for the article “Kuidas saab jumal 
tahta, teha ja tunda? ” [How can God want, do or feel 
anything?] Akadeemia 6, pp. 447– 472. 
 
 
 
 
206 
ELULOOKIRJELDUS 
 
Nimi:     Uku Tooming 
Sünniaeg:   21.01.1986 
Kontakt:  Tiigi 19–11, 50410 Tartu, Eesti 
         uku.tooming@gmail.com 
 
Hariduskäik: 
2010–2014   Tartu Ülikool, doktoriõpingud filosoofias 
        “The Communicative Significance of Beliefs and Desires”, 
juhendaja Bruno Mölder  
        Külalisuurija Nijmegeni Radboud Ülikoolis, veebruar–juuni, 
2013 
       Külalisuurija Hertfordshire’i Ülikoolis, oktoober–detsember, 
2012 
2007–2010   Tartu Ülikool, MA religiooniantropoloogias (cum laude) 
       Magistritöö: “Religion’s Folk Psychological Context”, 
juhendaja Jaan Kivistik 
       Erasmuse vahetusüliõpilane Helsingi Ülikoolis, usuteaduskond, 
2008/2009 õppeaastal. 
2004–2007   Tartu Ülikool, BA filosoofias (cum laude) 
        Thesis title: “Explanation and Prediction in Folk Psychology”, 
juhendaja Bruno Mölder 
 
Peamised uurimisvaldkonnad: 
Rahvapsühholoogia, intentsionaalsus, enesekohane teadmine, soovid, 
religiooniantropoloogia.  
 
Õpetatud kursusi: 
2013      Enesekohane teadmine, Tartu Ülikool 
2011      Sissejuhatus vaimufilosoofiasse (õpetatud kahasse Taavi Laan-
perega), Tartu Ülikool 
 
Publikatsioonid: 
Ilmumas    “Pleasures of the Communicative Conception”. Grazer 
Philosophische Studien. 
       “Without pretense: a critique of Goldman’s model of 
simulation”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 
2013     “Review of Julia Tanney’s “Rules, Reason, and Self-
knowledge.” Philosophical Inquiries, 1, 1–5.  
2012     “Enesetõlgendus ja soovid”. Akadeemia, 3, 1099–1127. 
       “Religion’s folk psychological context”. Kogumikus: Jackelén, 
Antje; Smedes, Taede; Fuller, Michael; Evers, Dirk (Eds.) 
Studies in Science and Theology, No. 13: European Society For 
207 
the Study of Science and Theology Conference, University of 
Edinburgh, 07.04–10.04, 2010.  
2011     “Intuitsioonidest eksperimentaalses filosoofias”. Kogumikus: 
Mölder, Bruno; Kangilaski, Jaan (Eds.). Filosoofia ja analüüs: 
analüütilise filosoofia seminar 20, 259–278. Tartu: EYS 
Veljesto Kirjastus. 
2010     “Kuidas saab jumal tahta, teha ja tunda?” Akadeemia 6, 447–
472. 
 
Ettekanded: 
2013     “Läbipaistvuse läbikukkumine”, IX Eesti Filosoofia Aasta-
konverents, 14. detsember.  
       “Second-personal attributions of mental states”, The Second-
Person Perspective in Science and Humanities, Oxford, 19. 
juuli. 
       “What to do with beliefs and desires”, Mind & Action Seminar, 
Radboud University Nijmegen, 15. märts. 
2012     “The communicative role of folk psychology”, Postgrad 
Seminar, University of Hertfordshire, 26. november. 
       “When do we need to talk about desires” [Poster], GAP.8, 
Konstanz, 17.–20. september. 
       “First-person mindshaping” [Poster], Social Cognition, 
Engagement, and the Second-Person-Perspective, Cologne, 25.–
27. mai. 
2011     “The role of enactive imagination in Goldman’s simulation 
theory” [Poster], Understanding Other Minds – Embodied 
Interaction and Higher-Order Reasoning, Bochum, 20. 
september. 
       “About the function of folk psychology”, Seventh European 
Congress of Analytic Philosophy, 1.–6. september.  
2010     “Religion’s folk psychological context”, European Conference 
on Science and Theology, Edinburgh, 7.–11. aprill. 
 
Tunnustused: 
2013     Akadeemia Hõbeauhind artikli “Enesetõlgendus ja soovid” eest.   
2011     Akadeemia Hõbeauhind artikli “Kuidas saab jumal tahta, teha ja 
tunda?” eest. 
DISSERTATIONES PHILOSOPHICAE 
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
 
1.  Jüri Eintalu. The problem of induction: the presuppositions revisited. 
Tartu, 2001. 
2.   Roomet Jakapi. Berkeley, mysteries, and meaning: a critique of the non-
cognitivist interpretation. Tartu, 2002. 
3.  Endla Lõhkivi. The sociology of scientific knowledge: a philosophical 
perspective. Tartu, 2002. 
4.   Kadri Simm. Benefit-sharing: an inquiry into justification. Tartu, 2005. 
5.  Marek Volt. The epistemic and logical role of definition in the evaluation 
of art. Tartu, 2007.  
6.   Aive Pevkur. Professional ethics: philosophy and practice. Tartu, 2011. 
7. Toomas Lott. Plato on Belief (doxa) Theaetetus 184B–187A. Tartu, 2012, 
208 p. 
8. Jaanus Sooväli. Decision as Heresy. Tartu, 2013, 153 p. 
9.  Ave Mets. Normativity of scientific laws. Tartu, 2013, 217 p. 
10. Vivian Bohl. How do we understand others? Beyond theories of mind-
reading and interactionism. Tartu, 2014, 184 p. 
